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This doctoral thesis investigates the evolution of trust in investment bank(er)-client relationship 
in mergers and acquisitions by focusing on deals over EUR 1 billion. As sub-areas of research in-
terest, this work explores the reasons responsible for the decline of trust in the research context, 
and also enquires if trust can be regained.
The author’s findings indicate that the investment bank(er)-client relationship cannot exist wi-
thout trust. The bank(er)-client relationship begins with Performance trust in the introductory 
phase, evolves to a stronger Experiential Performance trust in the second phase, and reaches at 
its zenith in the third phase i.e. the last phase of trust evolution. The third phase is quintessenti-
ally marked by a situation in which a client is left with the choice of choosing either the invest-
ment banker or the bank. The former concludes the evolution of trust in form of Superior Inter-
personal trust, while the latter marks the end of the phenomenon with Superior Company trust. 
Scams, dishonesty and irresponsible behaviour, lack of transparency predictability and perfor-
mance, can result in termination of trust. The authors’ findings suggest that regaining trust is 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
“The best way to find out if you can trust somebody is to trust them.” 
                                                                                                      - Ernest Hemingway 
Trust plays a significant role in the business world by facilitating business 
relationships (Plank et al. 1999; Henneberg et al. 2007). The growing interest in 
building trust between the organisations originates from the belief that trust enhances 
the performance of a business (Sako & Helper 1998), as it plays an important role in 
the relationship with the clients (Smitka 1991). The clients regard trustworthiness as 
one of the most important characteristics of the business actors (Hawes et al. 1989), 
which eventually leads to higher turnovers (Hayes & Hartley 1989).   
Oxford dictionary (2012) has defined trust as “firm belief in the reliability, truth, or 
ability of someone or something”. The concept of trust can be abstract in nature and 
the definition varies in different fields of study (Furlong 1986). The works of scholars 
like Rousseau et al.(1998) and Suchanek (2016) suggest that it is a psychological state 
of mind which comprises of the intention to accept the vulnerability based on positive 
expectations Singh & Sirdeshmukh (2000) examined this idea and elaborated on the 
two parts of it. Firstly, they related trust to the “positive expectations about the 
intentions and behaviors of the exchange partner” (p.154). Secondly, their work relates 
trust with an entity’s intention to “rely on exchange partner accepting the contextual 
vulnerability” i.e. they referred to the “behavioural conceptualization of trust” and 
identified trust as the “crucial variable” in relationships with conflicts of 
interests.(p.154) 
Investment Banking (IB) is one of the industries where examples of conflicts of 
interest are found in abundance. Moreover, this industry is no stranger to 
controversies, as it has been hit by big global scams like LIBOR manipulation scam, 
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rogue trader scam, spying scandal. Scholars (e.g. Armstrong 2012; Hurley et al. 2014) 
have identified the ‘issue’ with trust in the financial industry (especially after the 
financial downturn). However, the author of this thesis found very few works focusing 
on the study the phenomenon of trust in the context of IB. Therefore, this doctoral 
thesis chooses this ‘controversial’ branch of industry which has been suffering from a 
significant lack of trust, since the post-recession phase (as suggested by Armstrong 
2012; Hurley et al. 2014 a.o.). 
The bank(er)-client relationship is one of the most important aspects of IB business, 
because the clients are responsible for generating revenue. However, this relationship 
is complicated as clashes of interests are accompanied by a ‘high’ degree of risk on the 
clients’ side. Under the umbrella of IB, the bank performs various activities (e.g. 
Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A), Sales and Trading, Foreign Exchange and Precious 
Metals, Equities etc.) Usually, the IBs provide advisory services to their clients and 
charge a commission in return for their services. However, their advice and services 
can have far-reaching consequences for their clients. Even though the IBs charge a 
‘substantial’ amount of commission for their services, they do not share any 
responsibilities for the results. This is a typical case in M&A. Therefore, Günter et al. 
(2011) have related the importance of trust with the degree of risk associated with this 
business. According to these authors, trust is tested by the degree of risk involved. Due 
to the ‘high risk’ on the client’s side, the role of trust is more important in this 
particular relationship.  
The IBs provide M&A services to their clients (e.g. corporates, governments etc.). But, 
they do not share any responsibility if the results of the merger or the acquisition or 
both fail to live up to the expectations, even though it is sometimes the bankers’ 
responsibility to make sure that the deal is successful (as suggested by Fleuriet 2008). 
This phenomenon is particularly interesting while taking into consideration the 
potential risk as well as the trust issues with the bank (as pointed out by Armstrong 
2012, Hurley et al. 2014).  
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Therefore, among the other investment bank(er)-client relationships, the author of this 
doctoral thesis focuses only on the relationship between M&A bank(er)s and their 
clients. The author finds it surprising that the authors of related literature recognize the 
importance of trust in business and economics, but they have been relatively less 
proactive in studying the evolution of trust which has practical implications in the least 
trusted industries like the banking industry (as indicated in the works of Armstrong 
2012 and Hurley at al. 2014).  
This doctoral thesis attempts to contribute to academia, as well as the industry, by 
studying the evolution of trust from an M&A perspective, in an investment bank(er)-
client relationship.  
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter II focuses on the background and the 
motivations of the research, through a brief overview of the existing literature and 
provides arguments to support the value addition of this doctoral thesis to the existing 
body of knowledge. Based on the background and the motivation, this chapter also 
states the problem from a pragmatic viewpoint, as well as situational analysis, and 
frames the research questions.  
In an attempt to build the theoretical platform to conduct the research, Chapter III 
surveys to the relevant literature on trust and attempts to look at the research topic 
through the lens of theories, which the author finds relevant to the research context.  
In Chapter IV, the pertinent aspects of methodological standpoint, along with the 
rationale behind the choice of the methodological approach, have been discussed.  
Concepts of sampling, the data collection, as well as their respective validity and 
credibility are also covered in this chapter.  
Chapter V elaborates on the technicalities of the analysis part and discusses the 
concepts of data saturation. Based on this chapter, the results are presented in Chapter 
VI. Chapter VII investigates the results through the lens of the theoretical discourse 
covered in Chapter III. The thesis is concluded in Chapter VIII with the illustrations of 
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the limitations of this research, along with some aspects which the author finds 














Chapter II: The background and motivation 
 
2.1 Trust in investment banks: An overview of the present scenario 
  
“The money changers have fled from their high seats in the temple of our civilization. 
We may now restore that temple to the ancient truths. The measure of the restoration 
lies in the extent to which we apply social values nobler than mere monetary profit.” 
                                                                                      -Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933) 
Trust is a belief of a party that the counterparty will deter from taking advantage in a 
transaction when he is not monitored (Armstrong 2012). Trust forms the fundamental 
cornerstone of cooperation in the business, which enhances the performance of the 
business by enriching the business networks and by playing a pivotal role in the 
business relationships (Brusco 1986, Dwyer et al.1987, Henneberg et al. 2007) 
especially in banking industry (Hurley et al. 2014; Armstrong 2012). 
“Trust is especially critical in financial services” (p. 349) as these types of services are 
“highly intangible” (Hurley et al. 2014). Thus, it is comparatively difficult to 
understand trust in financial services sector because this sector often involves 
asymmetric information (Farber & Bazerman 1987) with high perceived risk and high 
reliance (Harrison 2003). According to Hurley et al. (2014), trust in banking is often 
challenged and is “at an all-time low” (p. 349). The following figures depict the 




Figure 1: Trust in banks (1979 – 2013) 






Figure 2: A comparison of trust in banks in different countries 





Figure 3: A comparison of trust in different industries 
(Source: Edelman 2013) 
 
Figure 2: A comparison of trust in banks depicts a sharp decline in trust in half of a 
decade and indicates that between 2008- 2013 the banking sectors in all the countries 
(apart from China) have experienced a dramatic fall (35% - 32%) in trust. Edelman 
Trust Barometer's findings (Figure 3: A comparison of trust in different industries) 
reveals that the banking and financial sectors were the least trusted industries (in 
2013).  
Hurley et al. (2014 p. 349) summarise the results as follows: 
 “trust in banks has declined significantly over time; 
 trust in banks showed major declines after the global financial crisis, and this is 
true on a global basis with the exception of China where the data have been 
questioned 
 banking is one of the least-trusted industries 
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 credit unions, regional and community banks have shown generally higher trust 
and loyalty than larger banks”. 
“Financial intermediaries have long understood the importance of trust for growing 
their business” (p. R4) as handing over the money on a promise to return over agreed 
terms in the future is one of the fundamentals aspects of banking (Armstrong 2012). 
To ensure that the promises are kept and the expectations are met, scholars (e.g. 
Barnett 1986; Barney 1986; Alvarez et al. 2003) advocate the necessity of a safeguard 
–contacts. The safeguard of a contract (Barney 1986) was put forward based on the 
assumption that individuals cannot be trusted to keep their promises. Contrary to 
scholars (e.g. Williamson 1975, 1985, Furlong 1986 a.o.) who opined that human 
beings lack the capabilities required to write perfect contracts, Armstrong (2012) 
argues that “it may be possible to conceive of writing a ‘complete’ contract covering 
every possible outcome, in an uncertain world this sort of superrationality is almost 
always too costly”
1
, and  therefore trust should be counted upon (p. R4). 
Globalized markets with increased transaction volume along with the volatility and the 
introduction of complex products have made the role of financial institutions 
increasingly important and risk-prone (Fleuriet 2008).  It is this “risk-prone” nature 
which makes trust so important in the financial industry because, without risk, trust 
has a minimum or no role to play (Günter et al. 2011). 
After the global financial crisis and a series of controversies in the financial industry, 
substantial amounts of clients’ money were missing, and transactions aiming to exploit 
the “less informed” clients were revealed (Armstrong 2012). This ‘reveal’ has 
highlighted the risk bourn by the clients, and hence, the importance of trust has 
increased. The financial downturn and some of the biggest controversies in the 
                                                          
1
 It is worth noting that although Armstrong is countering Williamson’s assumption, his rationale for 
advocating the importance of trust is different – the rationality of transaction cost. Reflection on the 
works of other scholars whose approach on trust has been different (e.g. Suchanek 2016 approaches 
trust as a prosthetic to the negative side effects of “freedom”), suggests a coherent view on the 
importance of trust in business and economics, but with different rationales.  
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banking history (e.g. UBS rogue trader scam
2





, Barclays LIBOR manipulation scam
5
 a.o.) have put a note of 
interrogation on the trustworthiness of investment bank(er)s in the recent years, and 
“the public’s trust in banks has fallen sharply” (Armstrong 2012 p. R4). It is not that 
only the trading and the capital markets have been the only victims of the 
controversies. The M&A business in the recent years also witnessed the controversy of 
Morgan Stanley and the state of Baden Württemberg which is one of the biggest 
controversies in the history of M&A
6
.  
The investment banks (IBs) were fast to comprehend that “trust is a necessary element 
of an efficient financial system, and therefore full economic recovery” (Armstrong 
2012 p.R5). Responding to this realisation, some IBs (e.g. UBS
7
) have become prone 
to the ‘risk-free’ strategy in the recent years (2012, 2013). This trend has been spotted 
after bankruptcy and the rogue trader scam (September 2011). UBS has been 
addressing this issue for a while now, to regain the trust of their clients. The same 
strategy has been followed by some other IBs (e.g. Morgan Stanley) too.  
                                                          
2
 In 2011, the Swiss IB UBS recorded a loss of over USD2 billion due to the unauthorized trading 
carried out by the Director of Global Synthetic Equities Trading team in London – Kweku Adoboli. 
The controversy led to the resignation of the CEO Oswald Grübel.  
3
 In 2009 an investigation revealed that Deutsche Bank spied on some of its management and 
supervisory board members and shareholders. The report was prepared by a legal firm named Cleary 
Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton. 
4
 In 2008, Societe Generale which is one of the largest banks in Europe got into trouble when a ‘rogue’ 
employee was caught executing a series of “elaborate and fictitious” transactions. The bank lost USD7 
billion which is the highest loss recorded in the history of financial industry. 
5
 In 2012 Barclays bank was fined GBP59.5.million by the Financial Services Authority, USD160 
million by the Justice department of US and USD200 million by Commodities Future Trading 
Commission for the attempt to manipulate LIBOR and EURIBOR rates. Three high profile bankers 
were convicted of the crime, and received prison sentences. 
6
 Dirk Notheis, the head of Morgan Stanley investment banking in Germany was accused of ‘breach of 
trust’ and indulging in unethical practices. The bank was accused of conflict of interest (i.e. working 
on both the buy and sell side of the deal), passing information illegally, not attempting to negotiate the 
price and unethically trying to put pressure of the government to complete the deal, within a certain of 
time. Morgan Stanley was sued and Notheis was fired. 
7
 The “world’s largest wealth manager” focused on a “risk reduction strategy” to strengthen the 
clients’ trust (as on UBS Group AG annual report 2012, 2013). The “risk reduction strategy” has been 
highlighted during the annual general meetings and the Group Executive Board meetings, in spite of 
the existence of the Basel III regulations”. 
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However, to understand the investment banker-client relationship it is important to 
understand the functions of the IBs, as well as the M&A side of the business. It is then 
that, the importance of trust in this business can be comprehended. To explicate the 
motivation for trust research, the following subsection provides a general overview of 




2.2 The M&A business, investment banker-client relationship, and trust 
 
M&A can be defined as process of consolidation of companies (Eccles & Crane 1988; 
Fleuriet 2008). Fleuriet (2008) suggests that in M&A, majority of the firms grow their 
businesses in the following three ways –  
 Bolt-on acquisitions 
 Alliances 
 Strategic acquisitions 
Bolt-on acquisitions are the ones “within the realm of a company’s existing 
operations” (p. 221) where the IB’s “local knowledge” is of particular importance. 
Alliances are the associations of more than one company for mutual benefits like cost 
reduction, market expansion etc. Strategic acquisition is the process by which a 
company acquires another company in order to capitalise on its strengths and 
weaknesses. “Alliances, joint ventures, and acquisitions of another business can 
provide access to a new set of clients or penetrate a new geography more effectively” 
(p. 221) whereas, the larger strategic mergers might help in the consolidation of the 
business. M&A transactions include two entities - an acquirer firm and a firm targeted 
for a takeover i.e. a target firm. The acquirers’ objective is to gain control over the 
target company’s assets so that synergies can be generated between the assets of the 
target and their own assets. These transactions are called mergers. But, the term 
                                                          
8
 Please refer to Appendix 1 for a basic overview of investment banking 
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acquisition can also be used in the context of a financial transaction, a buyout, when 
the businesses do not consolidate. (Fleuriet 2008) 
The works of  Eccles & Crane (1988) and Fleuriet (2008) suggest four basic 
procedures of acquiring
9
 the assets of another firm. 
 Acquire the assets of the firm which has been targeted. 
 Acquire the shares of the target to gain control over its assets. However, the 
shareholders of the target need to agree to sell their shares. 
 A merger which results in turning the target company to a part of the acquirer 
company. The authorization from the following groups of shareholders are 
required for this:  
o The shareholders of the target company need to approve the extinction 
o Mergers usually result in the issuance of additional shares at the time of 
the combination. Therefore, shareholders of the acquirer company are 
also required to give the authorization.  
 Consolidating two companies: Consolidation is the phenomenon in which both 
companies dissolve to form a new company (like merger). It is the 
combination of two companies followed by the formation of a new company 
with shares being issued. 
According to Eccles & Crane (1988), sometimes the clients (companies) do business 
with more than one IB. These clients follow either a dominant bank model
10
 or a core 
                                                          
9
 Additional note: Acquiring can be either friendly or hostile in nature. The bidding can be termed as 
hostile if the targeted firm’s board resists the attempt of takeover, and in spite of that the bidder 
continues to pursue the deal. Therefore, the next step for a banker is to decide whether to approach a 
target as a friend or as a foe (Please refer to the Union Carbide takeover attempt case in the works of 
Eccles & Crane (1988) for details. These issues are significant when it comes to identifying a client. 
For details, please refer to Fleuriet (2008). 
10
 This model helps the client to have a strong relationship with one bank and have access to the 





. Eccles & Crane (1988) argue that there are economic justifications for 
the active M&A clients to choose the core group model.  
Since the IBs can work on the buyer’s side or the seller’s side
12
, the bankers can 
approach the client for the deal or a client interested in buying or selling a company 
may approach the IBs (Eccles & Crane 1988; Fleuriet 2008).  
The buyer client might or might not have a specific target company. If the client 
already has a target company, then the job of the IB is to facilitate the deal. If the client 
does not have a target company, then the IB focuses on finding a suitable company. 
Thus, the IBs act as intermediaries or matchmakers between the buyers and the sellers.  
Eccles & Crane (1988) points out that, ties between clients and IBs is an important part 
of the structure of the industry. Based on their offerings and their client base, every IB 
has its own position in the industry. They are also interconnected, as they share clients, 
work on deals together by representing their clients, and negotiate with the other IBs in 
M&A deals.   
An IB working on the buyer's side focuses on the strategic settings of the buyer, and 
the target company to identify the strategic motives of the deal i.e. “how a deal might 
fit in with the company’s strategy” (p. 228). Fleuriet (2008) argues that based on this 
fit, a banker should focus on the following: 
1) The client’s M&A strategy 
2) If the specific target enhances the strategic objectives of the client  
3) Their client’s need(s) from the potential partner 
4) The target’s need(s) from their client 
5) The synergies between their client and the target 
6) The risks associated with the merger/acquisition  
                                                          
11
 In this model, the client has roughly the same relationships with a few IBs but they use the other 
banks/boutiques as well. 
12
 For details refer to works of Eccles & Crane (1988) and Fleuriet (2008) 
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The bankers should consider approaching the potential client only when they are 
convinced that the deal is appropriate for the client. The first step is to find the ‘best’ 
contact point i.e. the shareholders or the top management or the team dealing with 
corporate development or the operational executives at a subsidiary. However, the 
client might also approach the bank due to its existing relationship or as a strategic 
move to develop a relationship for being selected for an M&A transaction (Eccles & 
Crane 1988; Fleuriet 2008), as seen in the DaimlerChrysler case
13
.  
According to the findings of Titman & Trueman (1986) high valued firms often prefer 
to choose the high-value IBs. On occasions, big corporate clients might ask for a 
‘beauty parade’ for the mandate i.e. multiple IBs present their “pitches” to the client. 
The client chooses the IB whose offer they find more suitable to his needs.  
There are two facets of M&A – “pull and “push”
14
. The “push” on the buy side refers 
to a situation where the IB approaches a prospective client with a suggestion of taking 
over a company. This client might be an existing client or might be a new client. 
However, pushing an idea is relatively easier if a relationship of trust exists between 
the banker and the client (Fleuriet 2008). 
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 Please refer to Appendix 3 
14
 Push requires a specific angle and offers strategic getaway for the shareholders in the buy and sell 
side respectively, whereas, pull involves valuation and deal structuring in the buy side and strategic 
review auction and dual track on the sales side.  
In the case of a “pull” on the buy side, a client approaches an IB seeking their advice on if they should 
go for an M&A or seeking help on an acquisition (as in the IDEC and Biogen example stated in 
 
Appendix 2– IDEC and Biogen approached Merrill Lynch and Goldman Sachs respectively). 
The “push” quadrant on the sell side refers to approaching a prospective client suggesting to sell his 
company (full or a part of it). This strategy mainly applies to selling a subsidiary as it can be difficult 
to approach a company’s management with the suggestion of selling the whole company. Usually, the 
bank approaches the shareholders of a company which is supposed to be sold. However, it is possible 
that the bank might end up not getting an acquirer later on. Therefore, an ‘ideal’ strategy, in this case, 
might be approaching the firm knowing that a party is looking for a target i.e. approaching a potential 
target and with the proposal of helping them in case they are approached by a potential acquirer The 
“pull” quadrant on the sell side is applicable for potential sale, joined-ventures, mergers, and 
acquisitions. The client comes to the IBs seeking advice on whether it should look for a (strategic) 
potential partner. The IB, in this case, might give a proposition of organizing an auction sale or a dual 
track arrangement i.e. to selling a company to another firm or financial investor (Fleuriet 2008). For 
further details, please refer to Eccles & Crane (1988). 
14 
 
Reflection on the above-mentioned facts
15
 and the DaimlerChrysler and IDEC-Biogen 
cases (Appendix 1 and Appendix 2), and the fates of the companies after the merger or 
acquisition (as seen in the DaimlerChrysler case), it can be said that the clients’ degree 
of risk and vulnerability in M&A deals, is relatively high on the clients’ side especially 
when confidential documents are exchanged
16
 and the bankers and clients work 
together for a significant period of time
17
.  
McLaughlin (1990) investigated aspects of conflicts of interests in a banker-client 
relationship. In this sample, it was observed that in 95% of the cases the fees of the IB 
increased when the deal was successful (i.e. the service was availed by the client and 
the transaction was carried out). This raises the issue of “target”
 18
. Since the IB is 
focused on its revenue, and, the banker has his own “target” to meet, trust emerges as a 
significant aspect of the banker-client relationship. The degree of ‘risk’ involved in the 
whole process brings the issue of trust in an M&A banker-client relationship because 
risk and vulnerability are always central to trust (as suggested by Günter et al. 2011, 
Suchanek 2016). Thus, trust plays the role of a “fundamental cornerstone” (Henneberg 
et al. 2007) in investment banker-client relationship. 
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 For further details on M&A cases refer to the works of Eccles & Crane (1988) 
16
 In spite of the fact that, a non-disclosure agreement (contract) is necessary for the process to 
commence 
17
 Refer to Figure 4: A general view of a standard M&A timeline and Appendix 2 for details. 
Understanding the timetable is important because it indicates how closely the M&A bank(er)s work 
with their clients. As shown in the figure, the bank(er)s are appointed at the initial stage of the 
commencement of the deals. Their role ends with the execution of the deal. During this phase (approx. 
6-7 months), the bank(er)s work closely with the clients. 
18
 The big IBs hire senior investment bankers with big compensation packages. Usually, the salary 
thresholds of the big IBs are in accordance with each other. They usually do not exceed the salary 
threshold.  In order to acquire the best bankers in the business, the IBs add “targets” to the 
compensation package. Targets are the goals the banker needs to reach in order to get a certain amount 
of money by the end of the year. Senior bankers are hired with the objective of increasing the revenue. 
In the research context, it can only be done by executing the M&A deals successfully. 
Additional notes: In some countries, the Corporate Governance Codes (e.g. German Corporate 
Governance Code) suggest that compensations should be capped. Please refer to German Corporate 




Figure 4: A general view of a standard M&A timeline 
Source: Self-illustration based on IDEC & Biogen case cited in  
and adaptations from the works of Eccles & Crane (1988) 
 
Fleuriet's (2008) generic view on the “relationship of trust” involves multiple facets
19
 
of trust - interpersonal trust i.e. trust on the banker (as suggested by Titman & 
Trueman 1986), product trust i.e. trust on the product they are selling and company 
trust i.e. on the bank (as suggested by Carter & Manaster 1990; Johnson & Miller 
1988, Plank et al. 1999). Apart from these facets, the association of performance trust 
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 These facets of the relationship will be covered in detail in the literature review. 
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[i.e. the client’s trust that the bank(er) would deliver (as suggested by Perrone et al. 
1998)] and the client's trust on the goodwill of the bank (as suggested by Bowers & 
Miller 1990; Hunter & Walker 1990; McLaughlin 1992, 1990) makes the process of 
studying trust in banker-client relationship interesting as well as challenging. Another 
interesting aspect of the M&A deals is that the bankers deal with both B2B and B2C 
clients. The B2B clients are mainly the big corporates, governments etc. who approach 
the IB for advice. These big clients may or may not be the permanent clients of the 
banks. The B2C clients are individual clients who approach the IB seeking their 
advice. This indicates that different constructs of trust in both B2B and B2C 
relationships play a vital role in the banker-client relationship. This relationship is thus 
a more complicated and interesting scenario than it seems superficially, and it 
demands industry as well as relationship specific research. 
 “For the past three decades, a growing body of research has addressed the variables 
that affect the success of M&A. Despite this large body of research, however, the key 
factors for M&A success and the reasons why so many M&A fail remain poorly 
understood” (Günter et al. 2011 p. 575). This is implied in the landmark example of 
DaimlerChrysler deal (Appendix 3). Theoretically, this merger seemed to be a perfect 
fit
20
. However, the outcome
21
 of the deal was not as expected by the two companies.  
The role of investment bankers in M&A has been scrutinised before by different 
scholars (e.g. Smith 1977; Carter & Manaster 1990; Hunter & Walker 1990; 
McLaughlin 1990, 1992). Scholars like Bowers & Miller (1990) and Hunter & Walker 
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 To become a global company, Chrysler needed the infrastructure and the management, whereas, 
Daimler-Benz wanted to add diversity their product line and enhance their distribution channels. This 
made the two companies complimentary both by the region and by their products. A cost reduction of 
USD1.3 billion was expected alone in 1999, along with an increase in the cross-selling due to the 
integration of Daimler-Benz’s technological innovations and competencies with Chrysler’s ability to 
rapidly fast and dynamic operations management. For details, please refer to Fleuriet (2008). 
21
 DaimlerChrysler’s market cap decreased, by 50%, within one and a half year after the merger. On 
14th of May 2007, DaimlerChrysler AG announced that Cereberus Capital management which was a 
private equity firm based in the US has taken over 80.1% of the stakes in the holdings of Chrysler. 
Investment banking analysts opined that separation from the Chrysler operations was beneficial for the 
risk profile of Daimler AG.  
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(1990), identify the positive dimensions in the relationship. However, Fleuriet (2008) 
points out that in big of mergers, like the DaimlerChrysler deal, integrating well and 
quickly is the key to success, which the combined entity of DaimlerChrysler failed to 
integrate. It is a part of the investment banker’s job to make sure that the potential 
issues, which can act as embargos to a successful integration, are identified.  He argues 
that the investment banking teams did not highlight the post-merger challenges, and 
the failure of the merger was due to the lack of due diligence required during the 
merger discussions between the parties. The bankers spend more time on transaction 
and governance structures than analysing the potential synergies. The teams of elite 
investment bankers put more emphasis on “considering the structure of the transaction 
than to identification of the synergies of their valuation” (p. 254). These bankers failed 
to address the issues of their clients’ needs, the synergies, and the risks (as identified 
beforehand as the 6 key issues). Reflecting on these 6 key issues and after analysing 
the DaimlerChrysler case, the author can confirm that the investment bankers did not 
do the following 
1. The client’s M&A strategy 
2. Addressing their clients’ strategic objectives 
3. Post-merger cultural integration of Daimler (an engineering-focused company) 
and Chrysler (a company more focused on marketing and sales) 
4. The clients’ needs from their partners and an ‘optimal’ way to achieve them 
5. Addressing the issues of synergies 
6. The risks associated with the merger 
The DaimlerChrysler case also indicates that the investment bankers who were 
advising on the deal performed poorly on many aspects which led to a failed merger. 
The risks and vulnerabilities of this multi-million dollar deal were mostly on the 
clients’ side. The failure did not affect the compensation of investment bank(er)s as 
they already received their commission. Nonetheless, it affected the clients – Daimler 
and Chrysler.  
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As discussed before, the bank(er)s do not have any kind of financial or legal 
obligations on the fate of the M&A deals. After the deal is executed they get paid. In 
this context, it would be interesting to understand the fee structure of the IBs. Scholars 
like Bowers & Miller (1990), Hunter & Walker (1990), McLaughlin (1992, 1990) 
studied the trust and reputation in M&A. IBs usually charge a standard
22
 fee of 1% of 
the value of the deals and 2% discretionary fees (Fleuriet 2008). The fee of the IB 
increases with the value of the transaction (McLaughlin 1990; Servaes & Zenner 
2015).Therefore, from an objective viewpoint, it can be said that pushing a deal is to 
the interest of the IB even if the deal is not ideal to the client. Thus, it is evident that 
the risk and the vulnerability mainly lie on the client’s side, as the client is in a 
situation of high risk and the banker has the motive to mislead the client for his own 
benefit. This situation enhances the relevance of trust due to the presence of high 
financial risk (as implied in the works of Rousseau et al. (1998) and Günter et al. 
(2011). 
Moreover, the industry has witnessed a series of high-profile M&A disasters
23
 which 
resulted in huge losses for the stakeholders. Scholars (Hurley et al. 2014; Fleuriet 
2008; Armstrong 2012; McLaughlin 1990) have questioned the role of IBs and the 
investment bankers. Given the findings indicating that trust is critical and important in 
financial services and that trust towards the banks is at an all-time low, addressing the 
issue of trust is important. The following quote from Weidner (2009), reflects on the 
research done by Hay group and summarises the relevance of this research project. 
“M&A is an empty exercise built on promises of profits and efficiencies that rarely 
come to fruition. Companies almost always overpay for their targets, hurting their 
shareholders and enriching few except the CEOs who do deals and the investment 
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 It might vary from bank to bank and can also depend on the relationship with the client. The 
Lehman formula of 5-4-3-2-1 (advisors get 5%, 4%, 3% , 2% and 1%  of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and above 
4th million) is used in the middle market only, if used at all. However, on rare occasions, the 
investment bankers can work on a monthly on the basis of service retention. 
23
 Some of the notable disasters are AOL Time Warner, collapse of Enron, downfall of WorldCom, 
JDS Uniphase and Tyco deal etc. 
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bankers who goad them into the next must-have merger….The roadside is littered with 
deals that promised great things and went bust. Is it any surprise that the serial 
dealmakers of the financial world?…Close to 90% of European mergers fell short of 
their objectives in 2007…” 
To address the issue of trust in the research context, the origin and the process of 
evolution of trust needs to be studied. In spite of recognising the importance of trust, 
the trust researchers have been reluctant to study the process of trust evolution.  This 
indicates a research gap which needs to be filled.  
 
2.3 The theoretical view on the research gap, and research questions 
 
Trust has been the focus of research for a while now (e.g. Sako & Helper (1998); 
Plank et al. (1999); Möllering et al. (2004); Bönte (2008) a.o.) but a significant number 
of works on trust focus either on interpersonal trust (Plank et al. 1999) or on supplier 
relationships (e.g. Sako & Helper  (1998); Scheer (2012), Henneberg et al. (2007) a.o.) 
or investigate the phenomenon as from an ethical perspective i.e. as an element of 
business ethics (e.g. Suchanek 2016). 
During the 80s, there was a wave of trust literature on personal selling (B2C) and 
organisational trust. The 90s and the first decade of this century saw the advent of trust 
literature focusing on the B2B industry. The IB as a part of a financial industry where 
trust plays a very important role (as pointed out by Armstrong (2012); Hurley et al. 
(2014)) was somehow not given an utmost priority. 
Since the global financial crisis, there has been a trend on trust research focusing on 
the banking industry. However, the majority of the existing trust literature in M&A 
focuses on trust issues related to organisational action trust of post-merger or post-
acquisition integration (e.g. Günter et al. 2011; Günter et al. 2003) while others (e..g. 
Bowers & Miller (1990); Hunter & Walker (1990); McLaughlin (1990, 1992)) 
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investigate trust as one of the elements associated with an investment bank(er)-client 
relationship.  
Trust is central to business relationships as it forms the basis of performance and 
loyalty, and it increases the ability to adapt to unforeseen changes (Scheer 2012). The 
circumstances and the conflicts of interests (as pointed out in previous sections), can 
lead the bank(er) to “actively work” against the client. It can be argued that the client’s 
interest can be protected by contracts (Barnett 1986; Alvarez et al. 2003). But, 
Williamson (1975, 1985) argues that human beings lack the capacity of drawing 
perfect contracts
24
. Therefore, he argues the importance of trust in business 
relationships.  
In lieu of Williamson’s opinion, it is worth noting that, in the financial industry it is a 
legal obligation to have a valid contract in order to do business which brings 
“contractual trust”, (without which there cannot be a contract as suggested by Sako 
(1997)), within the domain of this research. The relevance of the contracts in the 
context of M&A investment banker-client relationship has also been recognised by 
scholars like Bowers & Miller (1990), Hunter & Walker (1990), McLaughlin (1990, 
1992) and Servaes & Zenner (2015).  
Contractual trust also underlines the importance of considering multiple facets of trust 
in order to study this abstract phenomenon. A successful banker-client relationship in 
M&A context includes a blend of a few different facets of trust (e.g. interpersonal 
trust, product trust, (inter)organisational/company trust, performance trust goodwill 
trust etc.). It makes ascertaining trust in the bank(er)-client relationship even more 
difficult. According to Perrone et al. (1998), different layers or facets of trust should 
not be mixed as they are all different constructs. To study the investment bank(er)-
client relationship, in M&A, the following types of trust need to be considered 
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 The Transaction cost theory will be covered in detail under the Literature review.  
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 Interpersonal trust i.e. trust on the banker 
 Company trust i.e. trust on the IB 
 Product trust i.e. trust on the pitch 
 Contractual trust i.e. trust on the contract 
 Performance trust i.e. trust on the performance 
 Goodwill trust i.e. trust on the goodwill 
Back in 1999, Plank et al. called for trust research which will include the multiple 
facets of trust. To the best of the author’s knowledge, no “multi-dimensional” study on 
trust in investment banker-client relationship has been conducted so far. The study of 
the evolution of trust demands the consideration of the multiple facets of trust together.  
Scholarly works on trust evolution are not rare. However, the majority of them focus 
on either inter-team cooperation and control (e.g. Jones & George 1998; Vlaar et al. 
2007). The late 90s and early 2000s saw a number of publications on trust evolution 
but mainly focusing on only the sociological perspective (e.g. Macy & Skvoretz 1998; 
Bateson 2000 a.o.). The evolution of trust brings the aspect of the relationship between 
trust and time (in the research context). There are three rationales behind that.  
Firstly, the bank(er)s and the clients work closely with each other for a considerable 
period of time
25
. Secondly because, in IB industry, it is sometimes found that the 
clients are ‘attached’ to their bankers (especially if they have done business for a long 
time
26
). This ‘attachment’ leads them to move from one IB to another when their 
trustworthy banker changes employers. However, some of the clients who have also 
shared a long and successful relationship with a certain bank prefer to continue 
banking with that particular bank. Either the former or, the latter takes place depending 
upon the “company trust” (Sako 1997) or the “interpersonal trust” (Hawes et al. 1989; 
Swan & Trawick 1987). Thirdly, the evolution can be studied if time is brought into 
consideration. Scholars like Scheer (2012) and Kusari et al. (2013) have studied the 
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 Based on the works of Hawes et al. (1989), Ring  & Van (1995), Scheer (2012), Kusari et al (2013)  
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However, scholars share a varying opinion regarding the interrelation between trust 
and time
28
. Scholars like Ring & Van (1994) and Vanneste et al. (2014) identify an 
increase in trust with respect to time whereas, Doney & Cannon (1997) and Poppo et 
al. (2008) identify a negative relation i.e. trust decreases with time. The examples
29
 put 
forward by Henneberg et al. (2007) indicate that trust definitely strengthens business 
relationships, but there is a neutral relationship between trust and time.  
The varying opinions of the scholars on the relationship between trust and time adds 
an additional motivation to the research and points out that the phenomenon of trust 
evolution requires further industry and relationship-specific research.  
Therefore, based on the discussed cumulative motivation, the author finds that it would 
be worthwhile to study the evolution of trust in the relationship between the bank(er)s 
and their clients, from an M&A perspective.  
Therefore, the main research questions for this doctoral thesis is -  
 How does trust evolve with time in the relationship between M&A investment 
bank(er) and their clients? 
However, to add to the existing body of knowledge, one needs to study the evolution 
as well as the factors contributing to its evolution. Thus, along with the main research 
question, the author will also address the following contextual issues as the subareas of 
interest – 
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 Scheer’s (2012) model of trust and distrust in relationship development covers the aspect of time in 
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For details refer to the mentioned works. 
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 Although, not in the context of IB industry. This section will be elaborated under the “Literature 
review” 
29




 What are the main factors responsible for the decline of trust?  
 Can trust be regained? If yes, how? 
24 
 
Chapter III: Literature review  
 
Trust literature extends from the realms of philosophy (Williams 1988) to social 
anthropology (Hart 1988) and political science (Dunn 1988). The conceptualisation of 
trust has attracted the attention of economists and sociologists (Furlong 1996). Trust 
has been related to transaction cost economics (Williamson 1975, 1985), game theory 
(Dasgupta 1988) and sociology (Luhmann 1988). However, in social sciences, the 
themes of trust research converge (Swedberg 1987). Although a plethora of trust 
literature has emerged in the past decades, the concept of trust still remains “elusive” 
(Gambetta 1988).  
According to Furlong (1996), the definition of trust varies both between and within the 
disciplines. Therefore, before delving deep into the research topic, it is essential to 
define trust in a comprehensive way which would be appropriate to the research 
context. 
 
3.1 Defining trust as a concept 
 
“To define is to limit.” 
- Dorian Grey (The picture of Dorian Grey: 1890) 
Trust has been defined in plenty of ways (Plank et al. 1999) but, there are no correct 
definitions. However, some definitions are relatively more refined than the others 
(Furlong 1996). Dwyer & Lagace (1986) conceptualized trust in three ways. The first 
view regards trust as a generalized expectancy (Rotter 1967) or as a personality trait. 
The second view revolves around the idea of trust as a predisposition or a belief 
towards one another (Driscoll 1978) that another party will behave in a manner which 
is beneficial to the other party. The third view presents trust from a perspective of 
25 
 
risking behavior (Schurr & Ozanne 1985, Günter et al. 2011) reflecting a willingness 
from the buyers’ part accepting the possibility of being vulnerable on their side of the 
transaction (Plank et al 1999, Suchanek 2016). These three views put forward the 
concept of trust as a relative phenomenon by connecting it to the behavioral 
conceptualisation (Singh & Sirdeshmukh 2000). This behavioural conceptualisation of 
trust has been reflected in the works of scholars like Moorman et al. (1992), Morgan & 
Hunt (1994), Doney & Cannon (1997), Chaudhuri & Holbrook (2001), Hurley (2006, 
2012) etc. 
Back in the 90s, Moorman et al. (1992), Morgan & Hunt (1994) and  Doney & Cannon 
(1997) looked at trust as a judgment of confidence and reliance of two entities – a 
trustor and a trustee. The scholars of this century (Singh & Sirdeshmukh 2000; Hurley 
2006, 2012; Günter et al. 2011; Hurley et al. 2014 a.o.) have capitalised on that 
opinion and related it to the uncertainty and the risk aspect of exchange relationships 
between certain persons, organisations, groups and even systems.   
Hawes et al. (1989) does not agree on a particular definition of trust but regards trust 
as a fundamental platform of a successful buyer-seller relationship. Swan & Trawick 
(1987) points out a ‘set of behaving in particular ways’ and opines that behaving in 
these ways i.e. being dependable, efficient, customer oriented and friendly can lead the 
buyer to trust the seller. These views on trust can be related to Perrone et al. (1998)’s 
argument that trust is related to performance, as well as an interpersonal relationship or 
interpersonal trust and trusting perceptions (Plank et al. 1999) or behaviours (Singh & 
Sirdeshmukh 2000). 
Plank et al. (1999) point out that the “unidimensional” studies on trust  concentrate 
solely on interpersonal trust, whereas, the obligations associated with the product or 
the service and the company that is perceived behind the product or service” i.e. 
“product trust” and “company trust” also need to be brought into consideration. 
Therefore, these scholars divided trust into three facets to suit their research demands 
and came up with three individual characteristic features of each type of trust – 
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I. Interpersonal trust i.e. the belief that a person (who is selling a product or a 
service) will fulfill all the obligations as comprehended by the buyer 
II. Product trust i.e. the belief that the product or service will fulfill its expectations 
as expected by the buyer 
III. Company trust i.e. the belief that the company will fulfill all its obligations as 
comprehended by the buyer 
Plank et al. (1999), argues that to understand trust, all these types/ facets of trust need 
to be considered. Reflecting on the varying definitions of trust and multidimensional 
aspect of trust, the following definition attempts to summarise the discussed scholarly 
definitions to a contextual one which will be used to conduct this research. 
“Trust is the confidence shown by one entity on another entity, and/or that entity’s 
goodwill, employees, product, performance; and the belief the that the latter will keep 





3.2 A platform to comprehend the phenomenon of trust  
 
To investigate the phenomenon of trust, this section would study trust through the lens 
of different theories which the author found relevant to the context of the research. 
3.2.1 Trust through the lens of transaction cost theory 
 
“The neoclassical paradigm of a perfectly competitive market obviates any space for 
the discussion of trust, effectively keeping the concept outside the domain of 
economics.” (p. 2) This paradigm suggests that all actors, who meet in a perfectly 
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 The use of the word “uncertain or risky situations” directs to another school of thought   on trust 
which advocates the use of contracts to ensure the confidence (e.g. Barnett 1986; Alvarez et al. 2003). 
This will be addressed at a later stage. 
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competitive market for an exchange of standardised goods and services, want to 
maximise their own profits
31
. Even if the actors or entities intend to behave in a 
dishonest way, the assumption of perfect competition including perfect information 
negates the opportunities for dishonesty. Based on the assumptions of the “perfectly 
competitive market”, it can be said that both trust and distrust are irrelevant because 
the economic system is transparent to all the actors. However, trust enters the 
discussion with the departure of the orthodoxy of the neoclassical theory. (Furlong 
1996) 
Transaction cost theory (TCT) is an alternative paradigm which suggests that 
exchange is not costless
32
 as “it is supported by the most economically efficient 
institutional arrangement” (p. 3). TCT, however, fails to provide an explanation of the 
behaviour of the actors involved in an exchange. Due to this limitation, trust has 
gained significant importance. (Furlong 1996) 
Benston & Smith (1976) point out that transaction cost is the “main reason” for the 
existence of IBs. These scholars provide three rationales behind their discourse – 
economies of specialisation, scaling of economies, the acquiring the information and 
the reduction of search costs (as pointed out by Servaes & Zenner 2015 and supported 
by Armstrong 2012). Therefore, transaction cost economics and trust play an 
important role in the organisation, even though both concepts differentiate between 
transactional and collaborative relationships
33
 (Bunduchi 2005).  
The majority of the neoclassical economic theories deal with tangible cost  (e.g. cost of 
production), and the analyses assume that the actors have the capacity to determine the 
optimal course of action to make the institutional assumptions in a costless manner 
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 Additional note: It can thus be related to network approach. According to the advocates of  network 
approach  (e.g. Håkansson & Snehota I 1990, 1995; Araujo & Mouzas 1994; Mouzas & Araujo 2000; 
Henneberg et al. 2007, Mouzas & Naude  2007) believe that no business can survive as an island as it 




(Bromiley & Cummings 1995). In order to deal with these issues scholars (e.g. Barnett 
1986; Bromiley & Cummings1995; Alvarez et al. 2003 a.o.) have suggested a mode of 
‘security’ in form of contracts.  
Williamson (1985) highlights three factors in order to differentiate between the 
‘appropriate or optimal’ contracting processes. The factors are as follows: 
a) Bounded rationality - human beings have restricted mental capabilities and 
knowledge which essentially means that “perfect” contracts cannot be written  
b) Opportunism - entities will not live up to the expectations as per the contract 
without monitoring, supervision and enforcement mechanisms 
c) Asset specificity - the actors involved in the exchange, invest in assets of higher 
value than they would otherwise or, in other words, the actors involved in the 
exchange should protect themselves from exploitation after the investments are 
made
34
. (Bromiley & Cummings 1995)  
Generally, the organisations/entities operate as per bounded rationality and must 
assume others to be opportunistic, and hence, the focus is on different levels of asset 
specificity (Williamson 1985; Bromiley & Cummings 1995). Thus, TCT mainly 
addresses the issues of managing in a world, where individuals cannot be trusted  
(Bromiley & Cummings 1995). It explores the responses to the problem, that people 
cannot be trusted to tell the truth
35
, or to avoid exploiting the advantages created by 
unexpected circumstances or not seek self-interest in guile (Williamson 1985; 
Bromiley & Cummings 1995).  
TCT can be of substantial importance in the context of trust in investment banker-
client relationship, as bounded rationality, opportunism, and asset specificity are all 
relevant to the context due to the following reasons. 
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 It has been assumed that the investments cannot be shifted. 
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 The author is aware of another school of thought which investigates trust as an element of Business 
Ethics (e.g. Suchanek 2016). This will be covered in the next section. 
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1) Contracts cannot protect the interests of the clients because human beings are 
incapable of coming up with a “perfect” contract.
36
 (Bounded rationality). 
2) It is expected that the without monitoring, supervision and other enforceable 
mechanisms (e.g. legally enforceable contracts), the bankers will probably 
behave in an opportunistic way.
37
 (Opportunism) 
3) The clients need to protect themselves from being exploited, manipulated and 
talked into an unsuitable M&A deal.
38
 (Asset specificity) 
Williamson argues if agents with bounded rationality who can act opportunistically 
meet up with appropriate transactions, markets are likely to be inefficient (Bromiley & 
Cummings 1995). An entity, thus, aware of the fact that he cannot have contracts 
covering all contingencies will avoid making investments, as he is not sure of the 
changes due to uncertain circumstances as he is left with a weak position for 
negotiation (Bromiley & Cummings 1995).      
Williamson (1975) realises the importance of trust
39
 and the role it plays in reducing 
transaction costs as the “businessmen rely on it much more extensively than is 
commonly realised” (p. 109) even though trustworthy behavior may be easily 
exploited
40
 (Williamson 1985; Bromiley & Cummings 1995). 
In the research context, due to the bounded rationality (Williamson 1985) or 
information asymmetry (Williamson 1985, Farber & Bazerman 1987), it might be 
difficult for the client to comprehend if the banker will pursue his own interest 
(Williamson 1985) i.e. if the bank(er) can be trusted. 
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 As argued by Williamson (1975,85) 
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 As argued by Barnett (1986), Barney & Hansen (1994) and reflecting in the works of Alvarez et al. 
(2003) 
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 As pointed out by Armstrong (2012) and reflected in the works of McLaughlin (1990, 1992) 
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 A number of  other economists (e.g. Knack & Keefer 1997; Zak & Knack 2001; Armstrong 2012) 
have supported this statement and come to the conclusion that trust affects investments and contributes 
to more efficient outcomes in economies. 
40
 Scholars like Cook et al. (2005), Scheer (2012) and Kusari et al. (2013) termed this phenomenon as 
the “dark side of trust”. 
30 
 
Scholars (e.g. Barnett 1986; Barney & Hansen (1994); Alvarez et al. 2003) have 
argued about the importance of contracts to ensure that a certain actor or a group of 
actors will make good-faith effort to behave in conformity with the agreed explicit and 
implicit belief by being honest in negotiations, and by not trying to be opportunistic 
(Bromiley & Cummings1995)
41
. However, this is contrary to the concept of trust. If 
the findings of McLaughlin (1992) are brought into account, as it identifies a conflict 
of interest in the majority (95%) of the cited cases and in the contracts
42
. In a situation 
in which the safeguard of contract (Barnett 1986) has a conflict of interest in it, the 
clients trust on contracts also becomes a part of the research domain. It also raises an 
important question on the trustworthiness of an entity if the required protection is ‘not 
provided’ by the contracts.  
Therefore, the following section will attempt to address this question by approaching 
trust from a different perspective. 
 
3.2.2 Trust freedom, and vulnerability – an ethical perspective 
 
The ethical perspective on trust, suggested by Suchanek (2016), is relevant to address 
the issue raised in the previous subsection. This approach is different from TCT, as it 
approaches trust as “the negative side of freedom”
43
 (p. 60).  
Citing the example of the prisoner’s dilemma, Suchanek  (2016) contends that the 
negative side effects of freedom are one of the “basic problems for human 
                                                          
41 Bromiley & Cummings (1995) also opine that “trustworthy behavior” implies one of the following 
three dimensions. The first dimension indicates a “behaviourally reliable” entity which fulfills its’ 
commitments. The second dimension entails that the entity’s “statements and behavior prior to making 
commitments are consistent” (p.224) with the party(s) expectation. In the third dimension, the authors 
imply that the entity does not take “full, short-run advantage of unforeseen opportunities to gain at the 
expense of the other” (p.224) i.e. the entity is expected to put forward a reasonable bargain to the other 
entity involved.  
42
 Especially with the fee structure of the IB 
43
 Suchanek (2016) argues that it makes little sense, to ask what shall be done, if the actions are not 
free and explains the concept of freedom in a 3-level framework – moves, rules and understanding.  
For details, please refer to Suchanek (2016). 
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cooperation” because entities are “vulnerable” to each other’s actions.  By relating 
trust with risk and vulnerability, Suchanek’s work reflects the findings of scholars like 
Singh & Sirdeshmukh (2000) and Günter et al. (2011).  
Suchanek (2016) argues that the concept of freedom raises a fundamental question on 
whether one can be trusted to take the ‘right’ and ‘ethically sound’ decision, under a 
given set of circumstances, and the freedom to act according to one’s own will. Thus, 
his take on trust draws attention towards an important issue - if an entity using his/her 
freedom and free will can be trusted. 
This issue has been addressed through a few hypothetical examples. Through these 
examples, Suchanek (2016) serves two purposes. The first purpose is that it addresses 
the concept of trust holistically. Secondly, it highlights the multiple conjoined facets of 
trust at the same time.  
This discourse investigates the examples relevant to the research domain to identify 
the multiple facets of trust ‘hidden’ in Suchanek’s ‘holistic’ viewpoint on trust. It is 
interesting to compare his opinions with the findings of Plank et al. (1999), who back 
in the 90s advocated the study of multiple facets of trust in order to get a holistic 
picture. These examples indicate that the different facets of trust are ‘conjoined’, and 
in order to study trust in a relationship, multiple facets need to be considered (as 
suggested by Plank et al. 1999). Therefore, this piece of literature supports the 
platform for author’s research discourse. The following table attempts to capture the 







Examples Facets of trust based on the 
research discourse 
A client buying a real estate trusts the estate agent to 
consider the best interests of the buyer 
Interpersonal trust, Company 
trust, Performance trust, 




A client trusting the goodwill of the reputed 
corporation 
Goodwill trust, Company trust 
A client trusts a tradesman to honestly do his repairs 








A patient in a research hospital trusts that the 
recommendations are to the best of his interest. 
Interpersonal trust, 
Performance trust, Goodwill 
trust, Product/Service trust 
A client trusts that a company will maintain the 
promised quality and standards. 
Company trust,  Goodwill 
trust, Contractual trust 
Table 1: Facets of trust relevant to the research discourse 
Self-illustration based on Suchanek (2016)  
 
The author will conclude this subsection with an aspect which is worthy of note. Both 
TCT and the ethical perspective of trust have advocated the importance of trust. 
However, both the schools of thoughts approach the issue from two different 
perspectives. 
TCT is partly based on the ‘notion’ of the world, in which an individual cannot be 
trusted. Hence, it proposes the ideas like bounded rationality and opportunism to 
justify the importance of trust. From a certain viewpoint, TCT puts forward the notion 
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 In countries like the US and the UK, it is a contractual as well as a legal obligation of the real estate 
dealer and the agent to disclose all the information on the property to the best of their knowledge to a 
potential buyer. This situation marks the overlap between TCT and Suchanek’s perspective. 
45
 Assuming that the client hired the employer of the tradesman to do the repairs 
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of ‘safeguard’ or control. But, Suchanek (2016), focuses on signaling the 
trustworthiness from the trustee’s perspective because the trustee has the ‘freedom’ to 
either fulfill or not to fulfill the trust expectations of the trustor. In the research context 
this, the viewpoint can be reflected in the bank(er) signaling the client that he is 
trustworthy and can be trusted that he will work to the best interest of the client
46
.  
Thus, Suchanek’s vision of trust
47
 is more about being an influenced relationship 
rather than being controlled by the involved parties. This view on trust also attracts 
attention to the multiple facets of trust involved in a bank(er)-client relationship i.e. it 
is the ‘multi-dimensional study’ which was advocated by Plank et al. (1999). These 
facets/types of trust will be addressed in the following sub-section. 
 
3.3 A theoretical framework to study the phenomenon of trust 
 
The majority of the literature (especially marketing) have had their “traditional focus” 
on clients rather than stakeholder trust in general (Hurley et al. 2014). By highlighting 
some critical facts on trust research, Grayson et al. (2008) showed the inadequacy of 
trust research in financial services and pointed out that trust needs to be considered at 
both the firm level and a wider industry level. Hurley et al. (2014) summarized these 
factors in the following way. 
 The majority of the research has been focusing on a narrow scope of trust (i.e. 
organisational and interpersonal level) and has been ignoring the broad scope of 
trust (i.e. social and industrial level). 
 Grayson et al. (2008) found empirical evidence that consumer/client behavior is 
affected by the financial system and is totally arbitrated by the narrow scope, or 
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 If it is combined with the findings of Titman & Trueman (1998), it can be said that the brand names 
of big IBs signal their trustworthiness to the clients. 
47
 Additional note: Suchanek (2016) agrees with scholars (e.g. Williamson 1975, 85; Bromiley & 
Cummings 1995) that trust can be an important tool to reduce the transaction cost. 
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the firm level trust. Their work also pointed out that considering the industry 
and the firm level factors of trust is required to understand the trust-related 
behavior of the client. 
 High levels of both narrow (i.e. firm level) and broad scope (i.e. financial 
system) level trust are required to understand client satisfaction in financial 
services. 
Gillespie & Hurley (2013) found out that stakeholder trust has been violated by the 
lack of trustworthiness both at the company i.e. the bank level and at the system level 
(i.e. governments, Central banks, regulators etc.) leading to strengthening of 
compliance processes. The recent crisis in Greece validates this finding as the Greek 
government has to sign a relatively stricter contract
48
 with the international creditors 
and promise to take certain measures to get an additional loan of around EUR86 
billion for the third bailout. Thus, it is evident that to understand trust, the multiple 
dimensions of trust need to be addressed and conceptualized from a multi-level wide 
point of view as suggested by scholars like Grayson et al. (2008), Gillespie & Hurley 
(2013) and Hurley et al. (2014). 
Hurley et al. (2014) identify five streams of theories to comprehend the multi-level and 
multi-disciplinary phenomenon of trust in banks –  
 stakeholder theory  
 relationship marketing  
 service quality  
 the research-based theory of competitive advantage  
 market orientation 
Stakeholder theory focuses on the relationship between the firm and the groups who 
are affected directly or indirectly by the decisions taken. These groups include 
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 including terms like to pass a law to ensure a EUR50 billion privatisation program, full liberalisation 
of energy markets, measures to tackle non-performing loans a.o. Hope et al. (2015). 
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employees, clients, the investors and even interest groups and national communities 
(Freeman 1984; Donaldson & Preston 1995; Jones 1995; Hurley et al. 2014). 
According to Donaldson & Preston (1995), the focal point of the stakeholder theory is 
that the interest of all the legitimate stakeholders have intrinsic values and it is crucial 
for a firm to consider these interests. Instrumental stakeholder theorists believe that the 
existence of mutual trust and cooperation in exchange relationships with stakeholders 
may lead to competitive advantage (Jones 1995). 
Relationship marketing is an important framework to understand trust in banks 
(Hurley et al. 2014). “Trust is by its nature a relational concept
49
 and the presence or 
lack of trust affects dyadic personal relationships and more impersonal (institution and 
system) exchange relations” (Hurley et al. 2014 p. 353). As a central aspect of 
relationships in all exchanges, trust should be focused upon (Morgan & Hunt 1994). 
Morgan & Hunt (1994) placed trust in the center of the key aspects of successful 
relationships. The main focus of researchers till this date has exclusively been on 
supplier relationships, partners and very specific group of clients (e.g. corporates, 
governments, and others). The other stakeholders like investors and employees have 
been ignored. This relatively “narrow focus” have made the understanding of trust 
even more challenging (Hurley et al. 2014). 
The literature on service quality superficially touches on trust as it relates trust with 
assurance as a measure of overall confidence (Parasuraman et al. 1985). The service 
quality and, the total quality management literature emphasize congruity between 
delivery and expectations, quality of the process and reliability contributed to the 
trustworthiness of the performance or competence. Researchers (e.g. Perrone et al. 
1998; Kusari at al. 2013; Hurley et al. 2014) have regarded competence and 
predictability as the antecedents of trust. These scholars have argued that research on 
total quality management and service quality focuses on the methods of being 
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 Additional note: Although the approach is different, Suchanek (2016) has also advocated the 
“relational aspect” of trust. 
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consistently efficient, and reliable in delivering on clients’ expectations (Hurley et al. 
2014). In that context, Harris & Goode (2004) opine that trust has never been the 
fundamental concept of total quality management, and service quality because a wider 
stakeholder perspective has always been absent. They regard this issue as one of the 
core problems with trust research. 
“The literature on market orientation is also relevant to understanding trust in banks” 
(Hurley et al. 2014 p. 353). Market orientation mainly relates to firms’ adaptation, 
learning and value creation for clients (Narver & Slater 1990; Day 1994; Hurley & 
Hult 1998). Advocates of market orientation approach argued on the importance of 
“superior customer value while considering the interests of other stakeholders” (Slater 
1997 p. 164).  
Even though the importance of other stakeholders has been recognized, relatively less 
work has been done on market orientation beyond a specific group of clients (Narver 
& Slater 1990; Day 1994), in spite of the recent call for a shift in focus from market to 
stakeholder orientation (Ferrell et al. 2010).   
The fifth stream of the theory is the resource-based theory of competitive advantage. 
Resource theory of firm views trust as a resource which can directly (e.g.: 
reputation/goodwill capital) or indirectly (e.g. by integrating different capabilities) 
contribute in the developing of competitive advantage (Barney &  Hansen 1994). 
Clients and investors offered to the firm by the trust are therefore further resources 
(Hurley et al. 2014). Also, firms with higher interdepartmental trust have higher co-
operation which help to serve the clients better (Hurley 2012). 
These five streams of theories bring together the multiple facets of trust which are 
instrumental to capture the trust evolution in investment banker-client relationship.
50
 A 
summary is as follows: 
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 It is interesting to note that, back in 1999 Plank et al. identified the same gap in trust research and 
stated that a “multi-dimensional” research is required to understand trust. 
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Theories Keywords relevant to 
the research context 
Types of trust 
associated 










(Schelenker et al. 
1973; Hawes, et al. 
1989; Hawes & 
Barnhourse 1987; 












(Swan & Trawick  
1987; Plank et al. 













(Plank et al. 1999; 
Henneberg et al. 
2007; Perrone et al 





superior client value 
Performance trust, 
product trust, 
(Perrone et al 1998; 
Plank et al.1999; 







Reputation, goodwill Goodwill trust 
performance trust, 
company trust 
(Plank et al. 1999; 
Perrone et al. 1998; 
Sako 1997; Sako & 
Helper  1998; 
McCrosky. 1992; 
McCrosky & Teven 
1999) 




Based on these five theories, this literature review will further investigate the 
investment banker-client relationship through the lens of the platform made up of the 
following six types of trust. 
 Interpersonal trust 
 Company trust 
 Product trust 
 Performance trust 
 Goodwill trust  
 Contractual trust  
This platform is the theoretical foundation of the framework which helps to examine 
trust from a wider perspective as suggested by scholars (e.g. Grayson et al. 2008; 
Gillespie & Hurley 2013; Hurley et al. 2014) and therefore attempts to respond to the 
call of Plank et al. (1999). 
The following subsection covers the relevant literature on this these six different types 
of trusts. 
Classification of different facets  of trust and their overlap 
Hawes et al. (1989) regard trust as the “binding force” in a transactional relationship. 
Considering the multiple facets of trust (Plank et al. 1999), scholars like Simpson and 
Kahler (1981), Hawes and Barnhouse (1987), Hawes et al. (1989) suggest an overlap 
in different dimensions of trust. Considering the research topic, this section will 
attempt to understand the overlap of the six kinds of trust, in the research context, 
through a generic example.  
A passenger traveling by Lufthansa trusts the skills of the pilot who is flying the 
airplane. The passenger might not know the pilot and the crew personally, but still, he 
trusts their skills, because of Lufthansa. He does not ask for the qualification of the 
pilot before boarding. He associates credibility of the employees with the credibility of 
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the company or the brand and therefore trusts him. The brand name Lufthansa “signals 
trustworthiness” (Suchanek 2016). This is an example of different facets of trust can 
overlapping each other. The following table will elaborate on it. 
The passenger trusting the pilot and the crew Interpersonal trust and 
Performance trust 
The passenger trusting Lufthansa as a company, and its 
goodwill 
Company trust and 
Goodwill trust 
The passenger trusting the flight, and the services on 
board 
Product trust and 
Performance trust 
Because of the contract based ticket, the passenger trusts 
that in case of any inconvenience (e.g. cancellation, delays 
etc.), he will be compensated 
Contractual trust 
Table 3: The overlapping of different facets of trust 
If this example is juxtaposed with a standard M&A investment banker-client 










The client trusts the investment banker
51
 Interpersonal trust and 
Performance trust 
The client trusts the IB and its reputation
52
 Company trust and 
Goodwill trust 
The client trusts the product/service of the IB
53
 Performance trust and 
Product trust 
The client trusts that the IB and its employees will abide 





Table 4: The overlapping of different facets of trust on the research context 
 
The following part of this subsection will elaborate on  
Table 4: The overlapping of different facets of trust on the research contextby covering the 
relevant literature as on Table 2: The theoretical framework of the research. 
The reliance of a client on the information received from another person about the 
uncertain situation as well as their outcomes is interpersonal trust (Schlenker et al. 
(1973). Hawes et al. (1989) point out that, although there are exceptions, the majority 
of the transactions take place due to the presence of interpersonal trust. Without 
adequate level of interpersonal trust, it is difficult for a transaction to occur, especially 
when a high degree of perceived risk is present. Scholars like Hawes & Barnhourse 
(1987) suggest that clients are most likely to make deals with exchange partners who 
promise a lower level of perceived risk which is lowered by the personal level 
relationship and trust. An experiment conducted by Schurr & Ozanne (1985) indicates 
that a higher level of cooperation exists when interpersonal trust is present as the client 
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 Based on the works of Titman & Trueman (1986); Servaes,& Zenner (2015) 
52
 Based on the works of Johnson & Miller  (1988); Carter & Manaster  (1990); Servaes & Zenner 
(2015) 
53
 Based on the works of Carter & Manaster (1990); Johnson & Miller (1988); Servaes & Zenner 
(2015) 
54
 Based on the works of Hunter & Walker (1990); Bowers & Miller (1990); Servaes & Zenner (2015) 
41 
 
is also more likely to inform the trusted individual of his future needs. Thus, it helps to 
build up a long-term business relationship (Hawes et al. 1989). 
The IBs depend upon their bankers to a considerable extent for client acquisitions and 
deal executions. Leading IBs (e.g. UBS, RBS, Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan etc.) pay 
millions as guarantees and targets
55
 to recruit the top bankers with the expectation that 
these bankers will bring their loyal clients along with them. The senior investment 
bankers usually have their network of clients, and, if a high degree of interpersonal 
trust prevails in the relationship, this group of clients is expected to ‘demonstrate’ a 
higher degree of trust on those specific investment bankers by following them to the 
IBs they are joining
56
. If they decide to stay with the IB rather than moving along with 
the investment banker, it indicates that the company trust on IB is more prevalent than 
that of the interpersonal trust.  
Scholars (Swan & Trawick 1987; Simpson & Kahler 1981; Hawes et al. 1989) argue 
on different facets of trust as they combine personal and company level trust by 
opining that clients are keener to transact in an occasion where a lower degree of 
personal and corporate risk is present, simultaneously. The works
57
 of Lax & Sebenius 
(2003) provide evidences to strengthen this view. Thus, the credibility (Simpson & 
Kahler 1981) is not solely concerned with personal level trust but also the trust of the 
client towards the company as demonstrated in Lufthansa example.  
The cause of this interpersonal trust and company trust can be the client’s favourable 
experience with the investment banker and/or the IB due to their good performance (as 
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 Usually, the IBs have their fixed base salary which they do not change for individual employees. 
The corporate governance codes of many countries recommend caps. e.g. German Corporate 
Governance Code (2015) section 4.2.3. The IBs use targets and guarantees to increase the total 
compensation packages of the bankers to attract them. The author cannot disclose specific figures, or 
even specific examples on this due to the non-disclosure agreement he signed with his previous 
employer. 
56
 Based on the works of  Hayes & Hartley (1989) and author’s experience of working with UBS 
57
 Lax & Sebenius (2003) provide a few examples on how associations with certain entities help to win 
deals. E.g. The association with the Rothschild Group and Baron Rothschild’s family helped a young 
investment banker with his credibility and goodwill.  
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suggested by (Perrone et al. 1998; Forkmann et al. 2012)) for a substantial period of 
time (Kusari et al.2013), originating from the client’s trust on a certain company’s 
goodwill i.e. goodwill trust
58
. This shows that one facet of trust can lead to another 
facet and one entity can be the origin of trust on another entity. Lax & Sebenius (2003) 
provide multiple examples
59
 to support this view. 
Titman & Trueman (1986) suggest that big corporations trust investment bankers from 
big IBs with their transactions. In the research context, it implies that a certain banker, 
as well as his performance and the product sold by him, may be perceived as credible 
and trustworthy by a client because that client trusts the goodwill of UBS or Deutsche 
Bank and associates its image with credibility
60
. Thus, associations can signal 
trustworthiness (as suggested in the works of Suchanek 2016). This also identifies an 
association between the different facets of trust, which echoes the findings of scholars 
like Simpson & Kahler (1981), Hawes & Barnhouse (1987), Swan & Trawick (1987), 
and Hawes et al. (1989). It should be noted that scholars like Plank et al. (1999) have 
agreed on the importance associating of different facets of trust in trust research. 
Forkmann et al. (2012) recognise performance as one of the most important drivers in 
business relationships. Performance
61
 trust demands a shared understanding of 
performance standards and conducts which can be developed over a period of time by 
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 This “goodwill” should not be confused with the accounting concept. This issue will be addressed in 
detail at a later stage. 
59
 Among other examples (for details, refer to their works), they cited the example of the middle-east 
negotiations where Egypt helped to improve the image of the US among the Arab nations (especially 
the oil producing ones) by building trust and turned the middle-east negotiations to a success. Egypt 
was dependent upon Israel for supplying them with the territory. Israel, on the other hand, received 
substantial financial and military aid from the US, and thus was dependent upon them. The ‘transfer’ 
of trust was the result of a quid pro quo relationship.  
From the above example and the discussed theories we find that the recommendation of an entity is 
capable of “building trust”. In this example, it was the recommendation by Egypt which helped to 
develop trust between the two parties, the US and the Arab nations. 
60
 At the same time, it can be also perceived in a negative way, as an organisation lacking goodwill can 
create a doubt in the mind of the client about the credibility of a certain banker just because he is 
associated with that particular organisation. 
61
 In the research context, the concept of performance can be related to resources, knowledge and the 
capacity of the bank to deliver a certain deal. For details, please refer to Forkmann et al. (2012). 
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“demonstrating trustworthiness” (Sako 1997). It can be the result of the client’s 
previous experience with the banker’s performance or track record of the bank(er) 
which has resulted in interpersonal or company trust or both (Planks et al. 1999).  
Referring to standard M&A cases (Appendices 2 and 3), and the background of the 
research cited in Chapter II, it can be said that the clients might approach the IB with 
or without a specific target in mind. However, they do focus on particular sector(s)
62
. 
The IB’s reputation in those particular sectors contributes to the perception of a certain 
standard of performance and specific products (as suggested by Driscoll 1978; Beatty 
& Ritter1986). The works of scholars like Carter & Manaster (1990); Johnson & 
Miller (1988); Servaes & Zenner (2015), also indicate that the goodwill of certain IBs 
help with product, as well as performance trust. Therefore, it can be inferred that the 
origin of the client’s performance trust (Perrone et al. 1998), and product trust can be 
due to the existing goodwill trust (Rotter 1967; Hawes et al. 1989).
 63
 
According to Bunduchi (2005), goodwill trust is crucial to understand the business 
relationships. Sako (1997) opines that goodwill trust rests “only on the consensus of 
principle and fairness”. Therefore, Perrone et al's. (1998) classification of goodwill at a 
personal level, as well as the organisational level, is relevant to the research context. 
According to Gulati et al. (2000) and Bunduchi (2005), these two levels are closely 
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There can be exceptions e.g. If the client is trying to move in a new market, he might take aid of the 
IB’s advisory services in M&A to identify a target for a merger or an acquisition. 
63
 This can be related to brand perception too. Brand perception is a set of perceptions on a brand 
which is reflected by the associations of the brand held in the memory of the (potential) consumer 
(Hsieh & Lindridge 2005). Images over perceived product and services are associated with the specific 
brand name which might or might not be from past experiences (Koubaa 2008). Clients rely on 
inferences in evaluating a product or a service and making a choice while taking a decision. Koubaa 
(2008) suggests that inferences are the outcomes of stored information on the brand. The images of a 
brand are the outcome of one or more of descriptive, informational and inferential beliefs (Fishbein & 
Ajzen 1975). The Lufthansa example shows that the passenger “perceives” (Hawes et al. 1989) that 
the pilot flying a Lufthansa flight is qualified and skilled enough to make him reach his destination 
safely. He trusts the service of the pilot as well as the product (the machinery of the flight, the quality 
of on-board services) because of Lufthansa. On this occasion, trust on the organisation, thus, leads to 
product trust as well. There are “Safety rating” rankings (e.g. JACDEC), in the market which ranks the 
Airlines. In the context of the research, it can be the “pitch”. 
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interrelated because the goodwill trust on personal relationships can enact business 
relationships.  
However, the goodwill referred in this thesis is different from that of the concept of 
goodwill used in accountancy
64
. It is important to note that thesis is not referring to 
that accountancy related goodwill because it is out of the scope of this research. The 
speculated goodwill trust, referred over here, is the “mind-set” of the client (as 
suggested in the works of McCrosky 1992; Teven & McCrosky 1997; McCrosky & 
Teven 1999). To do justice to the research topic this thesis will capitalise on that 
school of thought only. 
According to McCrosky & Teven (1999), trust on goodwill is based on the “perceived 
caring”, which acts as the means of opening communication channels between the 
parties. However, the business economists have been tackling the issues with defining 
and estimating the goodwill for more than one century (Liberatore & Mazzi 2010). So 
without getting involved in that debate, this thesis will focus on the scholarly opinions 
which appear to be appropriate to the context i.e. the works of  McCrosky  (1992) and 
McCrosky  & Teven (1999) focus on the three elements of goodwill – understanding, 
empathy, and responsiveness. 
Understanding the clients is about comprehending the clients’ ideas and feelings and 
fulfilling their needs accordingly, while empathy is the phenomenon when one person 
identifies himself with another person’s feelings. Responsiveness is how quickly a 
related entity reacts to the client’s attempts to convey the concerns. (McCrosky & 
Teven 1999) 
Considering the influence of goodwill trust on client’s decision-making regarding IB 
(as suggested by Titman & Trueman 1986), it can be said that goodwill trust might not 
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 “Goodwill” is often looked upon as an accounting concept which is generally acknowledged as an 
“intangible resource” on the accounting books. The modes, measurements and evaluation  have been 
debatable for a long time (Liberatore & Mazzi (2010). One of the basic points of differentiation 
between the accountancy specific goodwill and the mind-set related goodwill is that the mind-set 
related goodwill has more elements associated with it than only the balance sheet. 
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be a result of performance as suggested by scholars (Perrone et al. 1998; Scheer 2012; 
Kusari et al. 2013). It can be speculative in nature i.e. perception of a certain standard 
of performance, product and efficiency or the result of “signalling” (Suchanek 2016). 
Due to the uncertainty in these cases, the client might have the mind-set (Sako 1997) 
of a psychological ‘safe-guard’ – contracts (Barnett 1986; Alvarez et al.. 2003). 
Reflecting on TCT, the importance of contracts as safeguards is relevant due to 
opportunism, bounded rationality and asset specificity.  
Contractual structures contribute towards the durability of an exchange relationship 
(Dwyer et al. 1987). Sako (1997) considers honesty and promise as the building blocks 
of contractual trust which is a mindset or a particular behavioral trait (Rotter 1967; 
Singh & Sirdeshmukh 2000).  
A contract in a bank(er)-client relationship expands to the product(s), the obligations 
of the IB as well the obligations of its employee(s) e.g. A contract specifies that the 
bank, as well as its employees, the product/service provided by the IB, abides by 
certain specifics of the performance standards
65
 as well as a declaration that the bank 
will act to the best of the client’s interest (as suggested in the works of (Coates. J IV 
2015)).  
Contracts act as psychological safeguards as the trust between parties gradually 
increases over time (Ring & Van 1994). Thus, from a certain point of view, it can be 
said that, to a client, a contract(s) serves as a psychological ‘safeguard’ from three 
kinds of potential violators - the IB, the banker and the quality of the product/services 
by ensuring a certain standard and quality of performance. This phenomenon relates 
the contract with company trust, interpersonal trust, product trust and performance 
trust. Contractual trust is, therefore, a belief of the client ‘originating’ from the 
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 It should be noted that from a realistic perspective, certain terms used in the contract can be abstract 
and hard to quantify. However, it should be noted that on occasions, the contracts may be tailored 
depending upon the circumstances. 
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contract by ensuring certain thresholds as safeguards
66
. This phenomenon, thus, 
indicates an overlapping scenario where interpersonal trust, product trust, and 
company trust act as the elements of contractual trust. 
However, a question may be raised on the necessity of the contract if trust already 
exists. There can be two potential answers to this question. Firstly, the mere fact that 
something has been promised to someone creates no legal obligation and therefore, no 
legal remedy would be available in the case of non-performance. Thus, to be 
enforceable, the promise should be accompanied by some “other factor” providing a 
safeguard – contract (Barnett 1986). Secondly, it is a legal necessity
67
 to do business, 
as “M&A transactions are governed by contracts” (Coates IV 2015 p. 1). 
 
3.4 Trust vs. time 
 
“Every commercial transaction has within it an element of trust, certainly any 
transaction conducted over a period of time” (Arrow 1972 p. 357). “Trust is based on 
codes of conduct which evolve over time to constrain our behavior and, in turn, 
influence the efficiency of markets” (Armstrong 2012 p R4).  
Over the years, scholars have debated on the relationship between trust and time. 
Scholars like  Ring & Van (1994), Doney & Cannon (1997), Henneberg et al. (2007), 
Gulati & Sytch (2008), Poppo at al.(2008), Scheer (2012), Vanneste et al. (2014) have 
had difference in their opinions
68
, on how trust evolves over time.  Kusari et al. (2013) 
put forward the concept of relationship life cycle which illustrates the increase and 
decrease of trust, in course of time. Scheer (2012) captures the relationship between 
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 For general contracts as “safeguards” refer to Barnett (1986) and for details on M&A specific 
contracts refer to Coates IV (2015) 
67
 It includes the necessity in grounds for auditory, finance and accounting documentary purposes, as 
well as the deal details like valuation, risk preferences, specialised skills, complexities of ownerships 
of the companies, financial capabilities and the details of the transaction. For details refer to the works 
of Coates IV (2015) 
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 As covered in The theoretical view on the research gap, and research questions 
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trust and time more subtly in her the model of trust and distrust in relationship 
development.  
Ganeshan (1994) suggests environmental diversity and volatility, transaction-specific 
investments, reliance, the perception of dependence, reputation, clients’ experience 
and satisfaction with the seller, seller's credibility/goodwill and benevolence as the 
constructs of a trust in a long-term business relationship. The findings of Ganeshan 
(1994) bring interpersonal trust, company trust, product trust, contractual trust, 
performance trust and goodwill trust within the same bracket
69
. The RLC suggested by 
Kusari et al. (2013), also regards trust as elements in a holistic way.  
The author of this doctoral thesis attempts to study trust evolution, and therefore, as a 
starting point it would be worthwhile to choose the stream of literature which has 
focused on empirical evidence and identified a positive relationship between trust and 
time  Therefore, the RLC will be included as a part of the platform to study trust 
evolution, and follow the opinions of the school of scholars who opine that trust 
increases with time (e.g. Ring & Van 1994; Gulati & Sytch 2008; Scheer 2012; Kusari 
et al. 2013; Vanneste et al. 2014). 
 
3.4.1 Relationship life cycle 
 
Over the years, scholars (e.g. Dwyer et al. 1987; Jap & Ganesan 2000; Henneberg et 
al. 2007; Mouzas & Naude 2007; Scheer 2012; Kusari et al. 2013 a.o.) have suggested 
that relationships evolve over time. Kusari et al’s. (2013) Relationship life cycle 
(RLC) refers to the “dynamic process” through which relationships evolve over a 
period of time (Dwyer et al. 1987; Jap & Ganesan 2000; Kusari et al. 2013). The 
change at different stages in the RLC takes place due to the capacity of multiple 
control mechanisms and “context-dependent properties” (Jap & Ganesan 2000).  
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The RLC is composed of four distinct phases – exploration, build-up, maturity and 
decline. Each of these phases symbolise an evolution in the relationship between the 
exchange partners due to the development in the trust relationship. Therefore, Kusari 
et al.’s RLC has been juxtaposed to the existing platform of research to investigate the 
trust evolution in investment banker-client relationship.  
Exploration stage 
Exploration stage is a “fragile” phase where either or both the entities (banker & 
client) judge each other evaluating the risk associated factors (e.g. benefits, costs, 
obligations etc.). Trust is one of the most important variables that influence the 
exchange relationship as “it is especially critical for the onset of the relationship” 
(Kusari et al. 2013 p. 123). At this stage, the exchange partner (client) tries to 
determine the integrity, compatibility, and the potential performance of the other 
exchange partner i.e. the investment bank(er) (Dwyer et al. 1987). The initial goodwill 
of the IB is crucial at this stage (as suggested by Titman & Trueman 1986; Dwyer et 
al. 1987). 
Monitoring, at this critical stage, may make it easier to detect the (potential) non-
compliances, and increase trust on performance and satisfaction (Kusari et al. 2013). 
Positive results in monitoring may increase the influence of trust at this stage of the 
relationship by signaling emotional connections, feeling of security and co-operative 
intentions (Johnson & Grayson 2005; Kusari et al. 2013) which contribute in pushing 
the relationship to the second phase i.e. the build-up phase. However, if monitoring 
reveals any kind of breach, or suspicious/opportunistic behavior, the relationship might 
suffer the threat of termination. 
Build up phase 
This phase is characterized by more detailed information sharing and investments 
(Kusari et al. 2013), as it is marked by an increase in risk-taking, and the development 
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of interdependence (Dwyer et al. 1987) or reliance. One of the main objects in this 
phase is to develop a “mutually beneficial relationship that continues over the long 
run” (Kusari et al. 2013 p. 124). Standards for future exchanges are set in this phase 
(Narayandas & Rangan 2004) because there is comparatively more certainty and trust 
(Kusari et al. 2013) as experiences contribute to the durability of a relationship (Dwyer 
et al. 1987). 
During the build-up phase both parties learn about each other, and (one or both) adapt 
at this stage, which can result in errors. Therefore, performance trust comes into play 
at this stage (Kusari et al. 2013). This helps to continue the relationship in the long run 
by developing/increasing performance or competency trust (Perrone et al.1998).   
If monitoring at this stage may reveal underperformance, it can aggravate concerns 
regarding the entity’s (in this case bank/er) capacity or cooperation. This may hamper 
the increase of dependence/reliance and the development of trust (Dwyer et al. 1987). 
Jap & Ganesan (2000) suggest that this phenomenon may restrain additional risk-
taking i.e. the adverse effect of underperformance on competency or performance trust 
can be counterproductive. 
Maturity phase 
In this phase, both the entities (bank/er and client) imbue confidence in the relationship 
and trust each other. They adopt a long-term perspective towards the other incurring 
short-term costs and long-term gains as both have passed the ‘difficult’ initial phases. 
In the maturity phase, the entities experience satisfaction. (Kusari et al. 2013)  
At this stage, both the entities relax the initially erected guards regarding the other’s 
intentions (Jap & Ganesan 2000) as trust has been established because if the other 
would have been proven to be non-trustworthy, the relationship could not have 
reached the maturity phase (Kusari et al. 2013). Given the fact that “commitment” 
(Dwyer et al. 1987) and consistency have been assumed by the parties due to the 
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gaining of experience over time and further monitoring is regarded as unnecessary 
(Dwyer et al. 1987), trust is assumed to be most effective and mature (Kusari et al. 
2013).  
Decline phase 
The decline phase is the last phase of the RLC where the relationship begins to 
deteriorate as the entities start experiencing dissatisfaction (Kusari et al. 2013), and 
start considering alternative relationships (Jap & Ganesan 2000), as trust diminishes 
(Kusari et al. 2013). 
Scholars (e.g. Singh & Sirdeshmukh 2000;  Johnson & Grayson 2005) suggest that 
shake in trust or betrayal are some of the issues that cause dissatisfaction which in turn 
causes the trust to diminish. Kusari et al. (2013) anticipate the decrease in trust as a 
reason for the decline phase. However, the unpredictability in an “uncertain world”
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can also lead to dissatisfaction and instigate the decline phase as the outcome of the 
deals in IB industries are not certain (Armstrong 2012). 
Scheer (2012) suggests that an exchange relationship will progress only if both the 
parties are interested in taking the relationship further. Therefore, the dissatisfied 
client, due to lack of trust, may decide not to take the relationship any further. This 
phase might mark the beginning of gradual decline of the relationship in the long run, 
or the relationship may be terminated immediately.  
 
3.4.2 The model of trust & distrust in relationship building 
 
Apart from the RLC, Scheer's (2012) model of “trust and distrust in relationship 
development” is related to the context of the research and is worthy of mentioning. 
Although this model has been proposed in the context of B2B relationships, it is 
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 e.g. A situation that the bank(er) has worked on an M&A deal for a substantial period, and suddenly, 
a party who was willing to sell/merge his company decides otherwise (might be due to change in the 
market dynamics or improvement in their financial situation etc.). 
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relevant to the phenomenon of trust evolution because the element of time has been 
addressed in a covert way. Figure 5 juxtaposes trust and distrust and “reveals the 
insights into relationship development” Scheer (2012 p. 339).  
 
Figure 5: The model of trust and distrust in relationship development 
(Source: Scheer 2012 p. 340) 
A ‘small degree’ of trust may exist along with a ‘low level of distrust’ (Scheer 2012) 
which leads to a feeling of indifference or neutrality. At this stage, the parties may 
have “reputational information about each other, but uncertainty is great and 
expectations are modest” but they have compatible interests which “dominate initial 
interactions reducing problems ”. (p. 339)   
If the result of initial dealings (during the phase of neutrality) reveals opportunism 
(Williamson 1975) then the feeling of indifference may result in suspicion or lack of 
trust  which is a “transitional state” because if the concerns of the client are not 
address, the relationship will lead to “high distrust”
71
. In that case, the client will start 
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 Scheer (2012) defines “distrust” as the belief that one entity will neglect or work against the other 
entity’s interests.  The author regards distrust as a phenomenon out of context, and therefore will 
refrain from digression. 
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distrusting the bank(er) and the relationship is not likely to survive. (Scheer 2012; 
Kusari et al. 2013)  
At this stage, the bank(er)s credibility is yet to be proved. Trust reduces transaction 
costs (Williamson 1975), but it should be noted that this is a stage of ‘neutrality’ where 
little or no trust exists. Any ‘unexpected deviation’ from the promise or an ‘incident’ 
(e.g: bad performance, scams) can end the relationship. The client, on the other hand, 
may end up exploring (e.g. doing further research or finding out the deals other banks 
are providing) or playing a ‘wait and watch’ game before he gets more involved in the 
relationship by. taking more risks by trusting the bank(er). Investments are expected to 
be low at this stage as the risk is high and clients tend to take less risk as trust is low or 
non-existent (Scheer 2012). A high degree of monitoring also prevails at this stage 
(Kusari et al. 2013). 
Perception of alignment by both parties without desiring a closer relationship may also 
result in a state of stabilised neutrality in which case the relationship will not progress 
to the state of courtship where a higher degree of reliance is required (Scheer 2012). 
The reliance is essential to carry forward the relationship to continue (Henneberg et al. 
2007) to the next level. Courtship is a state of transition. If any or both of the entities 
(client and the banker) are not interested in a deeper relationship, the relationship may 
settle at stable neutrality. (Scheer 2012)  
 “Acting on trust when trust is reciprocated can lead to successful co-operation, and 
hence to mutual benefit and potentially to significant gain” (Ullmann 2002 p. 533). 
Over a period of time, a history of mutually benefitting or favourable interactions 
between the entities (client and the banker) or “shadow of the past” (Poppo et al. 
2008), serves as the foundation stone for the  greater trust, reliance and confidence 
(Henneberg et al.2007), resulting in high trust or a trusting relationship (Scheer 2012). 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Additional note: Scholars like Cook et al. (2005) suggest that this phenomenon need not necessarily be 
bad, because, if used appropriately, it can help to prevent misplaced trust. 
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The following table compares RLC with Scheer’s model and justifies the choice of 





















Similarities Dissimilarities Relevance to the 
research context 
Both study the 
evolution of 
relationships in the 
context of trust 
RLC brings time into 
consideration directly while the 
involvement of time in the 
model of trust and distrust is 
more of an implication.  
This thesis demands the 
consideration of time 
directly. A model 
which considers the 
element of time in a 
‘covert’ manner might 
add to the complexity 
of the research. RLC 
explains the gradual 
evolution of trust in a 
way which is more 
relevant to the research 
context. 
Both address the issue 
of trust in relationship 
evolution 
The model of trust and distrust 
assumes that only conflicting 
interest can lead to distrust 
whereas; compatible and 
collective interest leads to high 
trust. RLC takes a holistic view 
and considers a wide range of 
factors. 
The assumption of 
Scheer’s model is not 
applicable to the 
research context based 
on the works of the 
scholars (e.g. Titman & 
Trueman 1986; Hunter 
& Walker 1990; 
Bowers & Miller 1990; 
McLaughlin 1990, 
1992)) 
Both recognise the fact 
that the fulfillment of 
certain criteria (e.g. 
performance, 
monitoring) is required 
for the relationship to 
evolve 
RLC ends with the decline of 
trust and the relationship 
whereas; the model of trust and 
distrust captures the evolution of 
distrust too and gives no 
explanation on the ‘post-high 
trust’ phase. The author finds it 
difficult to ascertain the non-
psychological aspect of trust 
evolution. 
The thesis focuses on 
the evolution of trust 
only. 
Reflecting on the 
research context, the 
author intends to 
consider the ‘complete’ 
process of trust 
evolution. 
 
Table 5: A comparison between RLC and the model of trust and distrust in relationship 









 was brought to light in the early 90s, by Håkansson & 
Snehota (1990, 1995). Alongside, other scholars like Henneberg et al. (2007), Mouzas 
& Ford (2003), Araujo & Mouzas, (1994), Mouzas & Araujo (2000) have capitalised 
on that approach in the last two decades. This approach advocates the importance of 
networks in business relationships, which is relevant to the research context.  
Håkansson & Snehota's (1990, 1995) network model is reviewed through the 
organisational interphase i.e. the determinants of organisational effectiveness, the 
organisational boundaries, and the process of managing business strategy. “A 
company’s relationships are prime assets in this process, and their effective utilization 
is critical to success in implementing new initiatives” (Mouzas & Naude 2007 p. 62). 
From the IB’s perspective, network mobilization can be considered as the outcome of 
utilizing their relationships to develop their relationships with clients, in a way to make 
them work by their own plans (as suggested by Mouzas & Naude 2007). Given the 
fact, that organisations are the clients of the IBs, it would be worthwhile to apply the 
network approach and network mobilization.  
The network approach assumes that none of the firms can survive as an island 
(Håkansson & Snehota 1990, Mouzas & Naude 2007). The firms can achieve their 
objectives only by means of exchange relationships with other firms, rather than 
operating in isolation (Mouzas & Naude 2007). The network approach views the 
markets as networks of exchange relationships (Håkansson & Snehota 1990; Johanson 
& Mattsson 1992; Håkansson & Snehota 1995; Mouzas & Araujo 2000). Thus, the 
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 The network approach was proposed mainly in the context of buyer-seller relationships. But, this 
thesis looks at it from the perspective of the research context. Since the clients of the IBs are different 
organisations like governments, corporates etc., this section looks at the scenario through the lens of 
situational analysis. The given situation is one corporate introduces an IB to one of its partner 
corporates. This section attempts to merge the network approach with the power of recommendation 
(ex-clients or some organisation through the network or a person of importance like CEO or CFO of a 
company who is not directly related to the deal or the mandate) by using the 3D negotiation theory. 
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exchange relationships are viewed as the means through which the firms achieve their 
goals.   
The network approach fits with the research topic and the domain of the research 
because it “is sensitive to developments over time; it assumes that organisations 
transform resources to carry out transactions linked by relationships…”, the 
cumulative effect of which determines the position of the organisation where 
organisations “interactively shape and develop rules which constitute and govern their 
business relationships” (Mouzas & Naude  2007 p. 63) leading to “interdependent 
symbiosis” and trust (Araujo & Mouzas 1994). This approach matches with the 
Resource-based theory which has been discussed before, is an aspect of the platform 
for the research.   
Building an effective business network can be an essential part of trust building at the 
beginning of any relationship. The example of middle-east negotiations (Lax & 
Sebenius 2003) cited before supports this view. Apart from that instance, Lax & 
Sebenius (2003) also cite multiple instances
73
 to illustrate the importance of networks 
in building or signaling trust in business relationships. 
In the research context, on occasions, it might be difficult for the clients to ascertain 
the quality of the product and performance. In this situation, the recommendation from 
previous clients, in the portfolio, signals a certain threshold of quality of the 
product/service. Scheer (2012) claims that, the relationship begins with a feeling of 
neutrality or indifference. However, if a certain bank(er) is recommended to a client by 
a third party (maybe a person of importance or a partner organisation) whose opinion 
is valued by the client, the client might not have the feeling of indifference i.e. he 
might not need the mindset induced by contractual trust as the client already ‘values’ 
the opinion of the person who recommended the bank(er) and ‘perceives’ that the 
performance of the bank(er) would be agreeable. Thus, a recommendation can signal 
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 E.g. The case of Kennecott Copper and El Teniente mine in Chile. Please refer to the works of Lax 
& Sebenius (2003) for further details.  
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trustworthiness. The example of a client’s perception of a young investment banker’s 
credibility, due to his association with Rothschild Group as well as Baron Rothschild’s 
family cited by Lax & Sebenius (2003) justifies this view. This example indicates that 
trust can be signalled by certain associations with certain entities. 
The recommendation by previous clients is valued by the IBs they use it as a part of 
their portfolio. These recommendations act as a ‘symbol’ of a certain level of service 
quality and signal to the potential new client that the bank(er)s are experienced enough 
and they have provided good service to other clients on similar deals. In such a 
situation, the feeling of “neutrality” [as suggested by Scheer (2012)] can be replaced 
by interpersonal or company trust or both. This also fits the initial idea of client 
experiences and goodwill trust illustrated in the Lufthansa example. 
It is interesting to note that since the network is sensitive to time (Mouzas & Naude 
2004) i.e. the trust relationships are sensitive to time (Ring & Van 1994, Gulati & 
Sytch 2008, Poppo at al.2008, Vanneste et al. 2014). There is a probability that 
turbulence(s) (e.g. market crash, scams or other external factors) may lead to decline 
of the impact of the network i.e. the client may lose his trust (performance/goodwill) 
on the bank(er) or his distrust towards a certain bank(er) may override trust which may 
reduce/nullify the impact of the network. This characteristic fits with the concept of 
RLC too. 
The impact of a network can partly depend on recommendation agents too, because, an 
impression is formed on the basis of opportunities, action, and background (Dasgupta 
2000) which influences the decisions. The growth of the internet as a medium of 
information has turned it into "infomediaries" which can help the clients with the 
decision-making (Swaminathan 2003) by “signalling trustworthiness” (Suchanek 
2016). According to the law, the banks are supposed to declare all their transactions to 
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the public. Annual reports can be termed as the report card for any company
74
.  
Sometimes, IBs use the annual report as a marketing tool and a mode to convey 
messages to their client
75
. Having a look at certain banks’ background, the associations 
with certain companies, and the deals they have executed, a potential client may have a 
certain perception about the bank which may act as a catalyst in ‘shaping’ the mind of 
a client by signaling trust. This may help in developing the trust on the bank i.e. 
company trust, trust on the product i.e. product trust and trust on the banker 







The literature review has covered the state-of-art literature which the author found 
relevant to the context of the research. On certain occasions, the phenomenon of trust 
evolution has been investigated through situational analysis to make the existing 
literature relevant to the research context.  
The discussed theories are the backbone of this doctoral research project as the data 
will be analysed through the lens of those theories to explain the phenomenon of trust 
evolution in an investment banker-client relationship. 
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 The annual reports give a potential client an idea of the situation of the bank which may ‘develop’ 
his perception towards trust and influence his decision on whether to trust or not. It provides the client 
with an overview of how the bank is abiding by the rules and regulations of the financial market 
(Financial Conduct Authority i.e. FCA, Financial Services Authority i.e. FSA, Basel III etc.), and their 
presence and track record in specific sectors in the M&A market. The author recognises it as a new 
and different field of research which is out of scope of the research. 
75
 E.g. After the rogue trader scam, when Sergio Ermotti took over as the new Group CEO, he used the 
UBS Group AG annual report (2012, 2013) to ‘market’ his risk-reduction strategy. 
76
 Reflecting on the Lufthansa example, it can be said that the customer flying with Lufthansa may 
have the initial performance/goodwill trust on the company. Later on he makes his own experiences 
and the trust relationship may change. Due to the fact that he is not in direct contact to the pilot he 
builds trust only on an institutional basis whereas the M&A-customer is building trust in the IB as well 
as in the banker. In IB, it can be thus more interpersonal in nature. 
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Chapter IV: Methodology 
 
“If you do not get what you want, you suffer; if you get what you do not want, you 
suffer; even when you get exactly what you want, you will still suffer because you 
cannot hold on to it forever. Your mind is your predicament. It wants to be free of 
change….But change is law and no amount of pretending will alter that reality”                                                   
 - Socrates (469 – 399 B.C.) 
 
4.1 Prologue: The choice of qualitative research as a methodological approach 
 
“The selection of an appropriate method depends on the aim of the study…The choice 
of research methods should be determined by the research question, not by the 
preference of the researcher” (Marshall 1996 p. 522).  
Qualitative Research (QR) studies help to illuminate and understand complex 
psychosocial issues and are “most useful” to answer the mechanistic ‘what?’ and the 
humanistic 'why?' and 'how?' questions, yielding highly transferable findings and 
results (Marshall 1996; Trumbull 2005).  
QR studies phenomena under natural settings and attempts to “make sense of or 
interpret” them through the lens of “an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject 
matters”. Qualitative research method (QRM) is inductive in nature and describes 
multiple realities by developing a deep understanding and “capturing everyday life” 
and brings into consideration different perspectives of human beings as it examines the 
full context by collecting a substantial amount of data through interviews. It provides a 
variety of modes – e.g. interviews, observational, empirical, interactional, visual texts, 
introspective, personal experiences, life story, and historical incidences, to describe 
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both routine and specific problematic moments and meanings in the lives of the 
individuals. (Trumbull 2005)  
QR has an inductive and holistic philosophical foundation which makes it ideal to 
explore complex human issues (Marshall 1996). To “craft an understanding” (Lenny 
2006), the QR planning starts with the initial idea which evolves as the researcher 
learns more from the participants. By setting flexible levels throughout the proposal, it 
yields a data analysis which is mainly interpretive and descriptive in nature (Trumbull 
2005). 
The iterative and flexible nature of the qualitative study along with its trustworthiness 
makes it suitable for a phenomenon driven research (Marshall 1996; Trumbull 2005). 
Moreover, due to a high degree of transferability (Marshall 1996), QR can be used to 
develop a theory which is one of the main rationales behind its design (Glaser & 
Strauss 1967). Glaser & Strauss (1967) advocated building theories based on data. 
Therefore, if the plausibility of the developed theoretical foundation, formed by 
reshaping the literature, is tested on the basis of QRM, the findings of this thesis can 
be used as a platform for quantitative studies on (industry specific) trust research in 
general. Guided by broad research questions focusing on theoretical foundations, 
QRM also comes with the promise of helping to discover the phenomena which are 
being studied (Trumbull 2005) and thus it emerges as the obvious rational choice as a 
methodological approach for this research project. 
 
4.1.1 Validity of qualitative research 
 
Scholars like Patton (2002) and Trumbull (2005) have identified three different types 
of qualitative data – interviews, observations, and documents. Unlike the traditional 
data sources (where traditional measurements can be yielded), in QR it is difficult to 
validate the sources of data collections. Addressing that problem Trumbull (2005) 
suggests the following methods to improve the data validity. 
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1) The use of multiple sources of the data to validate information, (e.g. validating 
the interviews through observations) 
2) The participants’ review of the information for accuracy is required to validate 
the data. 
3) Another way to check the validity of the data is to report only “what was 
observed and told” because an attempt to infer might result in biased findings. 
According to Patton (2002), interviews provide direct quotations from the interviewees 
which convey their knowledge, opinions, and feelings about a certain phenomenon 
whereas, data acquired from observation provides a detailed description of certain 
people’s actions, behaviors, activities, and processes to observe the behavior of human 
beings. Documents analysis, on the other hand, includes the study of quotations, 
excerpts, memoranda, correspondence and written responses to open-ended surveys 
and questionnaires. Based on these findings, Patton (2002) proposed that QR should be  
developed out of in-depth and open-ended interviews, direct observations and written 
documents. 
This thesis reflects on the three above-mentioned points and uses in-depth open-ended 
one on one interviews as suggested by Patton (2002), under the subsection 
“Sampling”.   
 
4.1.2 Reliability, credibility and characteristics of qualitative research 
 
Some qualitative researchers believe that reliability of the research can be managed if 
records of interviews and observations are kept cautiously so that the results can be 
“replicated by other researchers”, based on which Trumbull (2005), identifies the 
PROs and CONs of QRM. 
PRO – Richness of the data: Qualitative data is rich even though it can be complex. 
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PRO – Interesting data: Qualitative data can reveal interesting facts unquantifiable in 
numbers. 
PRO – Focus of the data: If the researcher is interested in the quality of the data, 
numbers might not necessarily be able to reflect it on all occasions. 
CON – Subjectivity of the data: Usually, qualitative data are generated by coding or 
rating.  
If the researcher requires “richness, complexity, and something that cannot be easily 
translated into scaled numbers” (p. 107), qualitative data analysis is a natural choice. 
However, the researcher needs to be careful while using QR as it might reflect only 
individual opinions. But, this drawback can be addressed by using measurement 
techniques carefully. (Trumbull 2005) 




1) In-depth fieldwork is required to yield good quality data which is systematically 
analysed by focusing on issues of credibility. 
2) The credibility of the researcher is also important. Creditability of the 
researcher depends upon training, track record, previous experiences etc. 
3) QR should appreciate meaningful sampling, holistic thinking, and inductive 
analysis. 
Reisman (1993) identifies six characteristic features of QR. They are as follows – 
1) Natural setting 
2) Direct data collection 
3) Rich narrative descriptions 
4) Process oriented 
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 These factors have been brought into consideration during the data collection and will be covered in 
details under the sub-section “Sampling”.  
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5) Inductive data analysis 
6) Participant perspectives 
The author of this thesis is aware of the different types of inquiries (e.g. Grounded 
theory, Case study research, Hermeneutics, Ethnography etc.) on QRs which can be 
relevant to the research context. However, phenomenology has been chosen to study 
trust evolution in an investment banker-client relationship. The rationale behind the 
choice of phenomenology as well as relevant literature would be covered in the next 
sub-section. Appendix 4 covers the snapshots of some other types of QRs along with 
the rationales based on which they are not ideal for this research. 
 
4.2 Phenomenology – studying a phenomenon 
 
Phenomenology is the science which describes human events and behaviors in a 
comprehensive and detailed manner. This kind of research involves a systematic 
search of a description to comprehend the meaning or essence of a phenomenon 
designed from “live human experiences” (Trumbull 2005). Therefore, one of the 
conditions for conducting a phenomenological research is that the researcher should 
not have any kind of preconceived notion in his mind (O'Mery 1983).  
Qualitative researchers believe that analysing human experiences is not possible 
quantitatively because intuition is important to develop knowledge (Bruyn 1966; 
Trumbull 2005). According to Bruyn (1966), a qualitative researcher should focus on 
the total significance of the events in a holistic way. This is because the accumulated 
knowledge of the human experience is focused on one person, and, therefore using 
open-ended questions guiding sub-questions is recommended (Trumbull 2005). 
Malhotra & Birks (2003) phrased it as “an unstructured and indirect form of 
questioning” as this form of questioning brings out the underlying emotions (e.g. 
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feelings, beliefs, attitudes, motivation etc.) of the respondents regarding a  certain issue 
(Malhotra & Birks 2003).  
A researcher conducting phenomenological research searches for the “feelings, 
thoughts and awareness” i.e. the sample should be aligned with his search. e.g. If a 
certain researcher wants to know about the feeling of depression, he chooses 
interviewees who are suffering from depression (Trumbull 2005).  This feature of 
phenomenological research relates to the idea of judgment sampling because “if the 
wrong participants are selected, the ultimate findings have little meaning” 
(Mariampolski 2001 p. 75).   
Ray (1994) also supports the opinion of scholars like Malhotra & Birks (2003) and 
Trumbull (2005) and advocates the use of open-ended, un-predetermined, unstructured 
questions as they yield rich answers and help to “block out” and “remove” the 
researcher’s personal experiences and inferred beliefs from the research (Trumbull 
2005), which is a prerequisite for a phenomenon driven research  (O'Mery 1983).  
In order to know “how”, the researcher may ask “what” but not “why” because he 
needs to see and describe the life and views of the subject by keeping himself out of 
the research process and thus, coming up with textual subjective descriptions for each 
subject (Trumbull 2005). The following step is to analyse the data (e.g. detecting 
common patterns, grouping, clustering, deleting irrelevant data etc. (VanManen 1990; 
Trumbull 2005)) 
Agreeing with scholars like Stewart & Mickunas (1990) and Moustakas (1994), 
Trumbull (2005) has identified three stages of phenomenological study – epoche, 
phenomenological reduction and imaginative variation. 
1) Epoche: This phase is about identifying and suppressing the personal biases in 
order to reduce the impact on the outcome.
78
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 However, Trumbull (2005) points out that there are debates on the possibility of such an execution. 
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2) Phenomenological reduction: Separating and bracketing significant pieces of 
information in order to horizontalize or set all remaining materials which are 
equal in value. The next step is to delimit i.e. to bracket once more and identify 
the patterns, clusters and textually recording the responses of the subject 
followed by breaking the data into manageable patterns which have evolved 
from the cluster. 
3)  Imaginative variations: At this stage, the researcher’s job is to merge the 
description along with his interpretation and textually record it based on the 
actual response of the interviewee or the participant. Therefore, this phase 
relates to reflections, judgment, and comprehension. 
The following table identifies the following eight steps to conduct phenomenological 
research. 
1. The researcher separates himself from the phenomenon. 
2. Epoche – The researcher looks inside self; reduces prejudices. 
3. Phenomenological reduction – identifies data in the pure form. 
4. Horizontalize data – examines groups, clusters. 
5. Eliminate – irrelevant, repetitious or overlapping data. 
6. Identify patterns. 
7. The textual portrayal of each pattern – describe the experience. 
8. Structural synthesis – look beneath for deeper meaning.  
 
Table 6: Steps to conduct phenomenological research 
(Source: Trumbull (2005 p. 110) based on the works of Moustakas 1994)) 
 
Why is phenomenological research appropriate for this research? 
The main rationale behind choosing phenomenological research is that this type of 
study is ideal to describe phenomena with respect to circumstances and behaviours (as 
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suggested by Trumbull 2005). Reflecting on the research questions, it can be said that 
the description of events, factors, and the circumstances are of particular importance as 
the answers to these questions are expected to frame the answers to the research 
questions. The efficiency of this study to answer the “how” questions, makes it an 
obvious choice for this research.  
Phenomenological research overlaps with other qualitative approaches (e.g. 
ethnography and hermeneutics)
79
 (Lester 1999). Rather than explaining, this kind of 
research describes a phenomenon free of hypotheses and preconception (Husserl 1970; 
O'Mery 1983).  
“The purpose of the phenomenological approach is to illuminate the specific, to 
identify phenomena through how they are perceived by the actors in a situation. In the 
human sphere, this normally translates into gathering ‘deep’ information and 
perceptions through inductive, qualitative methods such as interviews, discussions, and 
participant observation, and representing it from the perspective of the research 
participant(s).” (Lester 1999 p. 1) 
As discussed before, a phenomenon driven research demands an open-ended 
questionnaire because the author is dealing with an abstract phenomenon. A close-
ended questionnaire might be the result of the researcher’s personal ‘biased view’ on 
the take and might restrict the scope of the results within a limited number of options 
(as suggested by Ray 1994; Malhotra & Birks 2003 & Trumbull 2005).  
By studying the “feelings, thoughts and awareness” of the interviewees in an unbiased 
way can throw light on the process of trust evolution in a bank(er)-client relationship. 
To make sure that his work is regarded as a scientific work, the researcher must ensure 
to throw light on the rationales to the answers of his research question in an unbiased 
way. This is only possible if the researcher delves deep into the topic by means of 
interpretations and linkages. Phenomenological study grants the researcher the 
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opportunity to make the “informed speculations”
80
 in order to establish those linkages 
by restricting the occurrence of personal biases (Trumbull 2005).     
The success of a phenomenological research depends upon the sampling as well as the 
questionnaire which leads to the next sub-section – “Sampling”. 
4.3 Sampling  
 
The choice of the study sample is one of the most important steps in research 
(Marshall 1996). Scholars like Mariampolski (2001), Patton (2002) and Trumbull 
(2005) have advocated the use of meaningful sampling. The author is aware of the 
different types of sampling methods (e.g. Random sampling, convenience sampling 
etc.
81
.) However, given the nature and sensitivity of the research topic, a blend of 
judgment and snowball sampling has been adopted, which will be covered in the next 
subsections. 
 
4.3.1 Judgement sampling 
 
Judgment sampling is the most popular sampling technique because the “most 
productive” sample is actively selected by the researcher for answering the research 
question/s (Marshall 1996). e.g. in order to study the driving experience of Ferrari, the 
sample may be composed of Ferrari drivers or the people who have driven a Ferrari. 
Similarly, if the research question is related to the foster parents’ experience of taking 
care of children in distress, the subjects will be the couples who are/were foster 
parents. This essentially indicates that the sample should consist solely of those 
subjects who come from the specific background and/or with specific experience, 
which is relevant to the research context. 
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 Provided there is clarity of the discussed findings and the assumptions made 
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 For details on other sampling methods and the rationales for not using them in this research, please 
refer to Appendix 6. 
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This type of sampling may “involve developing a framework of the variables that 
might influence an individual's contribution and will be based on the researcher's 
practical knowledge of the research area” (Marshall 1996 p. 523). The framework may 
involve variable epidemiological studies based on demographic stratification through 
age, gender, background, beliefs, social class etc. 
This doctoral thesis will follow judgment sampling because, in order to study the 
specific phenomenon of trust evolution in a banker-client relationship, rich data is 
required. Thus, it would be useful to set some specific benchmarks for the 
interviewees.  
The sampling will consist of only experienced executives who have been working or 
who used to work in the financial industry as M&A bankers.  
The three basic sampling criteria are as follows: 
1) All the interviewees should be investment bankers who are specialists in M&A. 
2) All the interviewees should be senior bankers with the experience of executing 
multiple deals with the same and different clients i.e. they should be senior 
enough to witness the evolution of trust. 
3) The interviewees should have the experience of working with different IB(s) to 
maintain heterogeneity of the sample. 
An additional benefit for using judgment sampling is that the respondents from the 






4.3.2 Snowball sampling 
 
Snowball sampling or chain referral sampling is widely used in QR as it “yields a 
study sample through referrals made among people who share or know of others who 
possess some characteristics that are of research interest”. It is ideal for research on 
“sensitive issue, possibly concerning a relatively private matter”. This method requires 
the knowledge of the “insiders” in order to select the people for the study. It has been 
designed for sociological research as it accommodates “the sampling of natural 
interactional units”. (Biernacki & Waldorf 1981 p. 141) 
In snowball sampling, a certain sample is identified which is relevant to the research 
interest. If the data is not easily accessible, the subjects are identified through a referral 
system. e.g. If the researcher wants to study the counseling experience of 
psychologists, who are specialists in treating specific issues like childhood trauma or 
post-divorce depression, he can use this referral sampling. He can interview one 
psychologist (can be through referrals too) and ask him if he has any 
colleagues/friends, with the same specialty who would be willing to co-operate with 
the research. Snowball sampling is expected to yield rich data as the subjects are 
expected to be appropriate for the research.  
Biernacki & Waldorf (1981) regards snowball sampling as a “self-contained and self-
propelled phenomenon…which somehow magically proceeds on its own”. However, 
they also identify the following limitations –  
1. Finding enough respondents and starting the referral chains 
2. Verification of the eligibility of potential respondents 
3. Engaging the respondents in assisting the researcher 
4. Controlling the sampling chains and number of cases in the chains 
5. Pacing and monitoring the quality of data in the referral chains  
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Given the research topic’s ‘sensitive’ nature, the requirement of specific types of 
respondents, and the lack of abundance of data, snowball sampling would be 
appropriate to this context. The author has the privilege to tackle the first problem 
because his supervisor worked in the banking industry, and is well connected to the IB 
industry. Apart from the network of the supervisor, the researcher also used the alumni 
network of HHL Graduate School of Management to connect with the senior bankers 
in Germany and in the UK.  
 





Figure 6 indicates that the author has been successful in building up a referral chain by 
engaging the respondents as research assistants. In the sampling chain, both 
interviewees 1, 2, 7 and 8 acted as research assistants. This indicates that limitation 3 
has been addressed. 
Since the research adopts a blend of judgment and snowball sampling, the data is 
expected to be rich. This rules out the possibility of the overflow of unnecessary data. 
The usage of judgment sampling ensured the quality of the respondents. Thus, the 
author tackled limitation 2. 
The interviewees were made aware of the topic and the research questions. To reduce 
the difficulties with pacing and monitoring, the interviewees were encouraged to share 
their experiences with their own flows. Since the questionnaire is unstructured, the 
tempo, the monitoring, and the direction of the interview were improvised accordingly. 
The respondents were identified through direct links from the supervisor of this 
doctoral project and the alumni association at the Career Service. Therefore, the 
referral chains turned out to be simple rather than being complicated and were 




The questionnaire attempts to capture the essence of trust evolution at different stages 
of the relationship. The questionnaires are rough guidelines on how the interviews will 
be conducted. Due to its unstructured nature (as suggested by Trumbull 2005; 
Mariampolski 2001), the questionnaire will be tailored and improvised on an interview 
by interview basis. The researcher intends to go along with the flow of the 
interviewees to avoid any kind of biases. 
The questionnaire attempts to hold on to the concept of unbiased mindset (as 
suggested by Stewart & Mickunas 1990; Moustakas 1994; Trumbull 2005) on the 
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research topic and encourages the respondents to speak their mind and share their 
experiences. Please refer to Appendix 5 for the questionnaire. 
4.5  The data 
 
Ensuring the quality 
One of the biggest challenges of this doctoral project is data collection. The IBs are 
‘sensitive’ regarding sharing any client-related information even with other 
departments of the bank. For outsiders, the rules are even stricter. According to the law 
also, they are obliged to guard their clients’ details from the outside world unless 
compelled by exceptional circumstances
82
.  
Abiding by the sampling criteria specified in the previous subsection, the sample will 
consist of only senior investment bankers who are specialists in M&A. In this context, 
it is important to state the implication of the word “senior”.  
Though the hierarchies of IBs vary from bank to bank, from his own experience of 
working with UBS Investment Bank (London), the author can confirm that the 
following figure depicts a general hierarchy of the investment banks.  
IB hierarchy 
Managing Director 
Executive Director / President (I, II and III) 
Director / Senior Vice-president (I, II and III) 
Associate Director /Vice-president (I, II and III) 
Analyst (I, II and III) 
  
Table 7: A general hierarchy of IB 
Source: Self-illustration 
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 E.g. Court orders, flagging, money laundering investigations etc.  
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A candidate, aspiring to be an investment banker, usually starts his career as an 
Analyst, and gradually progresses to the rank of Managing Director. Usually, the 
candidate spends approximately three years in each of the above-mentioned ranks
83
. 
However, the promotion and the time span depend upon a number of factors like 
performance, the opening of new job roles etc. The terms like “Junior/Senior Banker” 
etc. are usually used in IB industry to symbolise job roles, not ranks.  
The topic of this thesis demands the interviewees/the bankers to be involved in long-
term business relationships with their clients. Therefore, only the senior professionals 
on and above executive director level have been chosen as a part of the sample.  
Given the ‘general hierarchy’ of the IB sector, it has been assumed that the bankers 
have been at all the stages of the RLC. It is a safe assumption, because only the senior 
and most successful bankers can make it to the executive/managing director level. 
Therefore, it is expected that they have successfully handled their own client 
relationships for a significant period of time. Thus, it would be safe to assume that 
they have experienced the evolution of the relationship, and hence the evolution of 
trust. 
The credibility of the sample 
The “highly diverse” QR inquiries include phenomenology, critical theory, 
ethnomethodology positivism etc. The wide variety of theoretical and philosophical 
orientations raise the issue of the quality and credibility required for the research 
purposes (Patton 1999).  
In order to do justice to the judgment sampling technique and to ensure that the data 
yielded by the sample is of high quality and specific to the research context the three 
criteria, mentioned under the subsection “Judgement sampling” have been strictly 
brought into consideration. 
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 Apart from exceptional circumstances, the IBs do not encourage skipping ranks. 
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10 intensive qualitative interviews with senior investment bankers have been 
conducted in two of the biggest financial hubs in Europe – Frankfurt am Main in 
Germany and London in the UK. The average time of the interviews is 1 hour and 3 
minutes. 20% of the sample of was female while 20% of the sample had a doctorate 
degree in Business and Economics. The lowest qualification among the interviewees is 
masters’ degree. The lowest rank of the interviewee sample is senior Executive 
Director / Vice-President. The highest rank is Managing Director.  
This essentially means that all of the interviewees have spent at least 10 years or more 
working on M&A deals with different IBs. These well-experienced bankers enrich the 
dataset by bringing their experiences of working with 14 different reputed IBs as well 
as investment boutiques. The institutions they are/were affiliated are as follows:  
1) Morgan Stanley 
2) JP Morgan 
3) Deutsche Bank 
4) UBS Investment Bank 
5) Credit Suisse 
6) Rothschild GmbH 
7) Goldman Sachs 
8) Alma Partners 
9) Commerzbank 
10) Nordic Capital 
11) Ludwig & Co. GmbH 
12) Lazard M&A  
13) Citibank 
14) Miscellaneous (Includes miscellaneous boutiques too) 
 







Table 8: Sample credibility I 
 
The interviewees have a combined 140 years of working experience in M&A banking 
with an average work experience of 14 years and minimum and maximum work 
experience of 10 years and 17 years respectively. The following chart shows their 
individual work experiences in years. The substantial experience of these investment 
bankers provides the author with the opportunity to ask them questions and gain a 
deeper understanding of the evolution of trust in investment banker-client relationship. 
 
Figure 7: Sample credibility II 
 
Based on the works of Reisman (1993),  Patton (2002) and Trumbull (2005) the 
following steps have been taken to ensure the credibility of the data. 
Due to confidentiality issues, this table cannot be published on a public domain. 
Please contact the author for details. 
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1) In order to ensure validation, multiple sources (e.g. verification through 
secondary sources of data, i.e. annual reports, newspaper reports etc.) have been 
referred to. 
2) Separate video (using a video camera) and audio recordings (using the 
application called Video Record Pro on iPhone 6S) were conducted to record 
the interviews accurately.  
3) In-depth fieldwork was conducted in London and Frankfurt am Main to identify 
the interviewees and yield rich data through one on one direct interaction with 
the interviewees. 
4) The data have been collected focusing on the research questions. 
5) All the interviews were conducted by the author in “natural settings” i.e. either 
in the meeting rooms in their respective offices of the IBs in London and 
Frankfurt am Main or at the temporary residences of the bankers. This ensured 
an untailored and stress-free environment for the interviewees.  
 
4.6  Epilogue of the methodological approach 
 
The social, political and psychological factors are expected to play a significant role in 
this research. Each of the interviewees shared experiences which helped to understand 
the pattern of trust evolution and the rationales involved behind the evolution. 
According to Trumbull (2005), qualitative research needs to meet certain criteria, e.g. 
validity and reliability of the sources of the data. Given the fact that the interviews 
have been conducted with senior M&A bankers through personal sources and under 
natural settings, the data is expected to be specific and rich. This is also one of the 
rationales behind blending judgment and snowball sampling. 
In order to maintain the richness of the data, the interviews have been transcribed on a 
“word by word basis” referring to the recordings (as suggested by Trumbull 2005).  
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The next step would be to analyse the data-set and code and categorize the data. There 
are a number of softwares in the market (e.g. Atlasti) which are popular among the 
qualitative researchers. However, given the complexity of the topic and keeping 
convenience in mind, the author has opted for a manual coding. The analysis of the 




Chapter V: Analysis 
 
In order to remove personal biases, this phenomenological research study has been 
conducted following the guidelines specified by different scholars (O'Mery 1983, Ray 
1994, Trumbull 2005, Malhotra & Birks 2003, Mariampolski 2001). This issue has 
been discussed in details in the previous chapters. The results
84
 have been obtained by 
undergoing the following three processes as suggested by scholars like Stewart & 
Mickunas (1990), Reisman (1993), Moustakas (1994) and Trumbull (2005). 
Epoche: In order to eliminate personal biases from the researcher’s standpoint, the 
interviewees were actively encouraged to share their experiences, based on their own 
flow. To reduce the chances of the any of the interviewees’ opinion ‘influence’ the 
findings of the thesis, answers beginning with “I think…” or “I believe…” or “In my 
opinion...” or “I would (say)….” have been separated and compared.  
The interviews show a similar pattern on trust evolution but in their own ways. So, the 
quotes referred at different stages of the “Results” section reflect the opinions of all the 
interviewees in the words of one of the interviewees. The quotes have been chosen on 
the basis of appropriate contextual accuracy and compactness of conveying the ideas.  
Therefore, the possibility of the occurrence of individual biases influencing the 
outcome is rare, due to the unanimity of their opinions. The interviews were conducted 
by the author himself. No attempts were made to restrict the interviews within the 
discussed framework as the interviewees were encouraged to share ‘their viewpoints’ 
and experiences in a relaxed environment. Therefore, the chances of the biases from 
the researcher’s side can also be eliminated. 
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Phenomenological reduction: All the interviews were transcribed in pure form
85
. The 
transcripts were then analysed and “important pieces of information”
86
 were separated 
and compared. This step was followed by “delimiting the information” and 
identification of codes and categories.  
Imaginative variations: All the acquired information has been merged and recorded 
after removing the overlaps. At this stage, analysis has been done through the lens of 
interpretation. 
 
5.1 The coding manual 
 
Coding is “the critical link” (Charmaz 2006) which connects data collection with the 
explanation of the meaning of the research (Saldana 2010). “A code in a qualitative 
inquiry is most often a word or short phase that symbolically assigns a summative, 
salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or 
visual data. The data can consist of interview transcripts, participant observation, field 
notes, journals, documents, open-ended survey responses, drawing, artifacts, 
photographs, video, internet sites…and so on” (p. 4). It is a researcher generated 
construct which symbolizes or translates the data by attributing the interpreted 
meaning by detecting the pattern(s), categorising, building the theory and other related 
analytical processes. (Saldana 2010) 
In the first cycle, the part of the coded data can range from one word/phrase to an 
entire paragraph or page. During the second cycle of the coding process, the exact 
same or longer sections can be coded depending upon the strength of the link (as 
suggested by Charmaz 2006; Saldana 2010). 
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 Relevant to answer the research question as well as contextual questions 




The coding process requires the researcher to wear an analytical lens. The process of 
perceiving and interpreting the data depends upon the type of filter of the lens 
(Saldana. 2010). The following controversial quote by the present US president 
Donald Trump, made during one of his presidential campaigns, will elaborate on this. 
“When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best... They're sending 
people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems… They're 
bringing drugs. They're bringing crime….”  
To keep the data rooted to the interviewee, a ground theorist opting for Vivo coding 
may code it “people that have problems”, “bringing drugs” and “bringing crime”. 
An ethnographer researcher using a descriptive coding might code the same datum as 
“immigration issues”. A race theorist researcher might code this piece of datum as 
“Xenophobia”  (adapted from Saldana 2010).  
The coding process, thus, depends upon the researcher, his fieldwork, the research 
questions, structuring of the field notes, the responses received during the interviews 
(Saldana 2010). “All coding is a judgment call” because of “our subjectivities, our 
personalities, our predispositions and our quirks” (Sipe & Ghiso 2004  pp.482-483). 
The literature review of this doctoral thesis views the bank(er)-client relationship 
through the lenses of 6 different types of trust - interpersonal, company, product, 
contractual, performance and goodwill trust. Therefore, based on fieldwork, 
subjectivity and research questions, these types of trust will be used as codes.  








Reflecting on his work, the codes will be identified on the basis of their frequency, 
sequence, causation and contextually. Apart from the fact that all the codes are 
different types of trust but on different entities (e.g. Company trust indicates trust on 
the bank, Interpersonal trust indicates trust on the banker and his team), the possibility 
of an identical similarity can be ruled out. However, they are all different forms of 
client’s trust and, thus, are theoretically similar in a generic way. The “Difference” 
will play an important role in coding as it will keep the option for a new form of trust 




5.2 Coding technique for the first cycle 
 
Descriptive coding is applicable to almost all QRs, especially at the beginning of the 
studies as it helps the researcher to code the data with a wide variety of data forms like 
interview transcripts, field notes, documents etc. This coding method helps the 
researcher to answer the research questions by analysing the data’s basic topics and the 
readers to realise the view of the researcher. It helps them to understand what the 
researcher viewed and heard. (Saldana 2010) 
Descriptive coding is appropriate for this doctoral thesis because it deals with an 
abstract concept – trust. Since the thesis is not attempting to quantify trust but to 
follow the phenomenon of its evolution, it is important to identify if trust exists and the 
form in which it exists. It is essential to understand which kind of trust exists at 
different phases of the relationship.  
Descriptive coding, unlike any other coding (e.g. structural coding), does not look for 
a specific word(s) but instead looks at the subjective impressions in factual 
descriptions through merit consideration attuned to the predefined concepts of the 
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research (Saldana 2010). Therefore, this coding method is suitable to study the 
phenomenon of trust evolution.  
Since descriptive coding has been adopted for the first cycle, the coding has been done 
manually without the use of any software to ensure the best quality possible.    The 
following figure will elaborate on the general idea of the first and second cycle coding. 
 
Figure 8: An overview of the coding and categorising techniques 
Source: Adapted from Weber (2015) 
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Coding and categorising – First cycle 
Coding is the method of organizing and grouping coded data based on similarity into 
categories due to the similarity of their characteristic features based on the intuition of 
“looking” and “feeling alike” (Saldana 2010). Example: The data on the study of an 
MBA program at a European university can have codes like MATERIALS, 
LAPTOPS/COMPUTERS, TEXTBOOKS etc. These codes might be categorized as 
RESOURCES. Another major category can be TEACHING SKILLS with codes like 
pedagogy, socio-emotional, technical etc. There can be subcategories too. e.g. 
TEACHING SKILLS can have the subcategories like INSTRUCTIONAL SKILLS, 
MANAGEMENT SKILLS etc. There can also be a number of codes and categories 
depending on the research topic,  research questions and the researcher’s “intuition” 
(adapted from Saldana 2010). 
RLC constitutes an important part of the evolution in the theoretical framework 
discussed in the literature review. Therefore, the different phases of RLC i.e. 
Introduction, Build-up/Growth, Maturity, and Decline, will be used as the categories. 
Table 9: Coding and categorising the data – First cycle gives a snapshot of the codes and the 
categories used during the first cycle. The 6 different kinds of trust have been 
numbered for the ease of identification. 
Categories: Introduction phase, Growth/ Build-up phase, Maturity phase, Decline 
phase 
Code I Interpersonal trust 
Code II Company trust 
Code III Product trust 
Code IV Performance trust 
Code V Goodwill trust  
Code VI Contractual trust 
 
Table 9: Coding and categorising the data – First cycle 
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5.3 Recoding and categorising – Second cycle 
 
It is rare to get the coding right on the first attempt. QR requires unperturbed attention 
to the use of language and in-depth reflection on the emergent patterns and their 
implications. Recoding can be done post-adjustment to the first cycle. The second 
cycle describes the processes employed by the first cycle. Recoding refines the 
categories as the second cycle codes can include the first cycle codes, rebelled or may 
be dropped partially or entirely. As the researcher progresses with his work, with the 
second cycle, he can rearrange or reclassify or change the coded data. (Saldana. 2010) 
At the end of the first cycle, a total of 680 pieces of information relevant to answer the 
research questions as well as the contextual questions, were identified. These pieces of 
data were assigned to the suitable codes based on their relevance. To allow the codes 
to be replicated by other researchers, some of the key examples of assigning the codes 
have been mentioned under Appendix 7.
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Although methodologists have recommended checking the coder reliability in 
qualitative researches, at present, there is no standard approach to ensure or measure it 
(Lombard et al. 2002; Krippendorff 2004). Therefore, many studies are reluctant to 
include reliability measures at all, even though is causes criticism on the subjectivity 
of the researcher (Weber 2015).  
Scholars like Patton (2002) and Trumbull (2005) regard the background of the 
researcher as one of the parameters of the credibility and reliability of QR. In order to 
ensure the credibility of the coding, the codes were assigned by the author himself who 
is an ex-employee of UBS Investment Bank and also has over 8 years’ experience in 
dealing with business relationships in the IB and Consulting. Like the first cycle 
coding, the second cycle coding has also been done by the researcher himself. 
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answer some of the contextual questions on the thesis. 
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It should be noted that the coding was based on the intuition and judgment call of the 
researcher based on the works of Sipe & Ghiso (2004); Charmaz (2006); and Saldana 
(2010). One of the rationales behind first cycle coding was to check if the intuitions of 
the researcher were true i.e. if the codes actually exist in the dataset. 





Introduction Growth/Build-up Maturity Decline 
Code I          Yes              Yes      Yes No 
Code II Yes  Yes Yes No 
Code III     Yes  Yes Yes No 
Code IV           Yes        Yes       Yes No 







Code VI No No No No 
 
Table 10: Code appearances in the first cycle coding 
 
As shown in Table 10, codes I - IV appear in all the stated categories apart from the 
last category i.e. decline. No new code has been detected in any of the categories. 
According to findings from the interviews, the bank(er)-client relationship perishes 
without trust. This finding is a rationale which is sufficient to explain the absence of 
any of the codes under the “Decline” category.  
Code V i.e. goodwill trust appears in three of the categories but in the form of 
“goodwill”
89
. The findings indicate that a basic goodwill is required to start the 
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Based on descriptive coding “goodwill trust” is the client’s expectancy rather than a belief. 
Therefore, according to the definition specified in the Literature review, the “expectation” does not 
qualify as trust. Thus, the author will regard the ‘lack of confidence and belief” as stated in the 
definition as the rationale behind updating the code.  
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relationship, but the clients do not make decisions trusting the goodwill only. There 
are more factors (e.g. market presence, infrastructure, experience etc.) involved in it. 
Goodwill can be regarded as one of the basic prerequisites to obtain the mandate 
especially at the initial phase of the relationship. Therefore, Code V needs to be 
updated from goodwill trust to goodwill.  
After the first cycle coding, the data indicates the following: 
A. The banker-client relationship in M&A cannot exist without trust i.e. the codes 
occur in all categories apart from the “Decline” category. 
B. The evolution of trust in investment bank(er)-client relationship follows the 
RLC 
C. Codes I – IV occur in different categories i.e. at different phases of the 
relationship. However, Code VI i.e. contractual trust does not occur in any of 
the categories. 
D. Apart from codes I-IV, no other code i.e. type of trust is present in the 
categories and hence in the RLC. 
E. Code V i.e. goodwill trust needs to be updated to goodwill. 
Therefore, reflecting on Hatch (2002), Saldana (2010) and the above-mentioned 
indications, the changes in the second cycle changes are as follows: 
1) The category “Decline” phase has been deleted (based on A) 
2)  Code VI i.e. Contractual trust has been deleted (based on C) 
The other categories (based on B) and codes (based on A, C, and D) remain 
unchanged. The updated codes and categories depicting the changes have been 





Categories: Introduction phase, Growth/ Build-up phase, Maturity phase 
Code I Interpersonal trust 
Code II Company trust 
Code III Product trust 
Code IV Performance trust 
Code V Goodwill  
 
Table 11: Updated codes and categories after the first cycle coding 
 
Coding technique for the second cycle  
Pattern codes are “explanatory or inferential codes” which identify one or more 
emergent themes, configurations, or explanations. “They pull together a lot of 
information into a lot of materials into a more meaningful and parsimonious unit of 
analysis. They are meta-code” (p. 69) Pattern coding helps to group the summaries 
into a fewer number of sets. (Miles & Huberman 1994) 
Miles & Huberman (1994) suggest that pattern coding is ideal 
 for the second cycle coding after the initial coding is done 
 to develop major themes and patterns from the data. e.g. explanation of the 
occurrence of a phenomenon  
 to search and identify the causes and explanations in the data. 
 To study social networks and patterns of relationships 
Pattern coding draws the attention of the researcher to the conditions, causes, and 
explanations by identifying words and consequential phrases like “if”, “then”, 




Therefore, pattern coding would be appropriate for the second cycle of this research 
project. After the first cycle coding, similarly coded passages were identified from the 
data-set.  
As suggested by Saldana (2010), pattern coding has been then used in developing the 
major pattern of actions in the bank(er)-client relationship to study trust evolution.  An 
example of the pattern coding is as follows: 
The following are some quotes in the context of a client following a senior banker to 
another IB i.e. choosing the banker over the bank 
Interviewee 1: When I moved here from a different bank, it was like that I have moved 
here, it would be great if we continue the dialogue. But some people can be like you, 
are nice but I do not want to deal with that bank…For very high profile individuals 
with very strong brand name it works. But then also I would call it a rare case. We 
are talking about a very small number of people. 
Interviewee 5: Yes it happens, but there are few people who get to that stage…when 
we are talking of large corporations, there are only a few who get at this stage…the 
very big, very senior deal makers, it is actually…the of point of time for very very 
senior bankers when they don`t need the brand name anymore because they are … 
their own brand name… 
Interviewee 6: Oh yes! It does but, it cannot happen to everyone. Can it? It happens 
with the very senior bankers who are very successful. Like very few really big guys 
with lots of strong connections and experience.  
Interviewee 3: But there are very few other cases where very senior executives, they 
take so much trust and relationship capital into one or a few senior bankers that it 
becomes very important... I will give you an example…. (Interviewee 3 followed up 




In the above extracts, the word “but” indicates the exceptions of the common 
circumstances. It identifies the rare phenomenon of clients choosing the banker over 
the bank. The repeated use of the word “very” in the two different contexts, i.e. the 
seniority of the banker and scarcity of the phenomenon taking place, indicates the 
scarcity of the phenomena. The phrases/sentences in bold, thus, infer that the 
phenomenon is extremely rare. 
Therefore, the generated pattern is,  
“The clients can choose the banker over the bank. However, this is a rare situation 
and only very few and very senior banker can reach that stage”. 
Reflecting on the literature review, Hatch (2002) and the codes, it can be said that 
“Trust on the banker can precede the trust on the bank. However, this is a rare 
scenario and very few senior bankers reach that level of trust.” 
   
5.4 Post- second cycle coding findings 
 
A causal relationship has been identified as the “pre-beginning stage” of the 
relationship. The updated Code V leads to codes I, II and III. At this stage codes I, II 
and III exist in a conjoined form and the presence of all three of the codes together is 
essential. This combined existence causes code IV.  
It is interesting to observe that in the first category i.e. the introduction phase, codes I, 
II and III act as the components of code IV i.e. code IV is composed of codes I, II and 
III in the first category. All of codes I, II and III are the causes and the components of 
90 
 
code IV at the same time and are equally important. This phenomenon indicates a 
change in form of the generic level trust. 
90
 
Thus, Code IV is the starting point of the relationship which evolves in the next two 
categories – growth/build-up and maturity phases
91
. The following table will reflect 




I II III IV V 
Introduction Yes (as a component of IV) Yes (with I, II & III 
as its components) 
Yes (causes 
I, II, III) 
Growth / 
Build-up 
Yes (but as a component of the 
evolved IV after the 1
st
 stage of 
evolution) 
Yes (but in a 
different form after 
the 1
st
 stage of 
evolution) 
Yes 
Maturity Yes (but as a component of the 
evolved IV after the 2
nd
  stage of 
evolution) 
Yes (but in a 
different form after 
the 2
nd




Table 12: A snapshot of the code appearances and overlaps in the second cycle coding 
 
In the “Growth/Build-up” category, it was found that codes I, II and III are still 
combined together but as a part of evolved code IV along with the existence of code 
V. This pattern was detected in this category.  
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 This is a phenomenon which can be interesting for further research. The author suggests further 
industry and relationship specific research to delve deep into this topic. However, this thesis 
investigates trust evolution in a generic way and therefore, will regard this phenomenon as out of 
scope.  
91
 To portray this evolution and the pattern of this evolution, the author has taken the aid of typology 
which will be covered in details in the next chapter. 
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In the last category i.e. maturity phase, we find the pattern of further evolution. Code 
IV has evolved further but are still composed of codes I, II and III.  
The detailed results of all the findings of the first and second cycle research will be 
presented in the next chapter.  
 
5.5 Does the research require a third cycle coding? 
 
Scholarly works do not specify exactly how many cycles of coding are actually 
required to get the maximum out of the data. However, reflecting on works by  Sipe & 
Ghiso (2004), Charmaz (2006), Saldana (2010), and, Weber (2015), it can be stated 
that re-coding is not required if  
 no new codes and categories can be added to answer the research questions and 
the contextual questions 
 there is no need to update the existing codes and categories 
 the second cycle is sufficient to reflect and interpret the emergent patterns 
 rearranging, recoding and reclassifying the coded data do not extract any extra 
information from the dataset. 
Code IV, composed of codes I, II and III, changes forms in categories growth/build-up 
and maturity but this phenomenon does not lead to the advent of any new codes 




Assigning new codes to the different forms will not add any value to the research 
because codes I, II and III appear separately at the pre-stage of the relationship and get 
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 All these codes have been found to appear distinctively in the “pre-relationship” phase which has 
not been regarded as a category because this phase is a perceptual phase which is not directly a part of 
the bank(er)-client relationship. The pre-relationship stage is out of the scope of the research as the 
relationship has not started and thus, the evolution of trust has not started either. 
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combined as the relationship proceeds. Conceptually, they remain all the same. 
Recoding, rearranging or reclassifying the data will not yield any extra information. 
The patterns identified at the end of the second cycle are sufficient to answer the 
research questions and the potential contextual questions. 
Therefore, it can be said that all the above-mentioned criteria have been fulfilled. 
Thus, reflecting on Figure 8: An overview of the coding and categorising techniques and 
Weber (2015) it can be concluded that the third cycle coding is not required. 
The following subsections will attempt to answer the question whether the data 
collected to answer the research questions is sufficient to study the trust evolution. 
 
5.6 Data saturation in qualitative interviews 
 
A number of issues affect the size of the sample in QR, but, the main “guiding 
principle” should always be the concept of saturation. A number of authors have 
explored this concept but it is still highly debated, and hardly understood. (Mason 
2010) 
Ritchie et al. (2003) state that any qualitative sample reaches “a point of diminished 
return” (Mason 2010) where more data does not add any new information. According 
to them (Ritchie et al. 2003, Mason 2010), this phenomenon takes place because a 
single occurrence of a code or the data is necessary to make it a part of the framework 
for the analysis. The idea of qualitative research revolves around the meaning and 
deters from coming up with generalized hypothetical statements (Crouch & McKenzie 
2006) so frequencies are scarcely important in QR. A single occurrence of the data is 
as useful as many in QR. Also, QR is “very labour intensive” therefore, analysing big 
sample is not only time-consuming, but also impractical. 
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Different interviewees can have different opinions within a research area. Therefore, 
qualitative samples should be sufficiently large to uncover all or at least most of the 
important perceptions as demanded by the research. But, a larger sample size becomes 
repetitive and superfluous (Mason 2010). The sample size of a researcher who is 
“faithful to the principles of QR”, should abide by the concept of saturation (Glaser & 
Strauss 1967) because the new data fail to add value to the research (Mason 2010).  
Thus, even though there are other factors which might influence the sample size in 
QR, the concept of saturation is mainly used as a “guiding principle” for data 
collection.  
 
5.6.1 Factors determining data saturation 
 
In the majority of the qualitative samples, it is saturation which determines the sample 
size (Mason 2010). According to Charmaz (2006), the aim(s) of the research is the 
main driver of the sample size and the research design. A small study with humble 
targets is expected to reach a saturation point than a study involving multiple 
disciplines (Charmaz 2006). e.g. the sample of a study aiming to explain drug 
addiction in a specific group is expected to reach saturation faster than a study aiming 
to describe drug addiction in general. 
There are seven criteria affecting the size of the sample. These are - the heterogeneous 
nature of the population, the degree of  requirement of criteria is ‘nesting’, the number 
of selection criteria used by the researcher, “groups of special interest" requiring the 
intense study, numerous samples in one study, methods of data collection, and the 
resources (e.g. budget) available to conduct the research (Ritchie et al. 2003). 
According to Morse (2000), the nature of the research topic, the scope of the research, 





. Jette et al. (2003) suggest that the expertise of the researcher on a certain 
topic can help to reduce the number of participants required in a study. Scholars like  
Lee et al. (2002) even claim that studies using multiple in-depth interviews might 
require few participants. 
However, researchers like Dey (1999), Strauss & Corbin (1990) suggest that the idea 
of saturation is not appropriate as it is a matter of degree (Strauss & Corbin 1990). 
According to Strauss & Corbin (1990) the more a researcher delves deep by 
familiarising and analysing the data, the more there will be  potential for the new 
findings to emerge. Therefore, they suggest that saturation should revolve more around 
counter productivity i.e. the new findings do not add anything new to the framework or 
theory or model and ‘answers’ to the research questions [as on (Mason 2010)]. Based 
on these findings Strauss & Corbin (1990) opine that on occasions, one of the notable 
problems faced while developing a certain conclusion(s) is not the shortage of data but 
excess data. Thus, it is the responsibility of the researcher to improvise while 
conducting a research (Mason 2010). 
 
5.6.2 Guidelines on the size of the sample  
 
"Although the idea of saturation is helpful at the conceptual level, it provides little 
practical guidance for estimating sample sizes for robust research prior to data 
collection" (Guest et al. 2006 p. 61). Researchers are often reluctant to suggest a 
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 The concept of saturation is, however, debatable (Mason 2010) as researchers often lack the 
rationale behind claiming that the data is saturated (Morse 1995). QR reports often lack an overall the 
description of what is meant by saturation and the means by which it was achieved (Bowen 2008). E.g. 
an inexperienced researcher studying the “stigma” in obese (wo)men might claim that the data to be 
saturated quickly. However, an experienced researcher would explore the idea and the context of 
stigma in more details and what it essentially means to each of the respondents (as pointed out by 




sufficient or “ideal” sample size as there are numerous factors that might determine the 
sample size of a qualitative study (Mason 2010). 
Even though some researchers offer guidelines for qualitative studies (e.g.: Creswell 
1998; Charmaz 2006; Ritchie et al. 2003; Thomson 2004; Green & Thorogood 2004, 
2009), it is not necessary that the others will adhere to them (Mason 2010).  
The so-called idea of “saturation” is, therefore, a grey zone which can be determined 
by multiple factors. In order to determine the ideal saturation level, this doctoral thesis 
reflects on the existing works (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Strauss & Corbin 1990; Dey 
1999; Ritchie et al. 2003; Charmaz 2006; Morse 2000; Lee et al. 2002; Mason 2010) 
and determines the saturation of the data based on the basis of the following: 
A. New codes are not emerging (based on Ritchie et al. 2003; Mason 2010) 
B. The research question has been answered (Glaser & Strauss 1967) but no 
additional value is being added (Mason 2010) 
C. The aim of the research has been achieved (Charmaz 2006) 
D. No new findings are emerging from the data (Strauss & Corbin 1990; Dey 
1999)  
E. The data is rich (Morse 2000) and multiple in-depth interviews have been used 
(Lee et al.2002) 
 
Is the dataset saturated? 
The data-set fulfills the reliability and credibility criteria suggested by scholars like 
Reisman (1993); Marshall (1996); Mariampolski (2001); Malhotra & Birks (2003); 
Trumbull (2005) and Mason (2010).  
After the first cycle coding, no new codes were found to emerge. However, an update 
in the coding and categorising was required which was done in the second cycle. After 
the second cycle analysis, the emergence of no further new codes or categories has 
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been detected. No new information and findings were detected after the second cycle 
analysis which could add value to the research context in any way. As discussed 
before, this is one of the rationales for not performing a next cycle coding. The same 
rationale holds true for the fulfillment of criteria A and D discussed in the previously. 
All the 10 in-depth interviews were rich in data. However, after analysing the first 5 
interviews, the data-set showed signs of saturation as all the interviewees had a 
unanimous opinion on the process of trust evolution in a bank(er) client relationship.  
The only possibility was to analyse the other interviews in search of any difference in 
opinions and some additional interesting information relevant to the research questions 
as well as the contextual questions.  
The last two interviews echoed the same process of trust evolution but added some 
minute additional ‘facts’ to enrich the data. However, after analysing the last 3 
interviews no new information has been found which can add value to the research. 
The criteria B, C, and E, are therefore regarded as fulfilled.  
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This doctoral thesis investigates the phenomenon of trust evolution in investment 
banker-client relationship in a B2B context
94
. The B2B side of the M&A relationships 
includes only the clients like big corporates, governments etc. This thesis focuses on 
deals
95
 ranging over EUR 1 billion only. 
According to the empirical evidence, the evolution of trust follows the RLC. Hence, 
this thesis studies the phenomenon of trust evolution through the lens of RLC. The 
different phases
96
 of the RLC i.e. introduction, growth/build-up, maturity, and decline 
have been used as categories in this qualitative research. 
Another rationale for using the RLC is that the findings echo the findings of the 
scholars
97
 who have identified a positive relationship between trust and time and is 
coherent to the research. To back up the arguments at different stages, experiences (as 
shared by the interviewees) have been cited to elaborate on the rationale behind the 
phenomenon of trust evolution.  
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 According to the interviewees, for B2C cases there is a limited scope for trust evolution as buying or 
selling small businesses is usually once in a lifetime deal for the owners which restricts the chances of 
trust evolution over a period of time. Therefore, after analysing the interviews, the B2C side of the 
business i.e. the buying and selling of small scale businesses have been ruled out. 
95
 The IBs usually get paid only if the deal is executed. Therefore, to meet the break-even, they focus 
on the threshold of deals over EUR1billion 
96
 As suggested by Kusari et al. (2013)  
97
 e.g. Ring & Van (1994), Gulati & Sytch (2008), Vanneste et al. (2014) 
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1) Exordium - Introduction phase 
2) Incrementum - Build-up phase 
3) Maturitatem - Maturity phase 
4) Declino - Decline phase 
This chapter reflects on the last chapter and identifies the occurrence of the different 
types of trust at different phases of the relationship. The chapter also brings together 
the results of both first and second cycle analysis and attempts to answer the research 
questions. 
Empirical evidence found in the research indicates that the relationship cannot exist 
without trust. Exordium is the first phase of the relationship and it begins with a 
certain degree of trust. This stage occurs when the client starts to do business with the 
bank(er). However, in order to comprehend this phase, one needs to understand the 
pre-relationship phase, without which Exordium will never exist. 
 
6.1.1 The ‘pre-relationship’ stage in a ‘successful’ bank(er)-client relationship 
 
“…trust definitely exists between the investment bankers and their clients in M&A as 
the whole business run on trust…because the clients will never give a mandate to the 
bank or the banker whom they do not trust…but trust takes a while to grow.” 
-Interviewee 3  
According to the empirical evidence from the data-set, the author has also found that 
Performance trust is the first step of trust evolution. This Performance trust
99
 is 
speculative in nature and is the result of the existence of goodwill. There is no phase of 
neutrality or phase of indifference.  
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 Additional note: This is not a result of experience (as suggested by scholars like Kusari et al. 2013). 
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The interviewees suggested that the reputed IBs are not usually interested in deals 
below EUR1 billion thresholds. Therefore, given the fee structure (1% base fee and 
2% discretionary fee) of the IBs, the phenomenon of the non-existence of the 
neutrality phase is justifiable. If the importance of the deals and the amount of money 
involved in the deals are considered, it can be said that a substantial amount of money 
is on jeopardy for a phase of “neutrality” or a “feeling of indifference”. 
“I think if it’s a brand like Morgan Stanley…it would just be the ‘trust’ on the 
goodwill and brand name of the company…and that automatically makes clients trust 
to some degree...obviously, the very senior people at the bank will start building up 
interpersonal relationships and trust which are important to win business…but 
especially in Europe which is extremely overbanked, it is literally the goodwill of the 
brand name...the clients trust them and expect a good level of work from a big brand.” 
-Interviewee 5 
When an investment banker approaches a client for the first time with the pitch, the 
brand name and the track record of the bank act as the “gate-pass”. The brand name 
of the bank ‘assures’ the client that the banker and his team are well equipped in terms 
of “resources, knowledge, infrastructure and are professional enough to handle their 
multi-billion dollar M&A deal” (Interviewee 5). In a way, this goodwill communicates 
the responsiveness, understanding and empathy to the client
100
. At this stage, 
recommendations by previous clients act as ‘evidence’ of a track record for the IBs 
and thus constitutes to the goodwill.  
The goodwill can also be the result of “reputation, the bank’s network and expertise in 
the specific sector” (Interviewee 9). The existing goodwill of the bank leads the client 
to have an initial speculative trust on the IB, the pitch, as well as the banker and his 
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 The author’s findings reflect the works of McCrosky (1992); McCrosky & Teven (1999). 
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Reflecting on the Lufthansa example cited in the “Literature review”, it can be said 
that the goodwill of Lufthansa gets transferred to trust on the complete performance of 
the brand. Similarly, in case of a banker-client relationship, “…trust on the banker is 
relevant but it all starts with the goodwill of the bank…” (Interviewee 5) 
In a similar way, the goodwill of the bank leads the client to trust the product, the 
service and the skills, integrity, and efficiency of the banker and his team who are 
representing the bank. Thus, goodwill is the cause while the company trust, 
interpersonal trust, and product trust are the cumulative effects which eventually result 
in a performance trust i.e. the first phase of the relationship.  
It should be noted that all of the company, interpersonal and product trusts are 
“equally important” in order to start and continue the relationship. The M&A clients 
are “all highly educated and knowledgeable professionals” (Interviewee 10) who are 
answerable to their own stakeholders. Therefore, if a banker is representing a big IB 
with an excellent track record but the product
102
 is not good enough (i.e. product trust 
is absent) the relationship might not start at all. Similarly, if the banker has a bad 
reputation (e.g. known for not delivering or has been related to a scam
103
; which are 
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 As suggested by Hawes & Barnhourse (1987); Hayes & Hartley (1989) and as reflected in the 
author’s findings 
102
 All the interviewees unanimously referred to M&A services as the “product” 
103
 A very interesting finding from the interviews was the effect of scams on company trust. According 
to the interviewees, some of the big corporates are “matured enough” not to blame the M&A 
department if something goes wrong in some other desk (e.g. Sales & trading)). The word “wrong” 
implies scams. If the bank is performing well or has performed well in the past, this might not affect 
the client’s trust in the company. However, it certainly indicates that there are loopholes in the security 
desired by the clients and improvements are required. For a first time client, this might hamper the 
goodwill and the client might not trust a bank which has been involved in some controversy lately. In 
that case, the relationship might not start at all.  
However, if the client is a government concern, there is a comparatively higher probability that the 
issue of scams will influence the client’s decision making. According to the interviewees, the 
government concerns are less tolerant about scams as they answer to the public about their decision 
and it might affect their public image and their party’s image. They will have to ‘explain their 
association’ with a ‘corrupt’ organisation in the parliament too. Even if the deal goes wrong for some 
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both exceptional cases), it can prevent the development of interpersonal trust, and the 
relationship might not proceed or develop, although the product is good and the IB has 
a goodwill. However, this is a theoretical situation, because, under ‘normal’ 
circumstances the IB will be reluctant to give charge to a banker with a bad reputation 
as it might hamper their goodwill, and hence winning the mandate and starting the 
relationship might be difficult. 
The interviewees also indicate that even if the banker is reputed and the product is 
good but the IB has been involved in some controversies or scams in the recent times, 
the clients might be reluctant to trust the bank. This is an interesting topic which will 
be covered in detail later. 
The interviewees have been unanimous about the fact that the cumulative existence of 
the company, product, and interpersonal trust, form the backbone of the relationship at 
all the stages. Without the presence of any one of these three types of trust, there is a 
probability that the relationship will end
104
.  
Goodwill is, therefore, the first step towards a ‘successful’ investment bank(er)-client 
relationship. The following section elaborates on the constructs of goodwill in the 
context of the research.  
 
6.1.2 The constructs of goodwill at the “pre-relationship” phase 
 
To get a mandate, the bank(er) will have to demonstrate to the client that he and his 
employer has the resources, knowledge, network, infrastructure, reputation, 
professional attitude as well as the experience/track record to handle a multi-billion 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
other reason, the ruling party might have to face some uncomfortable questions from the opposition. 
This part will be covered in details under the subheading "Scams”. 
104
 This thesis does not cover the issue of trust measurement but, according to the empirical evidences 
found by the author, a minimum degree of trust needs to be present for the relationship to continue. 
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Euro deal. In a nutshell, the bank(er) is capable enough to live up to the client’s 
expectations of perceived performance and trust induced by the goodwill mindset. 
According to Interviewee 5, goodwill “…helps as a door-opener…” because 
understanding the clients is a very important quality of the bank(er).  It is about 
knowing the client’s “ideas, feelings and needs” and “getting to the point” where a 
potential client gets the idea that the bank(er) knows what is required from him while 
the communication takes place. The banker’s responsiveness to the client’s concerns is 
equally important in this context. The bank(er) needs to be responsive to the client’s 
needs. E. g: If a certain client is having a certain issue with financing the deal, 
acknowledging that need and coming up with the idea of financing (e.g.: providing a 
credit line) might lead to capitalisation of the goodwill. 
However, it is important for the trust relationship that the bank(er) states honestly and 
clearly what he thinks about a certain deal. If he does not give his honest opinion, the 
relationship might suffer at a later stage
105
.  
The author’s analysis also indicates that it is about communicating that the bank(er) 
recognizes the views of the client as valid views even if he disagrees with them
106
. An 
honest opinion (even a disagreement) can build up trust instantly and give a head–start 
to the relationship (as suggested by Interviewee 5). At the “pre-relationship” phase, the 
relationship has not started but, the IBs are being screened by their clients based on 
their goodwill. Therefore, it is important to note that, at this stage, goodwill is not 
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 Elaborated with examples under the Declino phase 
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 Teven & McCrosky (1997); McCrosky & Teven (1999) & McCrosky (1992) have identified 





 but instead perception
108




Based on the analysis, the following figure identifies the constructs of the goodwill, 
specific to the research context. A further explanation of the figure will be covered in 
the following subsections.   
 
Figure 9: The vital constructs of Goodwill in order to get the mandate 
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 The author’s findings reflect the works of Plank et al. (1999), Scheer (2012), Kusari et al. (2013) 
a.o. 
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 Based on the works of Teven & McCrosky (1997) McCrosky & Teven (1999) & McCrosky (1992) 
, Sako (1997), Sako & Helper (1998)  and the author’s findings 
109
 Additional note: According to Rotter (1967), it can be regarded as trust. However, the author 




Track record and recommendation  
Track record and recommendation is really important at the initial stage of the 
relationship
110
. Apart from the discretionary fees in M&A, the satisfied clients also 
give the IBs recommendations. The IBs add these recommendations to their portfolio 
to show their ‘symbol of excellence’. They use them as marketing tools showcasing 
their understanding, empathy, and responsiveness i.e. goodwill. The IBs’ previous 
client relationships, thus, play a critical role in executing the new initiatives
111
. 
However, it is rare to find a ‘well connected’ party who is not directly related to the 
deal dictating which bank(er) should get the mandate. The 3
rd
 party recommendations 
(even if not connected to the deal) signal trustworthiness of goodwill, and put the 
bank(er) a step forward in getting the mandate.   
The 3
rd
 party recommendations can also be related (or regarded as a part) to the track 
record which conveys to the client that the bank(er) has executed similar or bigger 
deals i.e. is ‘well-equipped’ to take care of a similar mandate. This acts as a part of the 
“gate-pass” (Interview 5). The track record signals to the client that the bank(er) has 
the resources, infrastructure, knowledge, reputation, integrity and the skills to execute 
a big M&A deal efficiently. 
The track record, along with its “infomediaries”,
112
 helps to signal the perception of 
perceived caring
113
, to the client. Thus, a positive impression is formed on the basis of 
this background
114
 which eventually helps the client to make his decision
115
. This 
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 As found by the author and supported by Mouzas & Naude (2007) 
111
 The author’s findings reflect the findings of Mouzas & Naude (2007) 
112
 Based on authors findings and supported by Swaminathan (2003) 
113
 As suggested earlier by McCrosky (1992);  McCrosky & Teven (1999) and the author’s findings 
114
 As suggested by Dasgupta (2000) and coherent to the author’s findings 
115
 Based on author’s findings, supported  by Swaminathan  (2003) 
116




“There are always 3 things…it is always the access...the market they are covering, the 
specific product they are covering and the region they are covering…like are they 
effective in Europe?....if they have a strong network here…how strong they are in 
M&A…If they have it, only then they can give a fitting offering, what fits the clients”.                                                  
- Interviewee 10 
Competence
117
 is as one of the key determinants of goodwill
118
. According to the 
author’s findings, at this stage, competence is determined by the access to the market 
the bank(er) is covering i.e. the network of the IB, the product, and the region. The 
bank(er) must have the network because “…the first thing is…network with investors 
and counterparties…it is very important…” (Interviewee 3) and “People do 
networking because…if you have a good network, it widens your access to the 
market…” (Interviewee 1)   
An efficient network boosts the competency and gives an edge over others. The access 
to the market is widened and there are more opportunities to win businesses, as the 
clients are not usually expected to give a mandate to an IB which does not have an 
efficient network
119
 (Interviewee 1, 2, 3, 10, and 6).  
                                                          
117
 Scholars, over the years, have defined competency in different ways. Prahlad & Hamel (1990) 
opined that if a firm grows like a tree and competencies being the collective learning of the 
organisations nourish the roots. Competence is “communication, involvement and deep commitment” 
(p. 279) involving many levels and all functions. The findings of scholars like McCrosky (1992), 
McCrosky & Teven (1999), Teven & McCrosky (1997) also regarded these aspects as constructs of 
goodwill. The author’s findings are coherent with their findings. 
118
 Based on author’s findings and supported by Teven & McCrosky (1997) 
119
 Under the literature review, the concept of network approach has been covered. It focusses on the 
idea of firms using exchange relationships to achieve their goals. Given the nature of M&A business, 
the application of network approach seems appropriate.  Thus, combining the opinions of Teven & 
McCrosky (1997), McCrosky & Teven (1999) and the advocates of the network approach (Håkansson 
& Snehota 1990; Araujo & Mouzas 1994; Mouzas & Araujo 2000 a.o.) along with the findings of the 
author, it can be said that business networks determine competency and competency leads to goodwill. 
In M&A, competency is thus, a direct determinant of the goodwill or “perceived care”. 
Additional note: Please refer to the works of McCrosky (1992), McCrosky & Teven (1999), Teven & 
McCrosky (1997) for details on the determinants of goodwill and the works of Håkansson  & Snehota 
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The findings from the interviews indicate that the term competency is being used as an 
umbrella which covers the IB’s infrastructure, knowledge, professional attitude, 
business networks, honesty, and integrity
120
. All these factors together contribute to the 
“collective learning” of the IB’s deep commitment and the perception of a certain 
degree of competence is formed. 
 
Brand image 
“In the first instance, my business cards enable me to have a conversation with clients 
because they intuitively believe in the brand name…for big clients, at the beginning it 
is company trust... there will be a significant influence of brand perception to the 
goodwill of the bank or the franchise...there is a perception that it is certain…I will 
phrase it more carefully - a certain minimum level of quality…There is a floor to the 
quality of the product or the service being delivered by the big banks… certain banks 
are typically perceived as being stronger in some products than the others…for a very 
large merger, a brand name is sort of a necessity, let`s say, such as Morgan Stanley or 
Goldman Sachs or so on, can give a little bit of an extra… You can call it a 
‘guarantee’ that there will be an implicit minimum standard.” 
-Interviewee 5 
The results of the analysis combined with the state-of-the-art literature
121
 indicate that 
the client’s positive perception of the big brands like Morgan Stanley and Goldman 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(1990, 1995), Araujo & Mouzas  (1994), Mouzas & Naude (2007), Johanson & Mattsson (1992) for 
network approach. 
120
 Combining the findings of scholars (Prahlad & Hamel 1990 McCrosky 1992; McCrosky. & Teven 
1999; Teven & McCrosky 1997) and the empirical evidence found by the author 
121 The findings of Fishbein & Ajzen (1975), Hsieh & Lindridge (2005) and Koubaa (2008) (as 
pointed out in the literature review have been reflected in the opinions of the interviewees multiple 
times.  
Additional note: The descriptive beliefs (as on Fishbein & Ajzen 1975) can be excluded because it is 
the result of direct experience because at this pre-relationship stage, the bank(er)-client relationship 
has not started. At this phase, the client has a pool of IBs with their respective shares of goodwill. 
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Sachs is reflected when they consider doing business with the investment bankers 
representing those IBs, although they do not have any past experience with those 
specific IBs
122
.  The brand names of these banks come with a minimum standard of 
service ‘guarantee’. The brand image in the client’s mind is the manifestation of either 
or both of these two beliefs. 
In the research context, the informational, as well as the inferential belief, can be 
formed by client recommendations, track records etc. “Competence” and 
“Recommendation/track record” can, therefore, be regarded as overlapping sets. It 
depends upon the point of view of the author whether to look at them separately or 
consider them as a part of the same set. 
Recommendations and track record can add to the competence and the brand image of 
the IB, or it can directly build up trust on the goodwill of the IB. Both of these 
elements can be informational or inferential belief at the same time. “Competence”, on 
the other hand, acts as inferential belief based on informational belief. It can also be 
directly beneficial the brand image.
 123
 
Each of the elements – brand image, recommendation/track record, and competence 
can lead to the initial trust on the goodwill as independent elements or can strengthen 
the solo element of the brand image (by means of inferential or informational belief) 
and thus lead to trust. The indirect influence has been represented by a dotted arrow in 
Figure 9: The vital constructs of Goodwill in order to get the mandate. 
This subsection brought into consideration the constructs of the goodwill relevant to 
understand the rationale behind the existence of initial level of perceived care due to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Therefore, the client has an image of “perceived care” they can expect from each IB. But, they have no 
direct experience on if a specific bank can live up to their perceptions. Thus, the client’s perception of 
the brand is based on either informational or inferential beliefs or both. The informational beliefs are 
based on the sources of information from outside while the inferential beliefs are the formed by 
making correct or incorrect inferences (Koubaa 2008). Please refer to the works of Huber & McCann 
(1982) & Koubaa (2008) for details. 
122
 This feature has also been reflected in the findings of Titman & Trueman (1986) 
123
 E.g. A client’s perception might be solely based upon the track record and the recommendation. 
108 
 
goodwill. According to the interviewees, it is essential for the first stage of the banker-
client relationship to take place.  This subsection acts as the backdrop of trust 
evolution in a bank(er)-client relationship by covering an overview of the pre-
relationship stage. The following subsections will focus directly on the trust evolution 
and answer the research questions.  
 
6.2 Exordium – The introduction phase 
 
“You need to trust their performance before giving them the mandate. The bankers 
and their teams need to support the clients with all kinds of different analyses and 
other services. Only then the clients trust them. You need to have the product, the 
bankers, and the bank all in order. Only then a client will trust your performance. 
That’s how it starts. At the beginning, they need to have an initial level trust.” 
- Interviewee 8 
This is the first phase of the relationship which begins with “Performance trust”. As 
discussed before, it is the cumulative result of the existence of the company, product, 
and interpersonal trust. It is a “perception”, “expectation” and confidence that come 
with the brand name of the bank, although the client has never done business with the 
bank.  
Goodwill of the bank leads to an initial level of confidence on the IB, the product, and 
the investment banker. Due to the existence of goodwill, the client, who has not done 
business with a certain IB before, trusts the performance of the bank(er)s due to the 
goodwill of the bank. In other words, the goodwill of the IB is transmitted to the 
bank(er) and his team
124
. This triggers the client’s belief in the bank(er)’s abilities to 
deliver the process as smoothly as desired.  
                                                          
124
 Please refer to the “Lufthansa” example for details. 
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Executing an M&A transaction is a long and complicated process. The job of the bank 
(hence the banker and his team) is to facilitate the process. According to Interviewee 1, 
there are approximately 100 employees in the IB who are involved in the deal at some 
point or the other. Therefore, a general performance trust on all is really important in 
order to begin the relationship. If the client is not convinced that the bank(er) and his 
team are not capable enough to run the process smoothly, the mandate will not be 
given to them. 
Performance trust is thus the first stage in trust evolution in an investment bank(er)-
client relationship
125
 as the client tries to determine the integrity and the performance 
of the banker
126
 based on perception
127
. 
“…you need an initial level of trust to make the decision with whom you are going to 
work because every single decision, to a point, is competitive for every single M&A 
deal out there…deals do not happen as a surprise, you need some initial trust to start 
with …once you start working on it, you will have big teams involved on both sides of 
the bank and of the client…and that is actually where the real issue of trust starts as 
they have never done business with the bank before….it is like starting from a zero 
with speculated trust…at the beginning, there is a certain degree of apprehension…” 
- Interviewee 9 
Thus, the introduction stage begins with the initial level of trust and when the banker 
gets the mandate and starts to work on execution. However, this stage can consist of 
multiple deals as a certain client might want to monitor/evaluate the “bank’s or the 
banker’s” performance in multiple deals before actually trusting him
128
.   
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 Based on author’s findings supported by  Kusari et al. (2013) 
126
 Based on author’s analysis and reflection on Dwyer et al. (1987) 
127
 Based on author’s analysis supported by  McCrosky (1992); Teven & McCrosky (1997); McCrosky 
& Teven (1999) 
128
 In this situation, the behavioural aspect comes into consideration, as suggested by Singh & 
Sirdeshmukh (2000); Schurr & Ozanne (1985) 
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At the initial stage of the relationship, the client trusts the banker because he is 
representing a certain IB
129
. It is the speculated interpersonal trust caused by the trust 
on the bank i.e. the client trusts the banker because of the IB
130
.  At this stage, 
‘underperformance’ or ‘breach of trust’ by either the bank or the banker) might affect 
the whole relationship
131
. According to interviewees, if another banker in the same IB 
(irrespective of the business area) does something unethical, it will hamper the 
goodwill of the bank and might have an adverse effect on the relationship.  
Interviewees refer to “some other factors” too which can affect the relationship 
especially at this stage. Interviewee 5 gave a specific example. Sometimes, the IBs, 
give “bundle deals”
 132
 to the clients. Providing a “bundle deal” at the initial level 




“If you lead a process which is very chaotic or at any step and it does not deliver the 
results you have been promising, then you probably will not gain the trust because the 
client will not trust you to perform as you have promised…like any other walk of life. 
You are not going to trust a bus driver who is not able to navigate out of the car 
park.” 
- Interviewee 3 
                                                          
129
 According to the author’s findings 
130
 As shown by Titman & Trueman (1986). However, if the banker is very high profile (e.g. one of 
the top M&A bankers in Europe) there is a probability the client would be more comfortable with him 
because of his brand name. 
131
 Due to high and strict monitoring as found by the author and suggested by Kusari et al. (2013) 
132
 The bundle consists of the M&A service as well as the financing of the credit-line to sponsor the 
M&A and other services. The bank charges interest on the credit line which is an important mode for 
their revenue. However, this “bundle” deal is not restricted to this phase of the relationship only as it 
can be provided at all stages of the relationship. The consequences of the “bundle deal” will be 
covered as a sub-section under “Declino - The decline phase” section. 
133
 As suggested by Henneberg et al. (2007) and put forward as a theoretical possibility by the 
Interviewee 5, becausee big clients usually deal with multiple banks to diversify the risks. Any other 
IB would take the opportunity to seize the mandate from their competitor. 
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An efficient delivery and performance at this stage help to consolidate and capitalise 
on the initial but ‘inexperienced’ and speculative performance trust from the client’s 
side which he has shown on the bank by giving the mandate. A competent 
performance helps to push the relationship to the next phase
134
.  
Any kind of suspicious or opportunistic behaviour might halt the evolution of trust
135
. 
However, ethical behaviour from the banker’s side can result in instant trust. 
Interviewee 5 shared an interesting experience to support this argument. According to 
him, the client needs to know that the banker’s first priority is the client’s interest. 
When Interviewee 5 approached a first time client, he negated an M&A deal as he did 
not find it to suit the best interests of the client. As discussed before, the bank gets paid 
only if the deal is executed and, therefore, it is the best interest of the bank as well as 
the banker to “push a deal”. So, the client was astonished by such a gesture of 
professionalism and honesty as “no other banker has suggested anything like that to 
him before”. At this point, the client understood that the banker is working for his best 
interest and can be counted upon because his initial ‘monitoring’ revealed positive 
results on the integrity and honesty of the banker. This marked the beginning of a long 
and fruitful business relationship. In the long run, the banker eventually received a few 
mandates from that particular client, in the following years. That client was still with 
that particular bank when the interview was conducted. Interviewee 5 was the banker 
who negated the deal and he is still the one in charge of looking after that particular 
client. 
In introduction stage, the banker and the bank need to capitalise on their existing 
goodwill in the market through their performance
136
. Therefore, the key to enhance the 
relationship to the next phase of trust evolution is by ensuring an efficient delivery i.e. 
the performance needs to be excellent (or at least up to the expectations) at this stage 
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 Based on author’s  findings and supported by Johnson & Grayson (2005); Kusari et al. (2013) 
135
 Based on author’s analysis and the works of Kusari et al. (2013) 
136
 Some of the clients might ‘test’ the service of the bank by giving them relatively smaller mandates 
although it is a rare scenario because usually the big IBs target the deals over EUR1 billion 
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as the bank and the banker is being monitored and evaluated very closely. The 
bank(er) must live up to the goodwill of the brand name. It is very important to 
communicate the idea that the IB is “working on the client’s interest” in order to make 




6.3 Incrementum – The growth/build-up phase 
 
This is the second phase of trust evolution. The author has taken the aid of typology 
and named it “Experiential performance trust”
138
 due to its nature. The rationale 
behind using this typology is as follows: 
As explained before, the starting phase of the banker-client relationship is 
“Performance trust” caused by the goodwill of the bank. Goodwill causes 
interpersonal, company and product trust which leads to performance trust due to 
which the bank(er) gets the mandate. However, at the introductory stage, the client can 
only speculate about the performance and delivery of the bank(er) because he has not 
experienced the performance of the bank. Since executing a deal is time-consuming; 
the client gets the chance to experience the service of the bank(er) for a relatively long 
period of time. This gives him the opportunity to check if the bank(er) can live up to 
the goodwill and, hence, the speculated performance trust. The introductory phase is 
thus not only the chance for the bank(er) to prove his efficiency to the client but also, 
the client has the opportunity to test if the bank(er) can live up to the reputation
139
. If 
monitoring reveals a lack of good performance or the client becomes suspicious about 
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 Based on the author’ analysis and supported by Scheer (2012) 
138
 Additional note: Experiential Performance trust should not be confused with History-based-trust 
(and its two psychological facets of trust) due to its extreme dependency on the degree of interaction, 
personalisation and irrelevancy to the research context. For details, please refer to Kramer (1996). 
139
 Based on the author’s analysis and the works of Kusari et al. (2013) 
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the bank(er) ‘moves or intentions’ due to a lack of transparency or due to opportunistic 
behaviour, trust, and, hence the relationship might get affected
140
.  
Experiential performance trust is the phase where the client has experienced the 
service of the bank(er) through monitoring and has found it satisfactory
141
. This 
existence of this phase essentially indicates that the bank(er) has executed at least one 
or more deals for the same client and has lived up to the client’s expectations. This 
phase is the result of the client’s positive experience which has transformed the basic 
and initial speculative Performance trust into stronger Experiential Performance trust. 
A positive experience in the previous phase leads to this phase. 
The first key indicator of client satisfaction in M&A deals is the full payment of the 
discretionary fees. If the bank(er) is successful in running a deal efficiently or has 
simplified a complicated process i.e. the performance has met/surpassed the clients’ 
expectations, the clients pay the full discretionary fees. 
The second key indicator is the recommendation. The recommendations act as the 
“proof of excellence” to the IBs
142
 as they use it as a ‘marketing tool’
143
 to 
communicate their expertise in the field and add on to their goodwill which is the 
cause of the first step of trust evolution. 
Experiential Performance trust is the result of positive experience and therefore is 
characterized by the increase in business
144
 for the IB. At this stage, the client has 
more trust than that at the beginning of the relationship and feels relatively more 
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 Based on author’s analysis and the works of Dwyer et al. (1987); Jap & Ganesan (2000) 
141
 It should be noted that, if the relationship reaches this phase, it implies that the client’s expectations 
have been met in the first phase. 
142
 The IBs add it to their portfolio to show-case their goodwill. If the client is not happy with the 
service he will not give a recommendation. This phenomenon works like any other consumer product 
(e.g. Interviewee 10 cited the example of an iPhone). His rationale was that if a consumer is not happy 
with the service of an iPhone, he will not buy it again or recommend it to others.  
143
 For details, please refer to Dasgupta (2000); Lax & Sebenius (2003); Swaminathan (2003) 
144
 Based author’s analysis and the implications in the works of on Kusari et al. (2013) 
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‘courteous’ towards the bank(er)
145
. The increase in trust, certainty, and expectations 
are marked by bigger mandates and increased interdependencies
146
 (in this context it 
might be financing through credit line)
147
 as the clients expect this “mutually 
beneficial” business relationship to continue in the long run
148
. 
The author’s analysis indicates that, at this stage, a dualism of trust exists in the 
investment bank(er)-client relationship. The client has experienced the service of both 
the banker and the bank and has found the performance in line with his expectations. 
However, the phenomenon of the client trusting the bank(er) because he represents a 
specific IB remains as was.  This phenomenon of the dualism of trust can change in 
the next phase of trust evolution. 
 
6.4 Maturitatem – The maturity phase 
 
The author regards this phase as the most interesting phase of trust evolution in an 
investment banker-client relationship. At this stage, trust evolves in two different ways 
when the bank and the banker split i.e. the banker decides to leave the bank or is made 
redundant. It is really interesting to find what happens when a senior banker leaves the 
IB and decides to join another IB or to open his own boutique. In such a situation the 
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 As suggested by Scheer 2012 and supported by the author’s analysis 
146
 As suggested by Dwyer et al. (1987) and experiences shared by the interviewees 
147
 Additional note: Even though “financing the credit line” implies an increase in interdependencies, it 
can also be regarded as a ‘threat’ to trust. It will be covered in details under “Declino – The decline 
phase”. The “financing” is controlled by a different department and the M&A department has very 
little or sometimes no influence on their decision making. If due to some reasons (e.g. change in 
regulations or the IB’s policies and strategies) the “financing through credit line” is stopped, it can 
have an adverse impact on trust because some of the clients can take it as a ‘breach of trust’ from the 
IB’s side. The result of this ‘breach of trust’ usually ends up in sending the bank to what the 
investment bankers call “the black box” (Source: Interviews). Being in the “black box” means that the 
client will avoid dealing with the bank till the time the bank regains their trust. The term “black box” 
is commonly used by investment bankers which denotes a situation in which a certain IB is blacklisted 
by a client i.e. the clients will avoid doing business with that IB (based on the interviews) 
However, the ‘threat’ of “financing the credit line” is not restricted to the “Experiential performance 
trust” only, as it can range to the next phases of the relationship too. These phenomena will be covered 
separately in the following subsections. 
148
 As suggested by Kusari et al. (2013) and the author’s analysis 
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clients are left with the option to choose between the bank and the banker. Therefore, 
there can be two situations in such a scenario.  
Situation 1: The client(s) follows the banker rather than staying with the bank 
Situation 2: The client(s) stays with the bank rather than following the banker to a new 
IB  
These two scenarios are elaborated under the next sub-sections. However, it should be 
noted that irrespective of the scenarios, trust is highest
149
 at this level. 
 
6.4.1 Situation 1: Superior interpersonal trust 
 
“…the further you move up the relationship pyramid, the more personal it gets. And I 
guess that is the case with the very big, very senior bankers…it is actually rare but it 
happens…After a certain point of time, there comes a point for very senior bankers 
when they do not need the brand name anymore because they are their own brand 
name…” 
-Interviewee 3 
This is a rare scenario which can be applied for the extremely high profile, reputed and 
senior investment bankers only. According to interviewees, it takes at least 20-25 years 
for the banker to develop this kind of high-trust relationship with the client – if he can 
develop such a relationship at all. To support his argument, Interviewee 3 cited the 
example of a very senior investment banker called Paul J Taubman. The author 
capitalised on that example and has illustrated it further in Appendix 8. 
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 Author’s findings reflect the works of Kusari et al. (2013) 
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The cases like those of Paul J Taubman, are specific instances in which the evolution 
of trust in the investment banker-client relationship is dramatically visible at this stage. 
The banker-client relationship began with speculated trust which was induced by the 
goodwill of the IB. It was the goodwill of the brand name of the bank which led the 
client to trust the banker. However, this case of Paul J Taubman indicates that, at this 
stage, the client’s trust on one particular banker can precede his trust on a big bank.  
Due to the fact that he performed very well for almost 3 decades, it can be argued if 
the prevailing trust is (Experiential) Performance trust. However, interviewees 1, 2, 3, 
5, 6, 7 and 8 unanimously agree that this is the client’s trust on one particular 
investment banker and this phenomenon is applicable in “very rare cases” for “very 
few” and “very high profile deal makers”. The author’s analysis indicates that trust, at 
this stage, is not a generic Performance trust or Experiential Performance trust, but 
instead, it prevails completely at the interpersonal level. It is the client’s belief and 
confidence that this banker will ensure that everything goes well with the deals. The 
honesty and integrity of this individual are ‘beyond question’. This case indicates that 
one banker can become so trustworthy (and signal so much trustworthiness) to the 




At this stage of the relationship, the banker and the client both experience satisfaction 
and deeply trust each other
151
. The relationship would not have reached this stage if 
the banker had not been consistent with his performance or had appeared non-
                                                          
150
 Interviewees (3, 6, 7 and 9) pointed out that his trend has influenced the phenomenon of a number 
of senior and reputed investment bankers leaving the bank and opening their own boutiques because of 
their clients’ high trust on them. 
 Additional note: Trust, at this phase should not be confused with the concept of “reliance” suggested 
by Henneberg et al. (2007). The clients are not reliant on a specific bank or banker as the competition 
is tough in the market and there are plenty of banks and bankers who are more than willing to replace 
another banker. This is an example of a dramatic trust evolution and how strong can interpersonal trust 
become in an investment banker-client relationship. 
151
 As suggested by Kusari et al. (2013) and the author’s findings 
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trustworthy at any of the previous stages
152
. The relationship reaches this stage if the 
banker has been consistently performing for a long duration i.e. “20-25 years”
153
. The 
client’s willingness to take risks at this stage indicates their high trust on that specific 
banker
154
. Stopping business with an IB which has given him efficient service for a 
long time is a big risk taken by the client. This is a situation in which the client’s trust 
is tested
155
.   
Situation 1 of the Maturitatem phase depicts a scenario which follows the phase where 
a dualism of trust exists i.e. the client trusts both the bank and the banker. However, 
trust on the banker (i.e. at interpersonal level) precedes the trust at company level (i.e. 
at the company level). Till the Incrementum phase, the client would have chosen the 
IB over the banker
156
. But, at this phase, when given the choice, the client decides to 
choose the banker as he trusts the banker more than he trusts the bank. Thus, this stage 
marks a ‘dramatic’ evolution of trust as the client’s trust on the banker is stronger than 
the trust on the bank in spite of the fact that the basis of the relationship was the 
goodwill of the bank.   
This evolved trust cannot be called “Interpersonal trust” as interpersonal trust is the 
trust on the banker and the teams as an entire unit, which is involved in an M&A deal 
at different phases of the execution. Given the fact that the banker approached the 
client for the first time during the pre-relationship phase, the interpersonal trust is 
generic in nature and induced by the goodwill of the IB. During the previous phases of 
the relationship, trust on the banker was a part of the interpersonal trust, induced by a 
general expectancy. But, this stage of the relationship witnesses the separation of the 
trust on the banker and being transformed into a stronger type of trust, at a personal 
level.  
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 Based on the works of Kusari et al. (2013) and the author’s analysis 
153
 Based on the findings of the author 
154
 As suggested Jap & Ganesan (2000); Günter et al. (2011) and supported by the author’s analysis 
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 Author’s findings reflecting the work of Günter et al. (2011) 
156
 Based on author’s findings 
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Therefore, the author has taken the aid of typology and called it “Superior 
Interpersonal trust”. The main rationales behind using this specific terminology are: 
firstly, this trust is embedded more at an interpersonal level
157
. Secondly, although 
there are similarities, the Superior Interpersonal trust is stronger than that of the 
generic interpersonal trust.  
At this phase of the relationship, the existing level of Superior Interpersonal trust is a 
‘one-man-show’ starring only one individual – the senior investment banker. Superior 
Interpersonal trust is specific to the investment banker-client relationship context and 
is stronger in nature from the speculative Performance trust and Experiential 
Performance trust. According to the interviewees, this is the highest level of trust 
which can prevail between the banker and their client i.e. this is arguably the last 
phase
158
 of trust evolution, in this situation.  
The interpersonal trust, at the initial phase, depicts the trust on the banker and his team 
and the employees of other teams (e.g. Legal and compliance team) who facilitate the 
M&A deal at different points of time. This trust is generic in nature and is not trust on 
one particular person. Interpersonal trust implies the client’s trust on all the employees 
of the bank who (will) work on the deal at some point in time or the other because 
“…trust on the banker is relevant but it all starts with the goodwill of the bank…” 
(Interviewee 6) 
 A banker might have goodwill in the market but the clients look at the banker as an 
‘extension’ of the IB. Especially given the fact that they have never done business with 
that specific banker. The goodwill of the bank is the cause which leads to Interpersonal 
trust i.e. trust on the banker and his team. This is valid for all the IBs in the same 
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 Based on author’s findings and as suggested by the works of Hawes & Burnhouse (1987), Hawes et 
al. (1989), Plank et al (1999) 
158
 Because high trust already exists between the banker and the client, the phenomenon of the client 
leaving the bank for the banker indicates the high degree of trust. The new relationship with the 
banker’s new employer does not start from a speculated trust. The client’s trust on the banker will get 
transferred to his new employer. At this stage the banker’s goodwill is more important than the 
banker’s new employer’s goodwill because the client’s trust is embedded at a personal level. 
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league and is not restricted to a specific bank. e.g. If Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan, 
UBS, and RBS are competing for the same mandate; all of these IBs have their own 
goodwill which leads to Company, Product, and Interpersonal trust, eventually 
resulting in generic expectancy of performance which is not restricted to a particular 
bank or banker. The client might have equal interpersonal trust towards the employees 
of all these IBs
159
. Therefore, the Interpersonal trust at this level is not trust on a 
specific banker but, it is the client’s generic trust on every banker (and the teams) 
induced by the goodwill of the respective IBs. 
Superior Interpersonal trust is, however, very high trust on a specific banker and is not 
generic in nature. The final stage of trust evolution witnesses a dramatic evolution on 
trust as it evolves from a generic level to highly personal level. At this level, the 
client’s trust on only one banker precedes the client’s trust on the bank
160
. This type of 
trust is the result of extremely positive experience and years of business relationship 
and thus it is stronger than the Interpersonal trust. Superior Interpersonal trust is the 
result of many years of experience and the result of Experiential Performance trust and 
is stronger in nature
161
. Very few and very senior and successful bankers can achieve 
that high level of trust, in an investment banker-client relationship.  
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 Based on findings from the interviews 
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 As suggested by the interviewees and illustrated in the case of Paul J Taubman in Appendix 8 
161
 The author recognises the fact that literature related to trust measurement can be brought into 
account on this context. The reasons for not bringing them into consideration are as follows  
1) The objective of the research is to study the evolution of trust, not to measure it. 
2) Majority of the trust measurement literature is focused on personal selling or measuring 
organisational trust (e.g. Glaeser et al. 2000; Young & Albaum 2003; Oko et al.2015 
(Goodwill) etc.)) and therefore, are not exactly applicable to a banker-client relationship 
because  
i) The investment bankers are advisors not personal sellers 
ii) The multiple facets of banker-client relationship in an M&A context were not brought 
into consideration. Also, in this case it is about trusting a certain target firm through 




6.4.2 Situation 2: Superior company trust 
 
“To these clients, it is like the bankers come and go but they will still stay back with 
the organisation or the bank because they look at it as a “guarantee” that the service 
will be consistent and the bank will deliver…to be precise, the face might change but 
they will get the same level of quality.” 
- Interviewee 5 
The second situation depicts the scenario in which the client(s) decides to stay with the 
bank rather than following the banker to his new employer. This situation is more 
common in a banker-client relationship. Numerous rationales can explain this kind of 
behaviour from the client’s side.  
The IBs work on strengthening their relationship with the client to prevent client 
attrition and also to reduce their dependency on the bankers. This is to ensure that the 
trust-based relationship is with the organisation, not an individual i.e. the bank – not 
the banker. 
“…it is important that…there was a very good past dialogue i.e. a lot of business was 
done, so that helps, the bank does not start from scratch. So, when the clients meet this 
new banker they are tempted to be more positive…so the banker is a half of a step 
forward…What helps typically is that this is positive perception, usually, it is not 
necessarily only associated with one name or person… most banks are trying to avoid 
that, because there is a huge business risk…the bank tries to associate it with 
themselves which is usually the case…usually in this situation, the bank calls the client 
and informs him that one or two other persons would come or replace some other 
people to introduce the new member and basically trying to transmit that trust on the 
banker who has left to the new member…then the new joiner are not just being thrown 
in the situation but instead can pick up from where his predecessor has left…A typical 
scenario is that when one of the senior banker leaves, even more, senior colleagues 
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call the client to let them know that the person has left but that they should not worry, 
that their service will continue and they will personally look after that and will 
introduce the new joiner soon…This is done to transmit the trust. It is also a 
professional thing to do.” 
- Interviewee 5 
If ‘significant’ business had been done in the past, the trust on the banker who left can 
get transferred to the new banker
162
 who replaced him. The bank’s ‘assurance’ makes 
the client trust the performance, competence and the integrity of the new banker. This 
phenomenon takes place due to the existence of strong trust on the IB. Thus, this level 
witnesses the transfer of trust, reoccurring
163
 to a certain degree. The client trusts a 
particular banker because of the bank. The difference is that this trust is the result of 
the positive experience of doing business with a specific IB for a long time, and is 
stronger than the speculative Performance trust which starts the relationship and the 
Experiential Performance trust. Due to the high trust on the company i.e. the IB, it can 
be transmitted to the new banker. 
It should be noted that a client’s decision to continue doing business with the IB does 
not necessarily indicate the clients’ lack of trust on a banker. Also, the decision makers 
on the clients’ side (usually the COO or the CFO or the CEO or politicians) might be 
answerable to their stakeholders, for dissolving a long-term relationship with the bank. 
If the client has multiple interests aligned to the IB (e.g. Credit line) the client might 
hesitate to move his business, to the banker’s new employer, as there is no guarantee 
that the banker’s new employer will provide them with the same benefits.
164
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 Under usual circumstances, very senior investment bankers are replaced by investment bankers of 
same stature (based on the interviews) 
163
 This phenomenon occurred at the pre-relationship phase when the goodwill of the bank led to 
interpersonal trust. However, one major difference is that at the “pre-relationship” stage, the 
perception of ‘trust’ was speculative but at this stage there is high trust on the organisation which is 
more concrete in nature due to the existence of Experiential Performance trust in the previous phase. 
164
 Based on the author’s findings 
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The client’s decision might also depend on his perception/experience with the banker’s 
new employer. If he does not trust the banker’s new employer, he might not be 
interested in business with them, 
“When I moved here from a different bank, it was like that I have moved here it would 
be great if we continue dialogue. But some people can be like, you are nice but I do 
not want to deal with that bank. So it depends. But bankers give them the chance to 
develop the relationship on a different platform. I think it is the combination of me and 
my present employer.” 
- Interviewee 1 
Apart from these rationales, if the client decides to stay with the bank rather than 
following the banker, it indicates that the client trusts that even if the senior banker 
(who has dealt with his mandates for many years) leaves, the quality of service and the 
trustworthiness of the bank will remain as it was.“…the face will change…but the 
service will remain all the same…” (Interviewee 5).The trust on a specific IB, 
therefore, precedes the trust on the banker.  
This evolved trust must not be confused with the generic goodwill induced Company 
trust, or Performance trust, which was prevailing in the previous phases. This evolved 
trust is the trust on a specific IB and is the result of years of positive experience. This 
kind of trust is placed on a certain IB with the client’s belief and the confidence that 
the IB will take care of his best interests under any circumstances. Thus, it is also 
stronger than both the generic Company trust and Performance trust. Therefore, taking 
the aid of typology, the author calls it Superior Company trust. 
Company trust is the result of the existing goodwill in the market where two or more 
IBs competing for the mandate can be at the same level. The Superior Company trust 
is the clients’ trust on a specific IB which is the result of Experiential Performance 
trust as the client has ‘hands-on’ experience with a specific IB which has lived up to 
the goodwill as well as the expectations and is therefore trustworthy.  
123 
 
Till the phase of Experiential Performance trust, the phenomenon of dualism was 
present. However, when it was time to choose between the banker and the bank, the 
client decided to stay with the bank rather than following the banker. This phase marks 
the advent of Superior Company trust which is stronger than the trust which prevailed 
in the last phases. This type of trust is the client’s trust on a specific IB rather than an 
individual. Superior Company trust is the result of years of good service and fulfilling 
the client’s expectations by the IB. “Expectations” can include more factors than the 
performance only (e.g. additional services). 
This phase of the relationship is marked by a very high satisfaction and trust from the 
client’s side
165
. Superior Company trust is the level of trust at which the client trusts in 
the new banker’s capability, competency and honesty because he trusts the IB. This 
trust can be regarded as a “high trust” as it evolved out of the positive experience
166
. 
However, this stage has similarities with the onset of the relationship i.e. the pre-
relationship phase where it was found that goodwill is the cause of company trust. Due 
to the existence of goodwill, the client has a speculative interpersonal trust on the 
banker and his team. However, one of the main differences is that the Superior 
Company trust which is restricted to a specific investment bank appears when the 
client has high trust on the bank due to extremely positive experiences. This type of 
trust is thus stronger than the speculative company trust.  
However, it should be noted that at the Superior Company trust stage, if the trust is 
broken then the bank will go to the “black box”. If there is distrust at this stage, the IB 
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 According to the author’s findings and supported by  Kusari et al. (2013) 
166
 Based on the work of Scheer (2012) 
167
 Based on the author’s findings and supported by Kusari et al. (2013) 
Additional note: The Superior Company trust must not also be confused with the Performance trust 
because, at this stage, the client trusts the specific IB, as an entity. 
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6.5 How does trust evolve in an investment bank(er)-client relationship?  
 
Trust in a bank(er)-client relationship reaches its peak in the Maturitatem phase before 
it is terminated
168
. To answer the main research question, this subsection will 
summarise the previous sub-sections and attempt to explain the phenomenon of trust 
evolution in this relationship. 
The investment bank(er)-client relationship officially begins, with the bank(er) getting 
the mandate i.e. the Exordium phase and a basic level of Performance trust. 
Performance trust is more of a generalised belief and confidence as the client has not 
experienced the IB or the banker’s performance.   
After the banker successfully executes deal(s) for the client, this generic Performance 
trust evolves into Experiential Performance trust, which is stronger than its 
predecessor. This phase is called Incrementum, because, trust is stronger at this stage. 
This evolution of trust takes place due to the clients’ positive experience(s) with both 
the banker and the bank, and, both these entities have lived up to or surpassed the 




The phase of Incrementum is followed by the phase of Maturitatem. At this phase, 
trust has matured, and is at its highest level and, hence this name has been chosen. The 
author’s analysis
170
 indicates that this phase marks the highest level of trust. This has 
been elaborated by a specific situation i.e. when a trusted and high-profile banker who 
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 Based on the authors analysis of the data and Kusari et al (2013) 
Additional note:  Since the results of the analysis indicate that the relationship perishes without trust, 
there is no gradual decline or transformation phase as suggested by the model of Trust and distrust in 
relationship development (Scheer 2012). The relationship is terminated with the termination of trust. 
169
 Based on author’s findings and supported by Perrone et al. (1998), Scheer (2012) and Kusari et al 
(2013) 
170
 Based on author’s findings and supported by Kusari et al. (2013) 
 Additional note:  Since the results of the analysis also indicate that there is no gradual decline or 
transformation phase as suggested by Scheer (2012). The relationship is terminated with the 
termination of trust. 
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has executed deals for certain specific clients for many years, leaves the IB. Therefore, 
the client is left with a decision to choose between the senior banker and the IB. In 
Situation 1 and Situation 2, the client(s) chooses the senior banker and the IB 
respectively.  
In Situation 1, the client trusts the banker over the IB, and therefore, demonstrates a 
Superior Interpersonal trust. The Superior Interpersonal trust is the “highest trust” a 
banker can achieve, and, thus it is stronger than the generic interpersonal trust. It is the 
result of extremely high trust at a personal level and many years of positive 
experience. Superior Interpersonal trust is specific to one particular investment banker, 
whom the client(s) trusts more than they trust the IB. The author’s findings indicate 
that it takes at least 20-25 years to reach such a high level of trust. According to the 
interviewees, this is an extremely rare phenomenon and only “very few” and “very 
senior” investment bankers can reach that level. Situation 2 is more common in 
nature. In this situation, the client chooses the IB over the banker. This situation is 
marked by Superior Company trust. Superior Company trust demonstrates the clients’ 
trust on a specific IB rather than an individual. This situation marks the clients’ trust 
on the bank at its highest level.
171
 
After Maturitatem, or the maturity phase, “something happens” as “the institution 
does something stupid” (Interviewee 5), and trust is terminated
172
 between the 
investment bank(er) and the client, resulting in the collapse of the relationship. 
According to the interviewees, it as a fact that this ‘incident’ is more likely to occur 
when trust is at its zenith. Therefore, this phase is the last phase of trust evolution. The 
following diagram attempts to capture the phenomenon of trust evolution in a banker-
client relationship based on the two distinct situations.  
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 Based on the author’s findings and supported by Scheer (2012) and Kusari et al. (2013) 
172
 The author has deliberately used the term “terminated” because there is no gradual decline of trust 
in a banker-client relationship. The causes for trust termination, which is one of the sub-areas of 




Figure 10: The evolution of trust in the relationship between investment-bank(er)s and their 
clients 
This figure brings both the situations together. The dotted lines indicate the division 












take place in the Maturitatem or the maturity phase in the relationship
173
. After the 
existence of dualism (the client trusts both the banker and the bank) of trust till the 
Incrementum, the client’s choice in the Maturitatem phase usually indicates the 
strength the clients’ trust on the banker against the strength of the clients’ trust on the 
IB. It is evident that dualism exists at this level too but, the client’s choice implies 
which of the entities he trusts more – the bank or the banker. If he decides to choose 
the IB, it shows that he trusts the banker but his trust on the bank is higher than his 
trust on the banker i.e. the generic trust on the IB has evolved into a superior trust on 
the company – Superior Company trust. In a rare scenario in which the client decides 
to choose the banker, it implies that the relationship which started with the speculative 
trust on the banker, caused by the goodwill of the company has evolved into a superior 
trust at an individual level – Superior Interpersonal trust.  
Irrespective of the situation, Maturitatem marks the highest level of trust in an 
investment bank(er)-client relationship
174
. According to the author’s analysis it is the 




All the interviewees shared the same opinion that the bank(er) would want the 
relationship to remain at the phase where trust is at the highest level i.e. the 
Maturitatem phase. However, at this point in time certain ‘incidences’ terminate trust 
and ends the relationship. This brings the author to the last phase of the RLC which 
will address the sub-areas of the research interest by investigating the key reasons 
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 Theoretically, the occurrence of both the situations is possible. If both Superior Interpersonal trust 
and Superior Company trust are equally strong, and, the client wants to hold on to both, he might 
divide his mandates. However, this is a hypothetical scenario as the author has not found any support 
to this claim. According to the interviewees, usually the clients choose between the banker and the 
bank.  
174
 As per the author’s findings and supported by Kusari et al. (2013) 
175
 The author regards “distrust” as a separate phenomenon (i.e. it is not a case of phenomenon of trust 
transforming into distrust) and out of scope of the definition of trust set in the literature review. 
Therefore, it will not be considered as a part of trust evolution.  Reflecting on the definition of trust 
stated in the literature review, it can be said that the advent of distrust is not a transformation or 
evolution of trust. For details please refer to Lewicki et al. (1998). Therefore, the author will restrain 
himself from delving deep into this concept. 
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responsible for the decline of trust and if trust can be regained, if it can be regained at 
all. 
 
6.6 Declino – The decline phase: The sub-areas of research interest 
 
“Although as a bank or a banker you would prefer the life cycle to last forever and 
never go down, it goes up and you just keep it there. But, I know instances where the 
clients have worked with the same institution for a very long time but…something 
happens… The institution does something stupid… At some point in time, something 
happens that damages the basic level of trust. Just look at the banking landscape in 
Germany maybe 40 years ago where all the big companies were either working with 
Deutsche Bank or Dresdner Bank or Commerzbank or one of the big state banks…40 
years back you never thought that they will work with the American institutions.  I am 
sure that the same is in Switzerland. You are right looking at it as a life cycle but, it is 
a very very long lifecycle.” 
- Interviewee 5 
All the interviewees unanimously agreed that trust in an investment bank(er)-client 
client relationship works like a life cycle and goes down from a point of very high 
trust. However, the interviewees also vehemently emphasize that a bank(er)-client 
relationship cannot exist without trust. So, when “something happens” and trust is 
broken, the relationship is terminated instantly. Thus, the phenomenon of trust 
evolution ends with the termination of the relationship and the ‘advent’ of distrust. To 
support this argument and to provide a suitable example relevant to the context, 
Interviewee 3 cited the classic case of Morgan Stanley and Baden-Württemberg
176
. In 
                                                          
176
 The author did further research on the cited example and turned it into a case under Appendix 9. 
Additional note: Although interviewee 5 cited the example of the banking landscape of Germany and 
Switzerland to showcase the decline of trust due to specific incidents, the author regards it as a 
situation where other factors might have influenced the decision making of the clients. Therefore, it 
has been regarded as a subject for further research. 
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this section, the author will attempt to address the first sub-areas of interest by 
covering some of the important factors which are responsible for the decline of trust, 
in an investment bank(er)-client relationship. The following reasons behind the decline 




“The reputation is extremely important to the banks, especially for the big 
institutions…especially the governments. It is of paramount importance...that’s what 
the clients base their mandate decisions on….That is what makes them trust the 
organisation…” 
- Interviewee 3 
In the recent times although, majority of these controversies had been related to 
divisions other than M&A (e.g. Rogue trader scam was related to the Sales and 
Trading division), given the importance of goodwill in a bank(er) client relationship, it 
is important to understand if trust is affected by such unfortunate incidents, which take 
place in other business areas of the IB.  
“It is not black & white…the scams like the LIBOR or anything else….the client might 
say that we like you…but we do not trust the bank anymore. We would not do business 
with you for the next months…you need to clean up first…it happened over there and 
it can happen in my case also…So, individual institutions do get black boxed for 
something of that sort…It might be frustrating because you are getting punished for 
something totally out of your control.” 
- Interviewee 1 
“If you look at issues like massive trading losses, it basically means that certain 
functions of your bank are not functioning, as the way they should. Because in theory, 
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the bank should have a very strong compliance procedure, monitoring system, risk 
management system and so on. But if someone manages to walk out with 4.5 
billion…from a big bank, it basically demonstrates to you that the systems in this bank 
do not seem to work and that automatically questions the systems’ safeguards which 
you need in the area of the bank you are working with…whether they are still 
functioning or not. In M&A it’s like confidentiality of documents… handling of credit 
relationships etc…” 
- Interviewee 3 
During the initial phase of the relationship, the clients monitor the bank(er)s very 
closely. Therefore, at this phase, a big scam like LIBOR or rogue trader scam might 
affect the trust in the bank(er)-client relationship because, in general, any kind of 
scams actually implies that there are gaps in the bank’s control and compliance 
system. This is highly undesirable to the clients. In that case, the client might monitor 
the relationship under a critical lens and question the goodwill and trustworthiness of 
the IB. This might even result into black boxing the IB, even-though the scam took 
place in a business area other than the M&A. 
However, this situation might be different if the bank(er) and the client have had a 
long relationship. Sometimes the clients are “intelligent enough” to not take a decision 
based on the press reports, as they are “educated enough” to understand that the 
wrong-doings of an investment banker in some other business area do not reflect the 
nature of their M&A banker.  
“…the clients understand how it works especially if you have a long relationship with 
the bank so on occasions it might not affect the relationship…” 
- Interviewee 10 
Reflecting on the interviews, the author can confirm that even if the scam is not related 
to the M&A side of the business, relatively new relationships are more likely to get 
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affected as big scams can reveal the gaps in the compliance systems. Although 
“reputation capital with big institutions seems to be very persistent” (Interviewee 3), 
and, the old clients’ usually, prefer the safe option, big scams can temporarily tarnish 
the reputation and the goodwill of the bank. Therefore, an old relationship might not 
have the same adverse effect. According to the interviewees, it is more of 'a grey area’. 
“What can really hurt your (banks’) reputation is when people act with gross 
negligence or with criminal intentions especially within the area you are talking 
of…the public sector is much more sensitive because there are politicians behind the 
scene…” 
- Interviewee 3 
If the client is a government concern, then the situation might take a different turn 
(irrespective of the duration of the relationship) as the politicians are involved in it. If 
the mandate is given to a so-called ‘controversial’ bank, the politicians might face 
unpleasant questions at the assembly which they would want to avoid. In that case, it is 
less about trust on the bank(er) and more about avoiding the controversies. To justify 
this, Interviewee 3 cited the case of Morgan Stanley and Baden-Württemberg. 
This case of : Morgan Stanley and Baden-Württemberg scam (cited in Appendix 9 
supports the above-mentioned findings. It is a classic example of one of the biggest 
scams in M&A which affected a big IB with a strong goodwill. This case indicates that 
significant scams and breach of trust can affect the trust in investment banker-client 
relationship. This example also justifies the rationale behind governments being 
‘sensitive’ to do business with IBs whose reputation has been at stake. 
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Dishonesty, irresponsibility and persuasive behaviour 
“Mistakes might happen”
177
, as big M&A deals involve multiple teams at different 
points. The clients usually recognise the ‘rare’ occurrence of minor mistakes, if the 
mistakes are admitted. However, dishonesty from the bank(er)’s side is unacceptable. 
Any signal of dishonesty, or the notion that the bank is not acting in the best interest of 
the client, can terminate trust immediately.  
Irresponsible behaviour implies negligence on the bank(er)’s side. This is uncommon, 
but it does happen. The clients share extremely confidential information with the 
bank(er)s. If their confidentiality is compromised (e.g. the details of the M&A are 
leaked/made public at a pre-mature state), it will break the trust of the client forever 
and the goodwill of the bank would be tarnished. Usually, in such cases, the 
relationships are terminated straight away. 
“The second thing is a conflict of interest. It is an issue for both big and small 
banks…like at the same time you advise two competing clients…such as conflict of 
interest is a massive threat to trust…” 
- Interviewee 3 
The : Morgan Stanley and Baden-Württemberg scam (Appendix 9) can be regarded as 
an example of conflict of interest in M&A. The case indicates that dishonesty severely 
damages the reputation of the bank, as well as the banker. The Baden-Württemberg 
scam resulted in Morgan Stanley being sent to the “black box”, as well as in the 
resignation Dirk Notheis.  However, the IBs usually try to tackle the situation by 
“…communicating to the clients that it was a few unscrupulous people high up the 
ladder who messed up and that does not reflect the banks’ behaviour to the clients or 
their honesty or their integrity” (Interviewee 3). 
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 To elaborate on the type of mistakes Interviewee 5 gave a specific situation where he ran a wrong 
analysis and suggested a wrong figure of EUR 4 million instead of EUR 4.5 million. The word 
“mistake indicates unintentional errors. 
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Dishonesty and irresponsible behaviour harm the image of the bank(er)s and highlight 
the loopholes in the compliance system. It is the responsibility of the IB to amend that 
image and communicate that the gaps have been filled i.e. the bank has taken the 
necessary steps to ensure that such “unwanted and unfortunate circumstances” do not 
happen again. 
“A banker needs to make sure that the long-term relationship with a client works. So, 
if at some point in time he is being perceived as too pushy or has pushed the clients 
into something… it will not turn out well, it will ruin trust and the banker will not get 
next piece of business or probably not get any business over long time …If it is too 
pushy… you lose the trust then they (clients) will turn to another bank and there are 
quite a few more banks out there…You might push to reach your targets but...I can say 
that it will hurt you in the following years. It is not being appreciated…sometimes the 
clients can have to feel that they can trust you because you are not pushing so hard.” 
- Interviewee 5 
According to the interviewees, if a banker tries to push a deal too much, the client 
might also become suspicious and even if there is an initial success, trust might be 
destroyed momentarily or in the long run. The chances are higher especially in the 
early stages of the relationship (due to monitoring). 
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However, the Baden-Württemberg scam illustrates that this phenomenon might not be 
prevalent if there is high trust between the banker and the client. In that case it is found 
that Dirk Notheis pushed Steffen Mappus to finalise the deal by the end of 2010. It is 
implied that Mappus did not become suspicious because he trusted Notheis and did not 
suspect any unscrupulous intentions. The evidences uncovered in the investigation (as 
on Appendix 9) indicate that probably Superior Interpersonal trust was prevailing at 
the Maturitatem phase of the relationship.  
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 Based on author’s findings supported by Kusari et al. (2013) 
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Acts of persuasion like these at the initial phases might terminate the relationship 
because the clients become suspicious about the banker’s intention. Thus, the lack of 
such persuasive behaviour can also facilitate the development of trust. 
 
6.6.2 Living up to the expectations 
 
“There is a certain level of quality associated with the institution.  So, that gets you to 
the door but it does not get you much further because if you do not perform it will all 
get messed up…You need to keep up with the clients’ expectations…The brand name 
in a way gives you that extra bonus but then people will still watch you whether you 
actually deliver.” 
- Interviewee 5 
The bankers are expected to be professional and live up to the goodwill of the bank. 
The initial ‘advantage of the edge’ comes at the cost of high expectations from the 
clients’ side. This is applicable throughout the relationship. However, at the initial 
stages of the relationship, the bank(er)s are monitored more closely
179
. The clients 
expect “absolute commitment” from the bankers. It is their “basic expectation” from 
the goodwill.  
“It is about providing the best possible advice in the interest of the clients. That is the 
first most important thing and there are two points which can be exclusively related to 
the bank’s network with investors and counterparties and so on…The two most 
important ones but also nearly equally important are the consistency and the quality of 
your product. They should manage the process in a good and efficient way, the 
materials prepared should be good and managing to steer the deal documentation 
should be done in the right way… different clients have different requirements - for 
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 Based on authors analysis and supported by Scheer (2012) and Kusari et al. (2013) 
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some industry network might be more important than the quality of deal delivery for 
others it might be the other way around.” 
- Interviewee 3 
Normally, M&A is a complicated process. The bankers’ challenge is to make sure that 
the process runs efficiently. Usually, the banks are professional, and they try their best 
to live up to the expectations. The IBs recognise the importance of trust development 
and do their best to deliver according to the clients’ expectations. However, the fate of 
the deal does not solely rests in the hands of the bankers. The clients understand that 
and therefore trust can also be earned even if the deal is not executed
180
.  
But, on occasions, the clients might blame the ‘performance’ of the bank(er)s for the 
failure of a deal after they have invested time and resources in it. If the process does 
not run efficiently and the bank fails to live up to the expectations, the client’s trust on 
the bank(er) might get affected.  The key is to balance the expectations of the clients 
with the delivery capacity of the banker. The following quote by Interviewee 5 
summarises it  
“…if you make a promise or over-promise and do not deliver, that will kill the trust 
immediately…” 
The senior bank(er)s regard clients’ trust with extreme importance. Therefore, they 
stick to the ‘unwritten rule’ of promising only what can be delivered. If they make a 
false promise and fail to deliver later, the client will become doubtful of their 
performance and will lose the trust immediately. This will result in a termination of the 
banker-client relationship. 
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  This phenomenon can be linked to the example (discussed under Exordium) of the banker who 
suggested his client not to go for the deal which resulted in the client trusting the banker immediately. 
The banker earned trust only by advisory although the deal was not executed. 
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6.6.3 Issue with additional services 
 
Sometimes the IBs bundle their M&A services along with an offer of a credit line to 
sponsor the deals. This is a win-win situation for both the banks and the clients. The 
clients get funding (if required) while the banks earn interest from the credit line. 
However, if for certain reason(s) (e.g. change in regulations) the credit line is 
withdrawn, some of the old clients might take it personally and regard it as a breach of 
trust.  
“The bank saying we cannot extend a certain credit line….that’s where it is the 
ultimate trust because money talks….so the client says why is there a change...the 
bankers are then coming into difficult positions because you as a person have nothing 
against this client but your bank has made a decision where you can do nothing 
against it. This is interesting because it is not a conflict between a client and a banker 
but between the client and the bank and ultimately it’s you who have to deal with it. 
That always happens. It breaks trust.” 
- Interviewee 4 
The above quote reflects the opinions of multiple interviewees. Interviewee 3 even 
shared a personal experience to support his argument. After the financial crisis, the IBs 
went through a lot of strategic changes. As a strategic move to slim down their balance 
sheets, they decided to cut down the credit line, for a few clients. Morgan Stanley was 
no exception. One of their existing 10-year-old clients, who had been enjoying the 
credit line for the last 5 years, took it as a breach of trust. They decided to send the 
bank to the “black box” i.e. they stopped giving mandates to Morgan Stanley. It is 
interesting to note that the client did not actually need the credit line. They were using 
it as a “backup in case if it is required”.  However, “they took it as a breach of trust”.  
At a later stage, Morgan Stanley identified a lot of opportunities for new businesses 
with that client. The Head of Media of Morgan Stanley was “particularly keen” on 
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winning back the client’s trust. To do that, the bank had to mend the relationship by 
bringing back the trust and make the client believe that, irrespective of the past 
experience, they can count on the bank.  
“The Head of Media basically lobbied them so that they would give Morgan Stanley 
another space in their relationship facility.” 
He apologized for the issue and inquired about the new opportunities and pursued the 
client. When there was a free spot (a big IPO for one of their subunits), he pushed 
internally to get it done as a “favour”, so that Morgan Stanley can enter the facility 
again.  
A couple of months later Morgan Stanley was offered a very small M&A deal which 
under normal circumstances would not be of interest to the big IBs. Usually, the big 
IBs like Morgan Stanley do not accept M&A deals below EUR1 billion because they 
are paid according to the volume. “Even if it is EUR 25 million or even EUR 400 
million, it is not inherently profitable even if the normal market price is charged. This 
deal was below the threshold and was complicated too.” (Interviewee 3)  
To win back the trust of this client, Morgan Stanley executed this complicated M&A 
deal even though it was below their usual threshold. It was a “favour” and eventually, 
they were able to win back the trust of the client at a later stage, as they were able to 
achieve their goal of winning the big M&A mandates. 
The above-mentioned example indicates that clients can take the additional services 
seriously and any deviation from the IB’s side can be looked upon as a breach of trust 
especially if an agreeable business dialogue has existed in the past.  
This is an interesting situation because trust gets affected at a company level rather 
than personal level or performance level. But, this issue reflects the author’s findings 
that all the facets of trust are equally important, in all the phases of the relationship
181
. 
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 Please refer to the “pre-relationship” phase for details. 
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6.6.4 Transparency and predictability  
 
“Clients need to see the point in doing what they are doing…They need to understand 
why you are doing certain things…like they understand…okay they are doing this and 
that because they need us to deliver this and that because of that and it is all very 
organised and predictable...Once you get this predictability in the process, the client 
will start trusting you because you are someone who knows what he is doing.” 
- Interviewee 5 
Transparency is one of the most important aspects of trust. Even though, the clients are 
highly educated and experienced
182
, they might lack the certain knowledge required to 
understand the whole process. Apart from understanding “what the banker is doing”, 
the clients appreciate knowing “why the banker is doing what he is doing” 
(Interviewee 6), especially at the early stages of the relationship. Due to the high 
monitoring, the transparency of the process is very important. A lack of transparency 
might make the client suspicious and affect the budding trust.
183
 
If the banker maintains transparency in his actions, it facilitates in developing the 
client’s trust. Considering the controversies, it is extremely important to maintain 
transparency. Transparency leads to predictability as the clients understand the 
rationales and the significance of the bank(er)s actions.
184
 Maintaining transparency on 
the bank(er)s’ side is like communicating to the clients that “…we are giving you the 
reason to trust us because you can see what we are doing and why we are doing as we 
are maintaining an absolute transparency.” (Interviewee 6) 
This helps to develop the client’s trust especially at the early stages of the relationship. 
Running a transparent process while being monitored makes the client comfortable as 
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 It is expected because the thesis brings only deals over EUR 1 billion into consideration. At this 
level the bank(er)s deal with the CEOs and the CFOs of large corporations (e.g. Deutsche Telecom). 
183
 Based on authors findings 
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 Based on author’s analysis and reflected in the work of Suchanek (2016) 
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he understands the process better and is assured that the IB is working in his interest. 
This strengthens the relationship between the investment bank(er)s and their clients by 
facilitating the evolution of trust. However, if the transparency is not maintained, it can 
have an adverse impact on trust as the clients might become suspicious about the 
bank(er)’s intentions. Lack of transparency can act as an embargo in trust evolution 
and can be responsible for the decline of trust.
185
 
The following section will cover the last part of the sub-area of interest and attempt to 
find out if trust can be regained in an investment bank(er)-client relationship. 
  
6.6.5 Can trust be regained? – A contextual question  
 
“As tyme hem hurt, a tyme doth hem cure” 
                                                       - Chauser (Troilus & Criseyde: mid-1380s) 
According to the author’s findings, trust can be regained, but it can take a significant 
amount of time. Certain banks (e.g. Morgan Stanley, UBS) have separate relationship 
divisions headed by senior relationship managers, who work on mending the 
relationships and regaining the clients’ trust. 
Regaining trust can be a time-consuming process depending on the reason of distrust. 
Usually, the senior managers reach out to the clients and admit the mistakes. This 
helps to clear the issues and come to a common understanding. It also helps to 
communicate to the client that the IB recognizes their mistake. The next step is to 
convince the client that the bank is ready to make up for the mistake, and if given the 
chance, will look to the client’s best interest.  
“…you go to the client you talk about ideas, you come back, you show that you care 
and then after a while, the client might say I have this project here, I want to give it to 
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you because you have earned that because you put in so much work without getting 
paid. And that can easily take two years or so…so that is in a way step one…Step two 
comes in where indeed you need to show that you are competent you can perform in a 
transactional context as well and that past is past...The key is to address the issue on 
which trust was lost.” 
- Interviewee 4 
Reflecting on the example discussed as a part of “6.6.3 Issue with additional services”, 
it can be inferred that trust can be regained, if the IB works on the issues responsible 
for the decline of trust. The example of credit line termination by Morgan Stanley 
indicates that the ‘trust regaining strategy’ of doing “favours” helps to regain trust. 
Morgan Stanley worked hard and ‘bend’ their strategy to accommodate the client by 
executing smaller deals for them. This was an ‘act’ to convince the client that the IB is 
trying hard to win them back, and the strategy was successful. They successfully 
communicated that Morgan Stanley is eager to win their trust back, and in the future 
will work in their best interest of the client. 
However, the cause of distrust needs to be identified before finalising the ‘trust 
regaining strategy’. The termination of the credit line was not a decision targeted to a 
specific client; instead it was a strategic one which was valid for the other clients too. 
Therefore, regaining trust was about regaining the client’s confidence in 
understanding, empathy and responsiveness
186
. So, regaining trust was relatively 
‘different’, and was taken care of by doing favours.  The cases like the Baden-
Württemberg controversy is different as the reasons of distrust are different. The latter 
was an act of dishonesty while the former was a part of regulatory reform. Since the 
causes of distrust were different, “running an extra mile to win back the client’s trust” 
(Interviewee 5) varies. 
                                                          
186
 Based on author’s findings and the works of McCrosky (1992); McCrosky. & Teven (1999); Teven 
& McCrosky (1997) 
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“Things like the Baden-Württemberg scams are instances where the M&A business 
should actually suffer. However, surprisingly, it did not suffer very much as Morgan 
Stanley fired Notheis which was the damage control to win back the trust of the clients 
and they succeeded so, transactions are still being done in Germany by Morgan 
Stanley…If even something as big like that does not to destroy the trust forever, then, it 
is possible to win back the trust if you know the right buttons to press... Yes. Trust can 
definitely be regained…” 
- Interviewee 3 
The empirical evidence found by the author supports the opinions of the interviewees. 
Even after the Baden-Württemberg scam, Morgan Stanley is still doing business in 
Germany (as of today). It appears that they regained the trust of their clients. 
According to the reports published by Bloomberg Market in June 2017, Morgan 
Stanley is about to set up their post-Brexit EU headquarters in Frankfurt am Main
187
. It 
should be noted that Morgan Stanley has made this move in less than 3 years after the 
Baden-Württemberg controversy was settled.  
 
“With the Baden-Württemberg case, company trust was so strong that even though 
two people very high up the ladder messed up, Morgan Stanley was able to 
communicate to the clients that it was only two individuals in it and the bank has 
nothing to do with it…Yes! That is how it happened and that’s how they did it. But 
frankly, it also showed the weakness of certain safeguarding systems of control…if 
someone that senior does that. But yes, that is how it was portrayed in the 
end…However; we are talking about trust on the bank. It can be regained but if the 
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 The author recognises this move as a decision based on many factors. It might not essentially be 
only trust related. However, given the importance of the local business networks and the product trust 
in M&A relationships, it can be inferred that Morgan Stanley has been successful in getting out of the 
black box and they have also fixed the trust issues. This is an indication that trust can be regained if 
the issues are addressed properly.  
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trust on the banker is broken i.e. at an interpersonal level, it might be impossible to 
regain it.”” 
- Interviewee 3 
It is also worth considering that in spite of the Baden-Württemberg controversy 
Morgan Stanley is still regarded as one of the top IBs. Although the controversy 
harmed their reputation and was responsible for the decline of trust, the IB did not 
have to regain trust from a scratch. They admitted the mistake that there was a 
loophole in their compliance system and bankers like Notheis are distinct cases. A few 
investment bankers like him do not represent the entire IB. To regain their 
trustworthiness, they fired Notheis which communicated to the clients that Morgan 
Stanley does not tolerate any kind of dishonesty, and will do its best to take all 
necessary actions to protect its clients’ interests. 
“I have seen relationships of some very senior bankers. Even though there was an 
issue because that somebody...did some ‘mistake’, they managed to shield themselves 
from it. Trust can be regained because of these people. That is why sometimes the 
banks bring these big names on board.” 
- Interviewee 5 
It is interesting to note a mutually dependent relationship on trust between the banker 
and the IB. At the beginning of the relationship, the goodwill of the IB acts a “gate 
pass” for the banker. However, the IBs also use the brand name of the senior bankers 
to regain the clients trust i.e. interpersonal trust in being used to regain company trust.  
“It is a small world and we are all professionals. No one can hold a grudge forever 
and say that I will never do business with these guys ever again…For the sake of 
argument, even if it happens at one point with time he will be replaced by someone 
else with whom we will be able to do business again. The circumstances change so 
does trust and with trust the relationship changes. It helps if you say to them that you 
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made a mistake and it will not happen again. Admitting the mistake helps with 
transparency and clears up issues.” 
- Interviewee 6     
The findings indicate that “Trust building from scratch is very difficult and nearly 
impossible…but, the big institutions just have a strong brand name....so they are not 
rebuilding it from scratch” (Interviewee 3). The big IBs have the advantage of an 
existing goodwill. Therefore, in spite of the controversies, technically they do not need 
to start building trust from the scratch. They are just required to address the issues. The 
IBs, thus, take necessary steps to clear their image and maintain their goodwill in the 
market which results in regain of trust. The ones with the big brand names usually 
succeed. 
According to the interviewees, “starting from scratch is nearly impossible” 
(Interviewee3). Referring to the example of “: PJT Partners and trust evolution” it can 
be argued that trust can be built from a scratch. But, it must be noted that it is more of 
a case of transfer of trust rather than trust building because “A firm like PJT Partners 
starts from the reputation of their founder and some of the senior partners they have 
hired” (Interviewee 3). This indicates that organisations like PJT Partners start with 
the transfer of trust from on high-profile bankers (like Paul J Taubman) to their 
organisations as the relationship and the business dialogue between the banker and the 
client continues. 
The author’s findings indicate that regaining trust at a personal level is impossible i.e. 
if a specific banker breaks a client’s trust it would be impossible for him to regain it. 
Trust on the organisation can be regained but trust on a banker, once lost can never be 
regained. This essentially means the Superior Company trust can be regained but it is 
impossible to regain Superior Interpersonal trust. 
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Chapter VII: Discussion of results 
 
This chapter juxtaposes the author’s findings, with the different theories discussed in 
the “Literature review”. It also attempts to address some of the contextual issues in this 
doctoral thesis.  
 
7.1 A pragmatic approach in relation to the research gap 
 
The findings of this doctoral thesis go in line with the findings of the scholars (Brusco 
1986; Dwyer et al. 1987; Hawes at al. 1989; Smitka 1991; Knack & Keefer 1997; 
Sako 1997; Sako & Helper 1998; Plank et al. 1999; Zak & Knack 2001; Henneberg at 
al. 2007; Scheer 2012; Kusari et al. 2013; Hurley et al. 2014) who opined that trust is 
extremely important for business. The author’s findings go a step beyond and claim 
that without the existence of trust the M&A business cannot survive. 
However, the author’s findings identify an issue with the findings of scholars like 
Armstrong (2012) and Hurley et al. (2014 ) who have opined that trust is at an all-time 
low. These scholars had a generic and a unidirectional view on banking, and they did 
not differentiate between the different types of banks and the businesses. From a 
pragmatic perspective, the findings of the author of this thesis are not coherent to their 
opinion. To counter their findings, the author has referred to the track record of the 




Figure 11: The number and value of M&A transactions worldwide 
Source: Institute for Mergers & Acquisitions & Alliances (2016) 
 
The author’s findings indicate that the M&A business as well as the bank(er)-client 
relationship is entirely based on trust
188
 without which the relationship cannot 
continue
189
. If Hurley et al. (2014) and Armstrong (2012) are to be believed
190
, then 
the M&A business should go down because trust “was” at an “all-time” low when 
these scholars were working on their respective articles. 
However, the report published by Figure 11: The number and value of M&A 
transactions worldwide 
Source: Institute for Mergers & Acquisitions & Alliances (2016) suggests that the 
M&A business performed comparatively well worldwide before and after the articles 
were published. The values of executed transactions are 40716, 38838, 43041, 46509, 
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 There is not even a phase of indifference as suggested by Scheer (2012) 
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 This is also coherent with the findings of (Brusco 1986; Dwyer et al. 1987; Hawes at al. 1989; 
Smitka 1991; Sako 1997; Knack & Keefer 1997; Zak & Knack 2001; Plank at al. 1999; Kusari et al. 
2013) 
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 It should be noted that these scholars also recognise the importance of trust in the financial industry 
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31844 (billions in USD) in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016 (till 29
th
 September 
2016) respectively. According to the reports, the figures for the number of M&A deals 
in Europe were 15777, 14505, 15914, 17311, and 15737 (billions in EURs) in 2012, 
2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016 (forecasted figure). It appears that the M&A businesses 
have been performing agreeably both in Europe and worldwide.  
 
Figure 12: The number and value of M&A transactions in Europe  
Source: Institute for Mergers & Acquisitions & Alliances (2016) 
 
Some of claims made by Hurley et al. (2014) can be challenged in the M&A context. 
The authors claim that trust in banks has declined dramatically over time. However, 
the figures from the report suggest that the M&A business has not been “dramatically” 
afftected. This is contrary if the author’s findings are brought into consideration. The 
second claim by the authors suggests that the post-financial crisis was followed by 
“major decline in trust”. This claim falls apart too, as the above-mentioned rationale 
holds true for that claim. The figures suggest that there was an increase in M&A 
business after the financial crisis which is impossible without the existence of the trust.  
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It appears that the claims made on trust by these two scholars might be too generic in 
nature. By contradicting these existing findings, the author attempts to establish a 
demand for further relationship specific multi-dimensional trust research focused on 
the IB industry (as suggested by Plank et al 1999). The author opines that the findings 
of Armstrong (2012) and Hurley et al. 2014) are too generic for the financial industry. 




The author’s findings suggest that the clients do trust the IBs and the investment 
bankers. By countering the existing literature, this thesis pinpoints the need of 
extensive trust research on M&A and other branches of the IBs. 
 
7.2 Transaction cost theory and a ‘free’ perspective 
 
TCT (Williamson 1975, 1985; Bromiley & Cummings1995) argues the importance of 
a safeguard through contracts. The author’s findings, however, indicate that, although 
contracts are legal requirements, the evolution of trust is more dependent on the 
“relational aspect” of trust (as suggested by Suchanek 2016).  
The interviewees do not question the legitimacy of the contracts. However, they are 
doubtful of the enforceability, and its effect on the relational aspect of the contracts. 
The relationships between big corporate clients and IBs (e.g. Deutsche Bank and 
Daimler as a specific example cited by Interviewee 1) are not dependent on contracts. 
The author’s findings also indicate that some of the senior bankers doubt if contracts 
can cover all the relational aspects in the bank(er)-client relationship. This supports the 
assumption on bounded rationality, but the fact that the IBs should honour the trust as 
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 Additional note: However, there can be another explanation to support Hurley et al. (2014) and 
Armstrong (2012). Even though, the authors claim that the reports include the viewpoints of “the 
clients”, the chosen sample does not include the M&A. It is possible that their sample consisted of the 
general clients who are not “directly” a part of the investment bank(er)-client relationship (e.g. the 
clients of the retail banks). 
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it is “their responsibility for their own survival” (Suchanek 2016 p. 224) nullifies the 
assumption behind the idea of opportunism from a certain perspective. The findings of 
this thesis also indicate that all the senior bankers who were included in the sample, 
agree with the above opinion by Suchanek, and regard this viewpoint as a ‘key’ aspect 
for the building and evolution of trust.    
The findings suggest that in order to maintain a trustworthy relationship with their 
clients, the bank(er) must act to the best interest of the clients, and by doing so the IBs 
will be acting on their own benefits. The findings of this doctoral thesis suggest that, 
by being opportunistic, one bank(er) can achieve momentary goals but its impact on 
trust (and hence the relationship) in the long run would be disastrous.  
The application of both TCT and the ethical perspective are valid from a theoretical 
and technical viewpoint. But juxtaposing his findings to the work of Suchanek (2016), 
the author can confirm that it is the responsibility of an IB fulfill the trust expectations 
bestowed by the client, and “invest in trust” because it is the basis of an investment 
bank(er)-client relationship. 
 
7.3 Goodwill and resource-based theory 
 
The pre-relationship stage in the bank(er)-client relationship discussed in “Prologue” 
points towards the “Resource-based theory of competitive advantage” (Hurley et al. 
2014). 
The author’s findings argue that the pre-relationship stage starts with goodwill as the 
IBs use their goodwill to increase the chances of getting a mandate. This is an example 
of the ‘use’ of goodwill to gain a competitive advantage over a competitor (as 
suggested by Barney & Hansen 1994; Hurley at al. 2014). In the “Prologue” section, 
the author also argues that goodwill leads to interpersonal, company and product trust 
which helps the IB to win the mandate. This finding is coherent to the finding of 
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Hurley et al. (2014) which implies that mandates are offered to the firm initially by the 
trust. This initial trust is the client’s belief on the further resources (e.g. knowledge, 
skills, networks etc.) of the IB. 
Hurley's (2012) opinion on organisations with higher-departmental co-operations 
being able to serve the clients better also holds true on the IB context. He advocated 
the use of interdepartmental trust as a resource to serve the client. This argument can 
be related to “Issue with additional services” aspect of the relationship. The M&A 
division is not responsible for sanctioning, extending or canceling a credit line. The 
example of canceling the credit line discussed in “Declino” indicates that trust can be 
broken if the credit line is terminated as the clients become suspicious of the IB’s 
understanding, empathy and responsiveness. When he becomes doubtful of these 
constructs, the goodwill and eventually trust suffers. An interdepartmental cooperation 
can thus help to prolong the bank(er)-client relationship. The second part of Hurley’s 
resource-based theory of competitive advantage holds true in this situation. Morgan 
Stanley lost the client’s trust because the credit line was terminated. If Morgan Stanley 
had continued to use the interdepartmental trust resource, the client’s trust, probably, 
would not have been broken. The use of interdepartmental trust and cooperation as a 
resource could have fixed that issue. The “favour” basically helped them to earn 
business by rekindling the lost feeling of understanding, empathy and responsiveness. 
This example indicates the use of trust as a resource, not only to begin a relationship 
but also to protect it by continuing using it as a resource throughout the duration of the 






7.4 Stakeholder theory, service/performance quality, and relationship marketing 
 
Apart from the resource-based theory of competitive advantage, the author has also 
referred to three other theories – stakeholder theory, service/performance quality and 
relationship marketing. This sub-section will relate these theories to the findings of the 
doctoral thesis and hence justify their relevance to the research context. 
Stakeholder theorists advocate the use of mutual trust and co-operation between 
stakeholders to yield competitive advantage. This thesis superficially restricts itself 
only to two stakeholders – M&A bankers and clients. According to the author’s 
findings, the IBs consider it crucial to address the interests of their stakeholders in both 
‘contractual and non-contractual’ basis. The author’s analysis indicates that contractual 
trust does not exist in the research context
192
. The rationale is that that it is to the best 
interest of the IBs to address the interests of their clients. The interviewees point out 
that Europe is overbanked, and therefore there is a trust relationship rather than a 
reliance or dependent relationship between the bank(er)s and the clients. The findings 
also indicate that when the client’s notion of perceptive care is fulfilled, it increases 
trust and the relationship evolves. If the client’s expectations are not met, the client 
loses trust, and the relationship is terminated.  
The ‘inherent value’ of the IBs should be to serve the clients to the best of their 
abilities which develops trust and contributes to the revenue generation. Failure to 
abide by the stakeholder theory will, thus, result in the collapse of the bank(er)-client 
relationship. 
Parasuraman et al. (1985) related trust with the client’s overall confidence on the 
quality of service and performance. The service and total quality management 
literature also focused on the congruity of delivery, process, expectations, and 
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 Contractual trust was the one of the codes in the analysis and it was not detected in any of the 
coding cycles.  
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reliability with trustworthiness. Performance and predictability have been regarded as 
the antecedents of trust by scholars like Perrone et al. (1998), Kusari et al. (2013) and 
Hurley et al. (2014). The findings of this doctoral thesis are coherent with the findings 
of these scholars.  
According to the author’s findings, issues with performance, predictability and 
transparency are some of the factors which can affect the trustworthiness of the 
bank(er) and can adversely affect the bank(er)-client relationship. The bank(er)-client 
relationship starts with Performance trust and evolves to a more concrete Experiential 
Performance trust when the client experiences a congruency in performance, delivery, 
efficiency, and fulfillment of the client’s expectations. 
Scholars like Morgan & Hunt (1994) and Hurley et al. (2014) have argued that the 
importance of relationship marketing is to understand trust in banks. There is a 20 year 
gap between the publications of these two articles. In two decades, little has been done 
to add a new focus to the research and to understand trust in banks, especially IBs. 
Although from a different perspective, the work by Suchanek (2016) addresses the 
“relational” aspect. However, it does not focus on IB exclusively. The author of this 
thesis attempts to respond to that call, and understand the concept of trust evolution in 
the bank(er)-client relationship by bringing the relational aspect into consideration. 
According to the findings of this thesis, the arguments of the advocates of relationship 
marketing, suggesting that the absence of the relational concept of trust has an adverse 
effect on the business relationship, holds true. The author’s findings indicate that the 
bank(er)-client relationship cannot exist without the relational aspect of trust. The 
absence of contractual trust argues the presence of the relational marketing aspect of 
trust. The example of Morgan Stanley’s loss of trust due to credit line termination and 
regaining trust through “favours” as well as the lack of contractual trust provide an 




7.5 The debate on trust and time 
 
In the previous chapters, the author has referred to the debate on the relationship 
between trust and time. According to some scholars (Vanneste et al. 2014; Ring & Van 
1994; Gulati & Stych 2008), there is no relationship. The others have identified either 
a positive or a negative relationship ((Doney PM, Cannon JP. 1997; Poppo L, Zhou 
KZ, Ryu S 2008)).  
The author’s findings indicate that in an ideal
193
 scenario, trust in an investment 
banker-client relationship increases with time. The evolution of trust in a bank(er)-
client relationship usually evolves like a life cycle i.e. trust increases with time till the 
phase of Maturitatem. At this phase trust is highest and thus the author’s findings are 
coherent with the findings of Kusari et al. (2013). After Maturitatem, it is terminated 
and stays as is till the relationship is mended and trust is regained. The ‘black and 
white’ conclusions by Ring & Van (1994), Doney & Cannon (1997), Poppo et al. 
(2008), Gulati & Stych (2008), Vanneste et al. (2014) can be combined, and the 
following conclusion can be drawn. Trust in the banker-client relationship increases 
with time till the phase of Maturitatem, and then it declines. All the interviewees have 
been unanimous on this. 
Thus, the neutral relationship with time implied by Henneberg et al. (2007) does not 
hold true to the research context because the progress in the relationship usually 
indicates an increase in trust while a termination suggests a lack of trustworthiness.  
However, one needs to realise another important aspect of the trust and time literature. 
The most of the cited scholarly works are based on the B2B buyer-supplier 
relationships which are different from the investment bank(er)-client relationships. The 
author adopted the concepts and tailored it to fit the context of the research. Thus, it 
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(covered in the previous chapters). 
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can be said that the findings of the scholars mentioned in the literature are not exactly 
specific to the context of the research. 
 
7.5.1 The model of trust and distrust in relationship development 
 
The model of trust and distrust in relationship development has been proposed mainly 
in the context of buyer-supplier relationships. The model suggests that a business 
relationship begins with a phase of neutrality which is a feeling of indifference. This is 
a phase in which trust rarely exists. The author’s findings suggest that the phase of 
neutrality (as on the model of trust and distrust in relationship development by Scheer 
2012) does not exist, in the banker-client relationship due to latter’s high dependency 
on trust. 
The inclusion of time is implied in Scheer’s model as it attempts to indicate the trust 
development from the phase of neutrality. The notion of time is subtle and is a matter 
of abstract implication. Thus, it ‘captures’ the development of trust till the level of 
“high trust”, and it gradually declines, and can be converted to “high distrust”. The 
findings of this thesis suggest that in an M&A bank(er)-client relationship, the 
evolution of trust continues till it reaches its zenith and then it is terminated. Since the 
model of trust and distrust in relationship development indicates that the relationship 
can prevail even when trust is absent, it is contrary to the author’s findings.  
Apart from that, the model of trust and distrust in relationship development 
investigates trust in a holistic and “unidimensional” way. According to Plank et al. 
(1999), to comprehend trust, a researcher needs to consider multiple facets of trust 
which are relevant to the research context. This thesis brings the multiple relevant 
facets of trust which are relevant to the M&A bank(er)-client relationship. Therefore, 
the findings draw a relatively ‘micro’ level comparison rather than that of the holistic 
‘macro’ level of the model of trust and distrust in relationship development.    
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7.5.2 Relationship life cycle 
 
The concept of RLC (Kusari et al. 2013) has been used as a part of the theoretical 
foundation for this thesis. All the interviewees unanimously agreed that the M&A 
bank(er)-client relationships follow the RLC. However, the bank(er)-client relationship 
curve does not go down gradually. If there is no trust in the relationship, the 
relationship is terminated. Therefore, the banker-client relationship reaches its top 
during the Maturitatem phase, before it is terminated. 
The next step after termination is the situation where the IB tries to mend the 
relationship and gain a spot back in the relationship facility of the client. The two 
situations described in the Maturitatem phase also point towards a complicated 
relationship. It argues that even if the relationship does not get terminated due to lack 
of trust, it might happen due to circumstances i.e. when the two entities split ways. 
This does not indicate that the relationship is terminated due to lack of trust as 
suggested by RLC. At the end of the Maturitatem phase, the client’s decision can 
indicates the entity he trusts most – the bank or the banker. Also, like Scheers’s model, 
RLC takes a holistic viewpoint on trust. These are a few aspects where the author’s 
findings are not coherent with the RLC. 
Apart from the generic similarities, there is another interesting circumstantial 
similarity which relates trust evolution to the RLC. Kusari et al. (2013) suggested that, 
while the relationship progresses from one stage of the RLC to another, the 
expectations, attitudes, and perceptions of the client can change. The example of 
Morgan Stanley cutting off the credit line and the client black boxing the IB suits the 
finding of Kusari et al (2013). The bank(er)-client relationship starts with generic 
expectations of good performance. But as the relationship progresses with time, the 
expectations of the client can gradually change. At the initial phases of the 





) which they like/want to be fulfilled. Based on the definition of trust in 
the literature review, it can be said that as the relationship progresses, the IB’s 
accountability increases along with the clients’ confidence. Hence the expectations 
change too. Keeping up with the expectations of understanding, empathy and 
responsiveness is crucial. 
The example also indicates that expectations of the clients changed and they expected 
Morgan Stanley to maintain the credit line as usual, although they were not using it.
 
This example also relates the phenomenon of trust evolution with the client’s 
definition of “best interests” which can change with time. This phenomenon points to 
the behavioural aspect of the client and echoes the findings of the scholars like Schurr 
& Ozanne (1985) and Singh & Sirdeshmukh (2000).  
 
7.6 Network approach, recommendation, and 3D negotiation 
 
In the literature review, the author has attempted to look at the research topic through 
the lens of network approach, and 3D negotiation theory. The concepts were applied 
from a pragmatic viewpoint to suit the research context.  
From a certain perspective, the application of network approach is viable since the 
M&A business is reliant on other organisations, which is one of the main essences of 
the network approach. Till now, the main focus of the network approach has been 
mainly the buyer-seller relationships. The findings of this doctoral project identify the 
importance of business networks in getting mandates. The author’s analysis indicates 
that having an efficient network is one of the very important qualities. A strong 
industrial network provides an added advantage in winning the mandates. Sometimes 
the IBs hire senior bankers to get access to their networks and to establish themselves 
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 Additional note: Bundled service is optional. It can help to get a mandate but might not be a pre-
requisite. This scenario regards the bundled service as an additional and optional service. 
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in specific sectors. The findings also show that having an efficient network adds to the 
market presence of the bank(er)s. Hence, the chances of getting a mandate are higher. 
The IBs use recommendations given by previous clients (i.e. use their existing network 
of clients) to ‘showcase’ their goodwill and efficiency. However, the “exact” idea of 3-
D negotiation (as indicated by Lax & Sebenius 2003) does not hold true, at least in the 
M&A context. The author’s findings show that recommendations can help with 
goodwill but the mandates are given usually on the basis of merit, and the client’s 
interpretation of the signals conveyed by the “infomediaries”. Therefore, the findings 
are in line with the works of Dasgupta (2000) and Swaminathan (2003). 
Recommendation from an influential third party helps with the initial level of 
confidence and the perception of trustworthiness, but one person who is not entirely 
related to the deal can rarely ‘facilitate’ the deal, which is one of the basic criteria of 
the 3D negotiation. In spite of providing the initial ‘edge’, recommendation and 
business networks are not sufficient to take the bank(er)-client relationship to the next 
level by escalating trust.  
 
7.7 Contractual trust and a phase of ‘neutrality’ 
 
In the literature review, the author addresses the existing literature (e.g. Barnett 1986; 
Sako 1997; Sako & Helper 1998; Coates IV 2015) which argues the importance of 
contracts and contractual trust. Barnett and Coates IV emphasize on contracts in 
general, and M&A contracts respectively while Sako focuses on contractual trust in a 
buyer-supplier relationship. In the buyer-supplier relationship context, the contractual 
trust plays an important role in trust development. However, the banker-client 
relationship is different because trust is “always non-contractual” in the relationship 
between big institutes. Contracts are important because they are “mandatory” due to 
the legal aspects. All the interviewees have been unanimous on the non-contractual 
aspect of trust in the banker-client relationships.  
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According to the findings of this thesis, trust in the relationship between the IBs and 
big corporates extends beyond contracts. The clauses covered in the contract are the 
set of basic expectations of a client from a big IB.  The contracts can be tailored from 
time to time but mandates are usually given on the basis of merit, not contractual trust. 
The contracts are looked upon as a legal requirement in deal-making. It is rather 
uncommon that a specific IB is getting a mandate from a big corporate only because 
they have a certain clause(s) covered in their contract.
195
  
The interviewees also unanimously expressed their concerns on the enforceability of 
the contracts. It is to the bank(er)s benefit that  he delivers according to the client’s 
expectations and build a long and trustworthy relationship with the client. The idea 
behind building a long relationship is to get more mandates from the client, which 
might not be easy if the bank(er) cannot meet the client’s expectations and build trust. 
Therefore, the findings go in accordance with Williamson's (1975, 1985) bounded 
rationality that trust is important in business and economics because human beings 
lack the capability of making perfect contracts. This also reflects the ethical 
perspective put forward by Suchanek (2016) which advocates trustworthy behaviour 
when one is given the ‘freedom’ to act otherwise.  
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 Additional note: The difference between the B2B and IB relationships are quite prominent in this 
context. The Marks & Spencer vs. Baird example (cited by Henneberg et al. 2007 and covered as a 
part of the literature review) suggests that tailored contracts can protect the interest of the clients (e.g. 
If the supplier does not deliver within the agreed time and the agreed quality, the buyer might actually 
put a compensation clause in the contract. Similarly, if the buyer does not pay as agreed, the seller’s 
rights can also be protected by the contract). In case of a tangible product where the quality can be 
measured, whereas; in M&A, it is difficult to measure the performance which is a relatively ‘abstract’ 
concept. The ‘key’ which the client holds is the payment of discretionary fees and the ‘promise’ of 
more mandates. The typical IB contracts focus on the payment if the deal is a success. The expected 
performance trust in case of a bank(er)-client relationship is the “perceived performance” which is 
difficult to cover in contracts. This phenomenon makes trust more important in these kinds of 
relationships and highlights the relational aspect. 
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7.8 Trust vs. reliance 
 
In the literature review, the author has cited the findings of  Harrison (2003) and 
Henneberg et al. (2007) which, in spite of recognising the importance of trust, 
advocate the importance of reliance over it. The research of these scholars has been 
conducted in the context of buyer-supplier relationships. The author of this doctoral 
thesis, found no evidence to imply that their findings hold true his the research context. 
The competition between the IBs to win the mandates is really high because Europe is 
“overbanked”. The big clients do not need to be reliant on a specific bank. If one of 
the IBs fails to deliver, there are multiple other banks with ‘equally strong’ goodwill 
which will be willing to replace their competitors
196
. The big clients usually have 
multiple dealings with multiple IBs (not necessarily on M&A context), as they prefer 




According to the findings of Harrison (2003) and Henneberg et al. (2007), there can be 
business transactions between parties based on reliance. Trust can be minimal or even 
absent. According to the author’s findings, M&A business cannot continue without 
trust due to the fact that the client will not give a mandate to a bank(er) whom he does 
not trust. Therefore, instead of reliance, trust is the core of investment bank(er)-client 
relationship. 
Thus, even though, this thesis is investigating the B2B side of the M&A business, the 
findings of Harrison (2003) and Henneberg et al. (2007) do not hold true in the context 
of the research.  
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 Therefore, it is irrelevant if the client is following a dominant bank model or a core group model.  
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 According to author’s findings supported by Eccles & Crane (1988) 
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Chapter VIII: Conclusion 
 
“Research is to see what everybody else has seen and to think what nobody else has 
thought.” 
- Albert Szent-Györgyi von Nagyrápolt 
The doctoral thesis “The evolution of trust in the relationship between an investment 
bank(er)s and their clients – An M&A perspective” is an attempt to lay a ‘stepping 
stone’ for trust research in IB. 
Due to the scarcity of industry-focused trust literature related to the research context, 
the author approached the research topic through the lens of general trust literature 
which has been applied in context to different industries. A number of theories have 
been used to find the answer to the research question, as well the sub-areas of research 
interest.  
The author has tried his best to consider all the relevant factors required to capture the 
phenomenon of trust evolution in an M&A investment bank(er)-client relationship. 
However, every investment banker-client relationship is unique in its own way. The 
experiences shared by the interviewees are based on their ‘map of the world’. This 
study has been conducted based on the data collected, and the theoretical lenses which 
were used to investigate the phenomenon of trust evolution. Therefore, in spite of his 
best efforts there are limitations, which are worthy of mention. 
The objective of this doctoral project is to contribute to the existing body of 
knowledge and to prepare a platform to ask the next best question. Thus, the author 
considers it as a part of his responsibility to conclude this thesis with its limitations 
and some of the opportunities for future research. 
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Limitations and future research 
“Have no fear of perfection – you will never reach it.” 
- Salvador Dali 
The doctoral thesis “The evolution of trust in the relationship between investment 
bank(er) s and their clients – An M&A perspective” deals with a dyad relationship 
between the investment bank(er)s and their clients. However, the interviews have been 
conducted with the investment bankers only. The author has not been able to reach out 
to the clients of the IBs. This can be regarded as a limitation, as well as a scope for 
future research because the client’s ‘story’ of trust evolution remains yet to be 
discovered.  
This thesis brings into consideration the big IBs and overlooks the small investment 
boutiques and the B2C side of the business. Therefore, the findings are valid for the 
relationships between the big IBs and their big clients only. In spite of the fact that 
there is limited scope for trust evolution in the B2C segment, it would be interesting to 
investigate the multiple facets of trust in banker-client relationships in comparatively 
smaller banks and investment boutiques. If M&A business is entirely based on trust, 
then for the small family business owners, buying/selling a company is a decision of a 
lifetime. Although not trust evolution, it would be interesting to know the rationales 
behind their trust on investment bankers and study their decision making process. 
Further investigation on the drivers of trust in M&A in a B2C context can also open 
new avenues of trust research. 
If trust is vital for business relationships, distrust can be responsible for breaking it. 
Therefore, if the issue of trust demands extensive research, so does the issue of 
distrust. The industry needs further research on the factors which lead to distrust, and 
can send a reputed IB into the “black box”. This will help them to focus on those 
factors and put emphasis on the client relationship issues specifically. This thesis has 
attempted to capture some of the important factors which can have an adverse effect 
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on trust evolution as a sub-area of interest. A more focused research on distrust would 
be value adding to both the industry and academia.  
The business relationships vary across the industries. The issue of trust demands not 
only industry-specific but also relationship specific research. This thesis skims through 
certain circumstances where trust was regained. It does not delve deep into the details 
because it is a contextual issue and sub-area of research interest. However, the author 
regards it as an important issue and believes that given the shape of a full-fledged 
research, it can add value to the state of art literature. 
The author’s sample consists of European bankers only. Therefore, the findings mainly 
reflect the region-specific process of trust evolution in investment banker-client 
relationship. The sample consists of the investment bank(er)s based in the UK and 
Germany only. So, the findings might not be valid for all the other countries.. Due to 
the difference in dynamics of business and the culture, all these countries demand 
separate country-specific trust research.  
Lastly, this thesis focuses only on the M&A side of the business which is one of the 
many business functions of the IB. The findings of this research might not hold true 
for the other business functions (e.g. Sales & Trading, Equity, Foreign Exchange and 
precious metals etc.). Therefore, the findings might not be applicable for other 
investment bank(er)-client relationships. This is a limitation as well an opportunity for 
future research. The findings of this thesis can be replicated to study trust in other 
investment banking relationships too. Researching the impact of scams and other 
factors responsible for the decline of trust, in different business divisions and areas 
might benefit both the academia and the IB industry. Thus, it can be said that the scope 
of trust research is ‘endless’, because  
“We know what we are, but not what we may be” 
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Appendix 1: A basic overview of the investment banking business 
Universal banks
198
 are massive organisations dealing with commercial and investment 
services by taking savings deposits, lending securities underwriting, market making, 
trading, and investment banking. “Investment banks were historically separated from 
commercial banks, and focused on advisory services for mergers and acquisitions, 
securities underwriting, asset management, and trading.” (Hurley et al. 2014 p. 349) 
The function of an IB is mediating the “flow of assets between issuers and investors” 
(p. 35). “Issuers” are the companies and other entities selling assets (e.g. stocks, bonds, 
parts or whole of companies). “Investors” are companies, governments, institutions 
and individuals who buy these assets
199
. However, the specialised functions of IBs can 
be carried out by commercial banks too. (Eccles & Crane 1988) 
The functions of investment banking include the main capital market activities. These 
activities include mergers and acquisitions, underwriting private placement, 
proprietary trading, market making, financial engineering, venture capital, clearing, 
settling, financing and money management (Liaw 1999).  
The IBs act as intermediaries between the buyers and sellers (Fleuriet 2008). They can 
work either on the buy side or on the sell side which is linked to another very 
important function of the IB i.e. to provide advisory service to their clients. The IBs 
provide advisory services to their clients and charge a commission in return. Usually, 
they do not share any legal or financial responsibilities for their services, be it trading 
activities or M&A deals or any other functions.  
 
                                                          
198
 The financial institutions which provide the combined services of IB, retail, and wholesale under 
the same umbrella, are called universal banks. e.g. Deutsche Bank, Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland, 
UBS (Switzerland) etc. 
199
 The issuers and investors can have direct transactions too but in most cases the exchanges take 
place through IBs 
183 
 
IBs can be divided into different parts depending on the bank. A generic subdivision
200
 
is as follows:Equities 
 Corporate center solutions 
 Sales and trading 
 Foreign exchange and precious metals 
Fleuriet (2008) pinpoints the main functions of IBs as follows: 
 Raising capital 
 Trading securities 
 Advising on corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
The following figure exemplifies some of the clients of the IBs 
 
Figure 13: Main entities in IB business 
Source: Self-illustration 
 
Some examples of IBs are UBS and Credit Suisse (Switzerland), Royal Bank of 
Scotland (UK), Deutsche Bank (Germany), HSBC, Citigroup, Bank of America, and 
JP Morgan Chase (USA), Societe Generale (France) and ING Bank (The Netherlands) 
(Hurley et al. 2014). Apart from these, there are the relatively small investment 
boutiques (e.g. Allen & Co., Cowen, Lazard, Perella, Weinberg Partners etc.).   
                                                          
200





Appendix 2: IDEC-Biogen case timetable 
The following case201 gives a general idea on the timespan of a merger. 
In the fall of the year 2002, the senior managements of IDEC and Biogen explored the 
probability of a strategic collaboration. IDEC approached Merrill Lynch who was their 
financial advisor to seek their advice on if the potential merger with Biogen or any 
other entity(s) would make sense.  
18
th
 December 2002, 
Merrill Lynch presented a preliminary analysis of the IDEC’s potential combination 
with Biogen. It covered the necessary background information about Biogen and the 
strategic rationales behind a combination. This analysis confirmed that the deal would 
be value adding which led the board to give a “go ahead” signal to the deal and start 
an expanded discussion with Biogen. The “expansion” of discussion included 
consultations with legal and financial advisors about the potential combination which 
continued until the end of the deal. The initial meetings between the delegates of the 
companies and their advisors focused on exchanging the information related to the 




 January 2003  
Biogen decided to retain Goldman Sachs as their strategic advisor for this deal. On 7
th
 
of February 2003, a meeting as a part of regularly scheduled meetings focusing on 
strategic rationales behind the potential business combination with Biogen and IDEC 
was held. 
 
                                                          
Additional note: This case was cited by Fleuriet (2008). The author referred to his works and 





 February 2003  
The two parties signed a non-disclosure agreement and the advisors of IDEC and 
Biogen met to exchange their information on financial status, products, and 
manufacturing operations. The two teams focused on the discussion on the potential 
combination which also included discussion related to the management organisation 
and structure. As the financial advisors presented their views to boards, the respective 
boards kept control of the discussions and kept on meeting at regular intervals 
(sometimes every 2-3 weeks).   
5
th
 March 2003 
The legal and financial advisors of IDEC met to discuss due diligence process and the 
topics, the possible structure and the financial terms for the potential combination. At 
the same time, IDEC’s executive management board took a tour of Biogen’s facilities 





 March 2003 
Members of IDEC and Biogen’s “certain” executive management met with certain 
other members for meetings focusing on the business combination and “ramifications 
of structuring the transaction as a merger of equals”
202
 ( p. 230). 
2
nd
 April 2003 
Each of the companies made a “data room” (with all financial, legal, economic and 
due diligence materials) available for the other party. 
                                                          
202
 On this context, it should be noted that a “merger of equals is a combination of two firms that have 
approximately the same premerger market capitalization” (Fleuriet 2008) and the ownership of the 
combined firm or the “new entity” are usually split 50/50 among the shareholders and is usually 




After this phase, the final phase i.e. the phase of negotiation regarding the pricing of 
the transaction began. Since this is a case of the merger it was about determining the 
exchange ratio. 
 April – end of May 
During this time, the respective advisors and the parties continued their due diligence 
and engaged in negotiations focusing on organisational issues and potential synergies 
as a result of this combination. The discussions also focused around the price, mode 
of payments and other aspects of the deal. Usually, the IBs play an important role in 
negotiation.  
Early June 
IDEC and Biogen negotiated the final terms of the merger agreement and agreed on a 
final share exchange ratio. After the respective approvals from the board of directors 
were taken, the merger agreement was finally executed on the 20
th









Appendix 3: The case of the merger of Daimler & Chrysler 
The case of “merger of equals” – Daimler and Chrysler, cited by Fleuriet (2008) is an 
example of the risks and vulnerabilities as well as the volumes of money associated 




 of May 1998, the merger between Daimler (the German makers of 
Mercedes-Benz luxury cars) and Chrysler Corporation (the American manufacturers of 
jeeps, minivans and Chrysler automobiles) was announced. The merger of the two 
automobile giants gave birth to a new giant in the automobile industry worth $155 
billion in sales. 
One of the key challenges faced by the automotive industry at that time was the 
problem of overcapacity which reduced the profitability of the manufacturers by 3-5%. 
The five global players in the automobile industry at that time were Volkswagen, Ford, 
Toyota, GM and the post-merger Daimler-Chrysler. The comparatively smaller players 
representing less than 25% of the market were PSA, Renault, Honda, Fiat and Nissan. 
The worldwide biggest players at that time were Ford and GM with almost 15% 
market share followed by Toyota which was at 10%. The post-merger phase witnessed 
DaimlerChrysler achieve an 8.4% of the worldwide market share. 
In the middle of January 1998, the CEO of Daimler-Benz Jürgen Schrempp met the 
CEO of Chrysler Robert Eaton at the Detroit International Auto Show and started 
discussions on the possibility of a potential business combination in the automotive 
industry worldwide. After the initial discussions between the ‘top bosses’ of these two 
companies (on 5th of February 1998), on potential consolidation of the complementary 
nature of their respective product lines and markets, they appointed their financial 
advisors. This is where the IBs became a part of the deal. 
188 
 
Daimler-Benz appointed Goldman Sachs and Chrysler appointed Credit Suisse First 




 of February to 
discuss the various transaction structures
203
 of the combined entity which continued 
for the next couple of weeks. The delegates agreed on the five following points 
 The merger will help to maximize value for the stockholders of both the 
companies. 
 It will make Chrysler’s U.S. stockholders go tax-free and will also be tax-
efficient for Daimler –Benz AG. 
 The post-merger governance structure will be based on the “merger of equals”. 
 The merger can be subject to “pooling of interests”204. 
 The combined entity will be a German stock corporation. 
On 2
nd
 March 1998, the two CEOs – Jürgen Schrempp and Robert Eaton met in 
Lausanne (Switzerland) for final discussions on governance and organisational 
structures of the combined entity. On 5
th
 of March1998, the Chrysler board was 
updated concerning the status of discussions (every two weeks thereafter). The 





to continue their discussions on the alternative transaction structures. 
Daimler-Benz and Chrysler along with their respective investment banking teams 
(Goldman Sachs and CSFB) met on 19
th
 of March to discuss the valuation issues.  
On 26
th
 of March 1998, Goldman Sachs and CSFB along with their clients met at the 
office of CSFB to finalise the discussions on valuations, working team progress, 
analyses structural issues and governance. The investment banking teams continued 
the discussion and the analyses on the ‘ideal’ combination structure from late March 
till the end of April. 
                                                          
203
 It involved different management, corporate and tax structures 
204
 This is an accounting method used in mergers. This is a tax-free method where the balance sheets 





 and the 6
th
 of May, the combination agreement and the transactions were 
approved unanimously by the Daimler-Benz and Chrysler board.  The final deal was 
signed on that very day late in the evening in London and was formally announced the 
















Appendix 4: Additional methodological approaches 
Grounded theory 
 
The concept of the grounded theory was first developed by Glaser & Strauss (1967) as 
a response to the sociologists’ questions which are relevant to understand human 
behaviour through the lens of quantitative research methods. The idea of the grounded 
theory is to develop a theory relating to a phenomenon/a which is being studied by the 
researcher (Trumbull 2005).  
The importance of grounded theory lies on the fact that human behaviour is “too 
complex to be relegated to basing analyses on averages and statistical manipulations” 
(p. 115) as human behaviour is developed by means of interaction with other 
individuals (Trumbull 2005). However, Trumbull (2005) points out that there are some 
controversies regarding the history and formation of the grounded theory. Since one 
utilizes the “symbols in one’s environment to construct the realities”, individuals are 
expected to become “active participants in the incoming situations” (p. 115). 
Based on the above-mentioned rationales, the theoretical notation of grounded theory 
was put forward by Glaser & Strauss (1967).  But, these two scholars split their way 
and adopted different viewpoints at a later stage. Trumbull (2005) points out that 
Glaser (1992) criticized the approach of Strauss and opined that the epicenter of the 
grounded theory is to develop a theory which is closely related to the phenomenon 
under the lens.  
However, Strauss & Corbin (1990) maintained their view that theory is supposed to be 
based on the data generated from sociology field. In spite of the controversy, scholars 
(e.g.: Stern 1994; Trumbull 2005) have recognized grounded theory as an important 
research tool. They pointed out that although there was a difference in opinions, both 
Glaser and Strauss produced similar scientific works but in different methods.  
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Creswell (1998) identified the following challenges faced by grounded theory 
researchers. 
1. A researcher needs to put aside his own biases to yield a substantive theory. 
2. Due to the inductive characteristic of this kind of research, the researcher needs 
to recognize that this approach is systematic in nature along with specific terms 
in terms of data analysis. 
3. It may be difficult to determine when a certain category/s is saturated or a 
certain theory/s is detailed enough. 
4. The primary outcome of these kinds of study results in specific components 
(e.g. a central phenomenon, consequences, strategies, contexts and conditions 
as pointed out by (Trumbull 2005)).  These components are “the prescribed 
categories of information in the theory” (Trumbull 2005 p. 116). 
Patton (2002) opines that grounded theory is generated from field work emerging from 
the interviews and observation of the researcher in the so-called real world rather than 
in the laboratory. The researcher’s objective is to include the appropriate data (from 
data sources like interviews, observations and field visits if applicable) and come up 
with postulates and hypotheses developing and integrating the analysed data. 
Combining these factors, the researcher paints a “visual picture” (Trumbull 2005) of 
the theory under consideration (Creswell 1998).    
The normative conceptual framework of trust evolution in bank(er)-client relationship 
is not based on primary data. Due to the scarcity of industry and relationship-specific 
trust research, the framework has been built based on the existing literature and 
situational analyses. 
Therefore, reflecting on the research design and the works of scholars like Creswell 
(1998); Patton (2002), Trumbull (2005), Glaser (1992) and Glaser & Strauss (1967), it 




Case study research 
 
Yin (2014) defines case study as the “empirical inquiry” which “investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real world context” (p. 16) in which 
there is a blurred boundary between the context and the phenomenon. It is used in 
situations where the researcher wants to contribute knowledge regarding social, 
political, group, individual, organisational or other related phenomena. It has been a 
popular research method in the fields of psychology, anthropology, political science, 
business and education (Yin 2014).  
Case study copes with different sorts of technically distinctive situations with more 
variables of concern compared to the data points by relying on evidence from multiple 
sources and converging the data “in a triangulating fashion”. Case study research 
“benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions” and guides the data 
collection and analysis. It “comprises of an all-encompassing method – covering the 
logic of design, data collection techniques, and specific approaches to data analysis”. 
(Yin 2014 p. 17) 
Case study research is relevant if the research questions which ‘“seek to explain some 
present circumstance e.g. “how” or “why” some social phenomenon works”’ (p. 4) and 
if the research question demands an extensive in-depth description. (Yin 2014)  
Case studies can be classified into different types (Trumbull 2005; Yin 2014). It is “an 
exploration of a bounded system” (Trumbull 2005) as it is bounded by restricted time 
frame and place and is mainly used in sociological studies (Trumbull 2005).  
It is up to the researcher to set the thresholds and conditions to study a certain 
phenomenon/a. Case study research includes single as well as multiple case studies. 
Therefore, a case study researcher has the option of choosing either single-site or a 
multi-site research design. In single-site design or the intrinsic case study a certain 
“unique aspect of a case study can be investigated or an instrumental case study which 
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emphasizes on a certain issue or issues to be explored” (Trumbull 2005; Stake 1995).  
On the other hand, the multi-site design or collective case study includes multiple 
cases (Trumbull 2005). 
Case study research method could have been appropriate for the research. However, 
given the following circumstances, this research method has been ruled out. 
Access to the data: As an ex-employee of UBS Investment bank, the researcher can 
confirm that the rules and regulations of any IB prevent all the employees from talking 
about client relationships to any outsider. To build rich case studies, a case study 
researcher needs access to specific data related to clients. The numbers might be 
available from the public domain but it would be difficult to study the evolution of 
trust from those data. Realistically, getting rich data might be impossible due to these 
strong regulations. 
On context to the research: As explained in the previous chapters, there are multiple 
types of M&A deals in multiple different sectors. This makes the dynamics of the 
relationship more complicated. This thesis attempts to focus on the generic pattern of 
trust evolution in M&A irrespective of the type of deals and the industries. 
Considering, one specific sector could restrict the findings to that particular sector 
only, while, considering multiple sectors could digress the findings and make them 
good enough for none of the sectors. In a nutshell, there is a risk that findings could 
digress too much to be significant for one of the sectors. This might not be sufficient to 
answer the research question. 
Hermeneutics 
 
According to (Trumbull 2005), hermeneutic researchers apply QR to find the meaning 
of “what people do on a contextual basis”. This study is related to the study of written 
texts. Thus, the narrative analysis includes “in-depth interviews, life histories and 
memoirs” (p. 114) as “there is a relationship between a listener’s comprehension and 
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literary-historical analysis” (p. 114). The hermeneutic study also supports the 
combination of reading the text and finding the intentions and the significance of the 
appearances of the respondents. (Trumbull 2005) 
This combination enables the researcher to find the “central meaning and unity” which 
helps in comprehending the “substance and essence” of the research. The hermeneutic 
study is a circular process through which prejudices can be rectified or eliminated and 
reach “scientific understanding”. (Patton 2002; Trumbull 2005) 
The doctoral thesis demands a double hermeneutic approach due to the complexity of 
the relationship under the lens. 
Ethnography 
 
Ethnography can be defined as the “description interpretation of a cultural or social 
group or system” ( Harris 1968 as on Trumbull 2005 p. 116).In this methodology, a 
researcher investigates a group’s patterns of behaviour and ways of life, as observable 
(Trumbull 2005). Over the years, this approach has been modified to cover different 
aspects of human behaviour and a variety of social science fields. An ethnographic 
researcher observes individuals in a variety of interactive settings and uses the it to 
generate themes and patterns from the data (Spradley 1980; Trumbull 2005).   
The data in ethnographic studies are gathered from observations, interviews, cultural 
themes etc. Intense field work is required for this kind of study. The challenge of the 
researcher is to find the individuals who are aware of the issues and are capable of 
helping the researcher with snowballing (Wolcott 1994). 
Ethnographic researcher should be well acquainted with the understanding of the topic 
which is being researched. Collecting data and analysing it can be time consuming. 




Appendix 5: Questionnaire 
Name:        Rank: 
Organisation:       Interview location:                                                            
Icebreaker round 
1. For how long have you been working as a banker in the IB industry/ with bank 
X? 
2. Have you been working with bank X throughout or you have worked with other 
banks before? Can you please tell me about your background? 
3. What kind of M&A deals are you specialised in?  
4. Approximately, how many clients did you visit till date? Can you please give 
me a rough figure? 
5. When was the first time you actually met a client? How? Can you please 
describe your first experience of meeting a client? 
Early stages of the relationship 
6. Can you please tell me if there is a difference between dealing with old & new 
clients? (e.g. when you are acting as door opener & when you are dealing with 
existing clients?) What difference did you notice?  
7. Did you experience a shift in trust (because you represent a certain bank) while 
dealing with existing clients? 
8. What was the positioning of the old clients when you visited them? Did trust 
(towards the bank/your predecessor) already exist or was it a feeling of 
indifference? 
9. Did the trust on the bank/your predecessor or both get transferred to you? 
10. What are the difficulties you faced / face when you try to do business with a 
client for the first time when you actually started taking care of deals by 
yourself? Did you ever feel that the clients were having issues with trust? 
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11. Given the fact, that the results of M&A are sometimes uncertain in IB did you 
ever have the feeling that the clients are hesitant to trust your judgement at the 
early stages of the relationship?  
12. Do you think that the clients are hesitant to trust you with their deals because 
they are apprehensive that you are more ‘employer-centric’ rather than 
‘customer-centric’ (Especially in the early stages)? 
13. What are the main issues you faced at the early stages of the relationship? It 
would also be great if you can share some stories 
14. Given your track record, I reckon you have been converting deals since you 
early days. What would you regard as your USP at the early stages of the 
relationship? What do you think did the trick – your personal charisma or the 
brand name of your employer or circumstances or all?  
Mid-stage of the relationship 
15. Would I be wrong if I say that some of your relationships with the 
(innumerable) clients you have dealt with matured in due course of time, some 
continued for a certain period of time while the others had a premature death?  
16. Why/How do you think this happened?  
17. Can you please share some stories about the journey from this initial phase (….) 
to the next phase where you and your clients were relatively more familiar with 
each other? Let us call it a courtship phase. How did the transformation take 
place? 
18. In your long and decorated career as a banker do you have clients whom you 
would like to term as “loyal clients”?  By “loyal” clients, I mean clients who 




Focusing on loyal clients 
19.  
i) Let us take a loyal client of yours. If you want you can withhold the 
name. For how many years have you been sharing this business 
relationship?  
ii) Did this client move his investments when you changed employers? (if 
applicable) 
iii) How and when did you meet this client? Can you please tell me about 
the first meeting? 
iv) So, from the first day, you have come all this way. Why do you think 
this client put his trust in your judgement for all these years? 
v) Can you please tell me the story about this relationship till date? How 
did it evolve with time esp during the crisis phases? By “crisis”, I mean 
the financial downturn, scams etc. What are the challenges did you face 
at different stages? 
vi) If you are asked to subdivide this relationship into different phases, what 
would they be and why? Do you think that the relationship has evolved 
like a lifecycle – introduction, growth, maturity and so on? 
vii) Can you please take me down your memory lane and tell me the first 
experience of meeting to how trust grew with time? Here, I am asking 
about your perception exclusive of any other factors like ROI / financial 
crisis, scams etc. It would be great if you back up your perceptions with 
events or stories. 
viii) Given the fact that you have a successful and long-running business 
relationship, do you think that this client is so much dependent / reliant 
upon you because of your personal relation/performance or any other 
factor that you are his first and last option when it comes to investments? 
e.g.: Some people always look for better deals while the others are a bit 
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defensive and prefer to stay in long relationships. Some people, on the 
other hand, are so ‘money driven’ that they value money over personal 
relationships.  
ix) What factors would you regard as the drivers of the long lasting 
relationship between you and your ‘loyal’ client? 
20. Did your job switching have an impact upon your relationships with your 
(loyal) clients? If yes, how?  
21. Can trust be so strong that the clients will follow a specific banker from one 
bank to another? 
22. Do you think the controversies surrounding your employers might have affected 
your relationships with clients? If yes, how? If no, why do you think it didn’t 
affect the relationship? Can you please share some experiences? 
23. What would you regard as the top 5 drivers of trust? 1 being the most and 5 
being the least important? 
24. Can you list 5 factors which you view as potential threats to the future of this 
relationship?  
25. We all know about the market turmoil during the financial crisis. All the 
investment banks suffered from the issue of trust during this phase. How did/do 
you tackle a situation of diminished trust with loyal clients?  
26. Is there any way to compensate for the loss of trust? When I talk of 
“compensation”, I mean from your side (if you had a fruitful relationship with a 
certain client) as well as your employer’s side? 
27. Is it possible to regain trust? Both on a personal level and the organisational 
level. 
28. Would you agree to the saying “Time heals all the injuries”? If yes, how much 
time do you think is required to regain the lost trust? When I talk of regaining 




Appendix 6: Additional sampling methods 
Random sampling 
 
Random sampling is really well defined and rigorous but this technique is not 
appropriate for descriptive studies because studying a random sample helps to 
generalize the results to a certain population “but is not the most effective way of 
developing an understanding of complex issues relating to human behaviour” 
(Marshall 1996 p. 523).  
The sample sizes of qualitative researches are smaller. Even if the sample size is 
representative, the sampling error of a small sample would be so large that biases are 
bound to occur. In order to select a truly random sample, the “characteristics under the 
study of the whole population should be known” (p. 523) which is almost impossible 
in the complex qualitative study (Marshall 1996).  
Marshall (1996) points out “random sampling of a population is likely to produce a 
representative sample only if the research characteristics are normally distributed 
within the population. There is no evidence that the values, beliefs, and attitudes that 
form the core of qualitative investigation are normally distributed, making the 
probability approach inappropriate” (p. 523). 
Lastly, qualitative researchers believe that some respondents are better than others and 
thus are expected to “provide insight and understanding” on the research context. 
However, sociologists have well recognized that everyone is not equally good at 
observing, comprehending and interpreting their own and other people’s behavior. The 
choice of a random person is therefore not prudent on the research context (Marshall 
1996). e.g. If a person who does not drink whiskey regularly is included in a sample to 
study “the invigorating effect of drinking whiskey at the end of the day”, the value 
addition might be limited.  
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The research context demands a specific type of sample focusing on the M&A 
business. Moreover, based on the above-mentioned reasons, Marshall (1996) goes a 
step forward and opines that Random sampling is not appropriate for qualitative 




This is the “least rigorous” technique because it involves the selection of the most 
convenient and accessible subjects. It requires least effort, money and time because the 
researcher is choosing the samples on the basis of his own convenience. This may 
yield poor quality data unless a thoughtful approach is adopted (Marshall 1996). In the 
case of research topics where data collection is tedious, convenience sampling may 
prove to be quite helpful. 
However, convenience sampling would not be ideal for this thesis because this 





















All Descriptions of association examples: 
“There might be other cases where senior 
executives, they take so much trust & 
relationship capital into one or a few senior 
bankers that it becomes very important.”  
“He left & suddenly the clients said okay 
guys nice to have worked with you but we 
actually want to work with Paul.” 
(identified as Code I preceding Code II) 
“…clients have worked with him for a long 
time & they trust him…” 
“In Germany when it comes from Sie 
(formal) to Du (informal), it is a good sign” 
(identified as  the advent of Code I) 
“…because these individuals are trusted i.e. 
trust linked to a person which they bring 
with them…” 
Associated words & phrases: very personal 
level of trust, interpersonal relationships & 
trust, trust to a certain person, mandate 
decisions are made on a more personal basis, 




II Company trust All Descriptions of association examples: 
“…it is literally the brand name, certain 
reputation...e.g. sector experience or product 
knowledge,  
you will have a significant influence of the 
brand perception of your bank or the 
franchise”  (identified as Code V causing 
Code II)  
“Lehmann Brothers went bust because 
people did not trust them”  
“….that affected the reputation of MS in 
Germany….” (context specific) 
“As you can imagine that the client was 
pretty unhappy about it & took it as 
withdrawing the trust relationship” (context 
specific) 
“Face might change but…I am convinced 
that he will only do what is good for me” 
(context specific) 
“This is interesting because it is not a 
conflict between a client and a banker but 
between the client and the bank and 
ultimately it’s you who have to deal with it. 




Associated words & phrases: institutional 
trust, trust in the bank/institution, trust on 
company/bank reputation 
III Product trust All Descriptions of association examples: 
“…for certain capabilities like for example 
global reach or the capability to provide a 
team close to their office location…”  
“…you have this company which cannot be 
sold by that…”  
Associated words: trust on; delivery, service 
delivery, advice/suggestion, transaction, 




All Descriptions of association examples: 
“…you will have a significant influence of 
the brand perception of your bank or the 
franchise…on performance trust”  
“I would say recommendations based on 
previous performances are worth much more 
than that….& we are actually using those 
references. If we pitch to a client with whom 
we haven’t worked before, we would 
normally include a page of former clients 
with whom we have worked very well & tell 
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that you can call up these guys & ask about 
our performance”. (identified as generating 
Code IV) 
“…those types of things which you need to 
deliver & those types of things are often 
very much the hard facts…” 
Associated words & phrases: trust on; 
Smoothness/duration of the 
process/transactions, competent, 
performance, consistency of service, 
competency, good execution, structuring the 
deal, professional(ism) etc. 
V Goodwill trust  All Descriptions of association examples: 
“…say reputation is extremely important to 
the banks Especially for the big 
institutions…” 
“If you take Goldman or Morgan Stanley or 
even UBS for certain transactions, it does 
not matter so much in the end because of the 
goodwill.” 
“I would say that they come to JPM because 
of the brand JPM....I would say probably 
80% because of the brand…the goodwill…” 
“You stay articulated with the brand...you 




Associated words & phrases: trust on; the 
goodwill of the bank, goodwill, institutional 






















Appendix 8: PJT Partners and trust evolution 
Paul J Taubman, a veteran high-profile banker, worked with Morgan Stanley for 30 
years. He advised on multi-billion dollar transactions including a $184 billion deal 
which created AOL Time Warner back in 2000. He has been known to advise in a 
number of other big and reputed corporates (e.g. Concords, Cablevisions etc.) too. In 
2013, this 55-year banker lost a ‘power struggle’ and decided to quit his job with 
Morgan Stanley.  
When Morgan Stanley approached Taubman’s clients (Concords, Warner Bros. among 
others), they found out that the clients are more interested in doing business with 
Taubman rather than doing business with the bank. The clients ‘trusted’ Taubman 
more than they trusted the bank. These clients later on mandated Taubman as an 
individual to work on these mega deals (one of them ranging up to $20 billion) and 
hired him as their lead M&A advisor. 
Paul J Taubman founded PJT Partners in 2013. The business experienced such a 
massive growth that he had to merge with Blackstone’s advisory businesses that year 
itself. Their combined units began trading on the 1
st
 of October 2013. Paul was the 
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 of July 2012, an investigation on the allegation of breach of trust was 
conducted against the former prime minister of Baden-Württemberg Stefan Mappus of 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and his friend Dirk Nothais who was the head of 
Morgan Stanley in Germany.  
The issue of the state government’s repurchase of shares of Energie Baden-
Würrtemberg (EnBW), which was Germany’s third largest power company at that 
time, from the French energy group Electricité de France (EDF) was at the eye of the 
maelstrom. Reputed personalities like ex-Finance Minister Willi Stächele and former 
state minister Helmut Rau were also involved in the controversy.  
Notheis was a childhood friend of Stefan Mappus and he talked him into what 
appeared to be a putsch without going through the process of getting the transaction 
sanctioned by the parliament. In December 2010, Mappus shocked state parliament of 
Baden-Würrtemberg by informing them that the state has repurchased 45% stake in 
EnBW from EDF for EUR 4.67 billion. According to the reports by Stuttgarter 
Zeitung, the government paid was EUR 840 million higher than what its original 
worth. 
Morgan Stanley came under fire as they were in charge of the deal and pulled off a fee 
of EUR 12.8 million with additional VAT. The deal was criticized by the oppositions 
as “unconstitutional” and “illegal”.  
The mail chain, later revealed to the parliamentary committee, was found to be fairly 
controversial
207
 too.   
                                                          
206
 Sources: Interview and The Economist 2012 and Nesan (2012) 
207
 Notheis wrote to Mappus  
“You will get calls from various banks (...) they will urge that they get the mandate. You have to reject 
everything and say that you have already received a complete technical briefing.” 
After analysing the emails, Stuttgarter Zeitung wrote  
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The most serious allegation against Morgan Stanley was that they advised both the 
state as well as EDF which was illegal due to the conflicts of interests. They also 
undertook commercial operations with themselves at the expense of the state i.e. they 
were employed by both EDF as well as Stefan Mappus. On behalf of Morgan Stanley 
in France, Rene Proglio who was the twin brother of EDF CEO Henri Proglio was 
involved in this multi-billion Euro deal. Proglio kept Notheis updated about the 
developments at EDF. 
The gravity of Morgan Stanley’s unethical role became more controversial as it 
seemed that they made very little or no efforts to negotiate on the price
208
. 
Investigations also unveiled the instances of illegal information sharing
209
.  
These were very serious allegations. Firstly, Morgan Stanley executed the deal 
illegally and secondly, they did not negotiate the price i.e. they were working on their 
own interests not the interest of their client
210
. Although later on Barclays Capital 
supported
211
 the price but that could not rule out Morgan Stanley’s conflict of interest. 
The lawyers of EDF were hesitant about the deal initially due to the lack of cabinet 
decision in Stuttgart. At that time, Notheis ‘played his cards’ and convinced them that 
the ministerial approval was a “mere formality” and in the 50-year history of Baden-
Württemberg parliament, it had never been called for.  The “breach of trust 
accusations report” drawn by the State Audit Office stated  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
“Notheis’ role, as reflected in the mail, went far beyond that of an investment banker. He was the 
director of the deal, he wrote the screenplay, and he also took care of the political strategy. Mappus, 
on the other hand, appears as a willing apprentice to the great master, almost like a talking doll, 
repeating pre-formulated sentences.” 
208
 The IBs charge a percentage of the total value of the transaction & hence it was not only conflict of 
interest but also a breach of trust. 
209
 Frankfurter Allegemeine am Sonntag quoted a mail from Notheis to Rene Proglio -  
“…your brother has already agreed to EUR 40 which, as we know, is more than rich.” 
210
 It would be interesting to think that the IBs get paid a percentage of the total transaction. Therefore, 
it was in line with the interest of Morgan Stanley that they do not negotiate for lower price.  
211
 Barclays’ revaluation was challenged too, because, according to some analysts it was so hedged 
that it did not carry enough value. 
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 “The audit has shown that in the pre-contractual phase the process substantially 
failed to meet the requirements of the state’s constitution and financial regulations.” 
The mail chain revealed that Notheis “used” Mappus’ political influence stating that he 
could appeal to Angela Merkel
212
 - the Chancellor of Germany to make a call to Elysee 
Palace because he controlled 30% of the CDU delegates. He also put pressure to get 
the deal done by the end of 2010. 
The whole parliament was deliberately kept in the dark on this deal which included 
Mappus’ finance minister too. By the 6
th
 of December 2010, the deal was executed. 
However, when the anomalies saw the light of the day, both Mappus and Morgan 
Stanley were at the centre of the controversy.  
In October 2011, the state court of Baden-Wüttemberg ruled that the repurchase of the 
EDF shares were “unconstitutional”, because Mappus bypassed the parliament.  
In the meantime, the state election of Baden-Württemberg was drawing near. Mappus 
was at the eye of the storm as he faced protests for his next venture Stuttgart 21
213
. His 
attempt to resurrect his image through the EnBW deal failed miserably as he lost the 
election on the 27
th




This deal saw Morgan Stanley sail past their rivals Goldman Sachs and emerge at the 
top of European league table for M&As. However, the controversy did some initial 
damage on the clients’ trust and Morgan Stanley’s reputation and goodwill. They were 
                                                          
212
 In one of the mails she was referred as “Mutti” (means “Mother” in German) which triggered 
further controversies.  
213
 It was concerned with building a new rail station and line in Stuttgart 
214
 This example also elaborates on why politician/governments are sensitive on the issues of financial 
corruption. 
Additional note: The Economist (2012) points out that “the business prospects for EnBW changed 
dramatically after the nuclear accident at Fukushima in March 2011 and the German government's 
decision to exit from nuclear power. Two of EnBW's four nuclear power stations were immediately 
shut down. EnBW's shares, which barely traded, were then at around EUR33.” 
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sent to a “black box” for a while as the clients lost trust in the bank because they were 
considered ‘guilty’ of “breach of trust”. 
The situation, however, improved after State Attorney withdrew the investigations 
without any obligations in October 2014 and Mappus and his associates were cleared 
of all charges. It helped Morgan Stanley to recover from the shock. However, Notheis 
had to leave the bank after the German financial market regulator communicated to 






Appendix 10: Transcripts 
Due to confidentiality issues the transcripts of the interviews has not been published. 
Please contact the author for details.  
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